ASSEMBLING AND REASSEMBLING THE STATE:
A RELATIONAL PROCESSUAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE MODERN STATE AND GLOBALIZATION

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Warning:
This "paper" is nearly 45,000 words long.

It comes, though, with a Table of Contents.
And if you open Bookmarks in Acrobat you can navigate with them.

In addition, the last paragraph on the first page (p. 3)
offers some suggestions for making the amount of reading more manageable.

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How we understand globalization is inescapably entwined with our understanding of the preceding era of the modern state. Barry Buzan and Richard Little exaggerate when they speak of a "near universal consensus" on a sixteenth-century origin of the modern state.[1] That dating, though, is indeed the norm in IR.[2]

In this story, a new kind of polity begins to appear in medieval Europe, takes on a recognizably modern form in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and comes to full fruition in the nineteenth century. Then, in the late twentieth century, half a millennium of fundamental political continuity is radically disrupted by globalization (and the associated decline of the state).

"Relationalists" would describe this account as "substantialist:" it sees the modern state as a distinctive kind of thing that develops across time but remains essentially that thing (until its demise). My alternative account employs the relational and processual frame of assemblages.

In this telling, medieval political assemblages were indeed fundamentally reconfigured in the late-fifteenth, sixteenth, and early-seventeenth centuries. These new polities, however, were a type in their own right, not incomplete instantiations or stages in the development of the modern state. They were succeeded by "absolutist" or fiscal-military states in the late-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The modern state was still a different type of (nineteenth- and twentieth-century) political assemblage. And globalization is generating still new political forms through reconfigurations comparable to those that have repeatedly taken place over the past several centuries.

The standard story confuses chronological succession with development or evolution. That A preceded B, which preceded C, which preceded D need not imply that A or B – or even C – was leading to D. Stops at R and S on the way to T do not make R and S stages in the development of T. That x and y are used in J and then in K does not make J an early form of K. And evolution, rather than gradually realize a thing essentially or embryonically present from the start, creates new things that are linked by historical succession. (Chimpanzees are not an early form of humans. They are a different kind of creature from which we evolved.)

This "paper" is hopelessly overlong. Each section, however, can be read, skimmed, or skipped as your interests (and patience) dictate. Part One (§§1-3) lays out essential terms of reference. Part Two (§§4-10) examines the differences between early modern polities and modern states. Part Three (§§11-14) uses the early modern case to sketch a broader vision of historical change, which Part Four (§0) applies to globalization. Many readers will find these last two Parts of greatest interest. Therefore, if the historical material becomes "too much," skip or skim until §10, which summarizes and concludes my account of the case – which the following sections situate in an analytical framework of broad general interest for IR.

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[1] (Buzan and Little 1996, 408). Prominent exceptions include (Rosenberg 1994), (Reus-Smit 1999), (Teschke 2003), (Nexon 2009).

[2] See, for example, (Nye 1990, 183), (Held 1991, 202), (Ruggie 1993, 166), (Porter 1994, 22 [electronic edition]), (Hirst and Thompson 1995; 2001, 46-49ff.), (Anderson 1996, 18-21), (Philpott 2001, 12), (Spruyt 2002, 128-134), (Fukuyama 2004, 1), (Nolan 2004, 78), (Nardin 2006, 455), (Sutch and Elias 2007, 44), (Polat 2010, 331), (Tickner 2011, 6), (Bierstecker 2013, 246), (Kadercan 2013/2014, 123), (Mazzuca and Munck 2014, 1223, 1224), (Antonsich 2017, ???).

PART ONE: CONCEPTUAL PRELIMINARIES

I begin by introducing the ideas of relationalism, processualism, and assemblages and situating the standard model of the modern state in a typology of political systems. Lacking the space to defend these framings, I simply state them here – and then try to demonstrate their utility in the case study.

1 Relationalism and Processualism

"Relationalism"[3] stresses the interconnections of the things of the world (rather than their substantiality and separateness). Relationalists think of the world as made up more of configurations (of things) than of things (that stand in various relations).

Relationalists oppose themselves to what they call "substantialism," which

> maintains that the ontological primitives of analysis are "things" or entities – entities exist before interaction and all relations should be conceived as relations between entities. Relationalism, on the other hand, treats configurations of ties … between social aggregates of various sorts and their component parts as the building blocks of social analysis.[4]

Relationalists, of course, do not deny the reality or importance of substances and things. Rather, they deny that "things" are essentially substantial or exist prior to (or remain fundamentally independent of) relations. Relationalism rejects the idea of persistent pre-existing entities; of "pre-given units such as the individual or society."[5]

"Stuff" (substance) becomes things only when arranged in specific ways. The things of the world are the things that they are – are *real things* – not because of substance alone (or even necessarily primarily) but in part (and essentially) through the internal relations of their parts and their relations to other (relational) things.

Relationalism is also anti-essentialist.[6] "Every so-called essence appears as a dense bundle of relations."[7] An entity is what it is "not, as with classically conceived substance, through its continuing ('essential') properties, but by its history … [Its identity] is constituted through its characteristic patterns of sequential occurrence."[8] "The question of what something is becomes one of the relational configurations within which it is embedded."[9]

Processes are so central to "relationalism" that Patrick Jackson and Daniel Nexon, in their seminal call for a relational IR, not only label their perspective "processual relationalism"[10] but argue that "a p/r [processual relational] approach holds that processes *are* the most fundamental elements of

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[3] (Jackson and Nexon 1999) is the seminal programmatic statement in IR. (McCourt 2016) is an excellent recent overview. In Sociology, where the perspective is most highly developed, (Emirbayer 1997) is classic.

[4] (Jackson and Nexon 1999, 291-292). Cf. (Emirbayer 1997, 281), (McCourt 2016, 478-479), (Adler-Nissen 2015, 285-286, 288, 290-295).

[5] (Emirbayer 1997, 287).

[6] For example, (Fuchs 2001) frames what is usually called "relationalism" as *Against Essentialism*. Cf. (Tilly 1998, ch. 1 esp. 17-21), (Jackson and Nexon 1999, 293, 295, 300, 301, 307, 321 n. 18) (Emirbayer 1997, 282, 283, 285, 286, 292, 295 n. 34, 308).

[7] (Powell 2013, 205).

[8] (Rescher 2000, 26).

[9] (McCourt 2014, 36).

[10] Cf. (Abbott 2007 [1996], 2-3).

reality."[11] I agree – and suggest on this basis that the perspective is better understood as "relational processualism," using process as the noun; a *processual* approach that emphasizes relations.

"Process" is understood here in the ordinary language sense of "a continuous and regular action or succession of actions occurring or *performed in a definite manner*, and *having a particular result* or outcome."[12] As Jackson and Nexon nicely put it, a process is a "linked set of occurrences or events which produce a 'change in the complexion of reality'."[13]

The things of a processual world do not merely emanate from processes. They *are* "complex bundles of coordinated processes."[14] A human being, for example, is not so much "a" "substantial" "thing" as a complex assemblage of physical, chemical, biological, psychological, sociological, and ecological processes. And this is true all the way down to the subatomic level. "Instead of very small things (atoms) combining to produce standard processes (windstorms and such), modern physics envisions very small processes (quantum phenomena) combining to produce standard things (ordinary macro-objects)."[15]

Both "things" and "relations" *are* (manifestations of) stabilized processes. And relations and relata are inseparably linked. As Jackson and Nexon put it "descriptions of an object as a 'substance' and descriptions of that object as a 'bundle of processes and relations' are complementary, in that neither exhaust[s] the object itself."[16] More precisely, "things" and "relations" are complementary fundamental dimensions or expressions of processual reality; two kinds of (or perspectives from which to view) ontologically primitive processes.

"Things" *are* other "things" arranged in particular ways. (Water is hydrogen and oxygen related in particular ways. Bureaucracies are complex assemblages of (among other things) offices, office holders, and administrative technologies.) Conversely, there are no relations without relata. (You can't connect, arrange, or relate nothing.)   The world is made up of more or less stable "relations" of more or less stable "things," which are separable only analytically, not ontologically (both relations and things being types of stabilized processes).

Because substantialism both has dominated Western philosophy since the Greeks and is the norm in the contemporary social sciences,[17] remedial attention to relations certainly is warranted. But "relationalism," understood literally, is as one-sided as "substantialism." *Relational processualism*, by contrast, shifts the focus to relations in a way that is not ontologically problematic. It understands

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[11] (Jackson and Nexon 1999, 314 [emphasis in original]). (Rescher 1996, 2000) outlines a philosophical perspective that supports this view.

[12] *Oxford English Dictionary* [emphasis added]. In the (now rare) sense of "that which goes on or is carried on" (*Oxford English Dictionary*) a process need not occur in a definite manner or have a particular result. (Anything that occurs might, in this broader sense, be considered a process.) In the (standard) sense that I employ, however, there must be a certain kind of order to a process.

[13] (Jackson and Nexon 1999, 302). The quoted passage is from (Rescher 1996, 38).

[14] (Rescher 2000, 9). Cf. (Rescher 1996, 46 ("clusters of actual or potential processes"), 51 ("manifolds of process")).

[15] (Rescher 2000, 13). Cf. (Rescher 2000, 12): "at the level of the very small there are no ongoing things (substances, objects) at all in nature … Matter in the small … is not a Rutherfordian planetary system of particle-like objects but a collection of fluctuating processes organized in stable structures (insofar as there is stability at all) by statistical regularities of comportment at the level of aggregate phenomena."

[16] (Jackson and Nexon 1999, 292).

[17] On independent-variable correlational analysis as substantialist, see, very briefly, (Emirbayer 1997, 286). (Abbott 1988, 1998, 2007 [1996]) provides a more extended argument.

relations not as ontological primitives but as the dimension of processual reality on which, for substantive explanatory reasons, analytical attention is focused.

Jackson and Nexon, employing a formulation common among "relationalists," call sets of relata *configurations*.[18] The noun "configuration" points to the "arrangement of parts or elements in a particular form."[19] The verb "configure" stresses process. Configurations are the result of processes of configuring, of "fashion[ing] by combination and arrangement."[20] They are things that hang together, with the emphasis on the hanging together.

For example, a configurational understanding of *states-in-a-states-system* sees "states" and "states systems" neither as separate "things" nor as "things" (units) and "relations" (structures) but as interrelated elements or dimensions of a particular configuration. There are no "states systems" without "states." And these "states" *are*, in a fundamental sense, parts of a states system.

Thus understood, relational processualism focuses on configuring configurations that configure.

2 Assemblages

Configurational analysis in IR (and the social sciences more broadly) employs a variety of frames, including networks,[21] fields,[22] systems,[23] and complexity.[24] Here I will use assemblages.[25]

Assemblages are perhaps most readily understood as a class of systems. Understanding systems as wholes that have distinct identities and emergent properties (that is, properties not reducible to

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[18] (Jackson and Nexon 1999, 292, 304).

[19] *Oxford English Dictionary.*

[20] *Oxford English Dictionary.*

[21] (Avant and Westerwinter 2016) and (Kahler 2009) are excellent edited volumes that provide a good sense of the range of network approaches in IR. (Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and Montgomery 2009) is an article-length overview. See also (Dorussen, Gartzke, and Westerwinter 2016), (Haim 2016), (Owen 2016), (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2014), (Mueller, Schmidt, and Kuerbis 2013), (Oatley et al. 2013), (Carpenter 2011), (Maoz 2011), (Goddard 2009). (White 2008) offers a powerful and influential network-based social theory.

[22] Interesting international applications include (Steinmetz 2007, 2008), (Go 2008, 2011), (Adler-Nissen 2011), (Dixon and Tenove 2013), (Guzzini 2013), (Kauppi and Madsen 2013), (Stampnitzky 2013), (Berling 2015). (Martin 2003; 2011, ch. 7, 8) and (Fligstein and McAdam 2012) are useful introductions to field theories in the social sciences. (Bourdieu 1996 [1989]) is a classic empirical case study in Sociology that has had immense theoretical impact. See also (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 14-26, 94-115).

[23] (Jervis 1997) is the classic discussion of systems thinking in IR. Today, most IR applications employ Niklas Luhmann's "modern systems theory." See especially (Albert 2016). Cf. (Peña 2015), (Kessler 2012), (Stetter 2008), (Helmig and Kessler 2007), (Stetter 2007). The definitive theoretical statements are (Luhmann 1995 [1984], 2012 [1997], 2013 [1997]). (Luhmann 2013 [2002]) is a relatively accessible introduction.

[24] (Miller 2015) and (Miller and Page 2007) are useful general introductions. More briefly, see (Holland 2014) and (Walby 2007). For IR applications, see (Gadinger and Peters 2016), (Wagner 2016), (Byrne and Callaghan 2014), (Cudworth and Hobden 2013), (Gunitsky 2013), (Bousquet and Curtis 2011), (Walby 2009), (Kavalski 2007), (Harrison 2006).

[25] See especially (Deleuze and Guattari 1987 [1980], ch. 3, 4) and (DeLanda 2016; 2006). More briefly, see (Harman 2010, ch. 10). I also treat "actor-network-theory (ANT)" – see (Latour 2005) – as a style of assemblage thinking. For IR applications see especially (Sassen 2008), (Abrahamsen and Williams 2009), and (Acuto and Curtis 2014). Cf. (Bachmann, Bell, and Holmqvist 2015), (Bellanova and Duez 2012), (Blomberg 2015), (Dittmer 2015), (Gould 2015), (McFarlane 2009), (Schouten 2014), (Wood 2013).

those of their parts[26]), assemblages are systems the parts of which are linked by "extrinsic" relations, in the sense that the parts retain a certain separateness or separability.[27]

For example, an archaeological or paleontological assemblage – "an associated set of contemporary artefacts that can be considered as a single unit for record and analysis" or "a group of fossils occurring together within a particular stratum"[28] – is the product of an "extrinsic" "logic" of deposition and excavation (rather than a logic intrinsic to the parts). The assemblage is an emergent whole, with a character and a meaning distinct from its parts. The parts, however, retain at least some sort of separate or separable identity.[29]

The parts of a complex organism, in sharp contrast, are *intrinsically* related to – fundamentally inseparable from – the whole. For example, a human heart is intrinsically part of (only) one kind of whole. Similarly, many social roles – parent-child; teacher-student – are related "intrinsically" (although families and classes, like most social groups, are assemblages).

The parts of an assemblage are "more" than just parts of a whole. Although transformed by their assembly, they (also) continue to exist separately – or at least have the potential to be re-divided or re-assembled. They are more or less tightly linked into a still heterogeneous and only incompletely and contingently stabilized entity.

"Assemblage," like "configuration," nicely captures both the relational whole and the related elements. Assemblages involve both "a bringing or coming together" and "a number of things gathered together."[30] And that the whole has been assembled – and might be disassembled or reassembled – highlights the continuing processual nature of assembled things.

"No [assembled] object is a seamless whole that fully absorbs its components."[31] An assemblage is both a multiplicity and a unity. Niklas Luhmann's description of a system as a *unitas multiplex*[32] is especially apt for assemblages.

An assemblage framing threat the relative significance of constancy and change as an empirical (not a conceptual or theoretical) matter. There is no reason to presume that an existing assemblage/configuration will either remain the same – that is, be processually sustained – or change (except, of course, in the long run, in which entropy prevails).

Assemblages are equally characteristic of the natural and social worlds, at the smallest and largest scales. In fact, "the world" can be understood as assemblages of assemblages of assemblages, arranged in hierarchies of increasing scale and complexity.[33]

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[26] (Jervis 1997, 12-17) cites much of the classic literature on emergence. See also (Elder-Vass 2007), (Sawyer 2005, ch. 10), (Bunge 2003, ch. 1-3, 5). (Wagner 2016) is a recent book-length IR application of the idea.

[27] (DeLanda 2016, 2, 10, 11-12). Cf. (Holmqvist, Bachmann, and Bell 2015, 4): "an assemblage is a network in which relations between elements are never fully contained by a set formation."

[28] *Oxford English Dictionary.*

[29] Assemblage thinking, like relationalism/processualism more generally, can be understood ontologically, epistemologically, or methodologically and as applying to all (DeLanda 2016) or only parts (Acuto, Curtis, Ong, et al. 2014; Acuto, Curtis, Abrahamsen, et al. 2014; Bueger 2014) of the world. It may also be either realist (DeLanda 2016; Harman 2008) or constructivist (Latour 2005).

[30] *Oxford English Dictionary.*

[31] (Harman 2010, 172).

[32] (Luhmann 1990, 409–410, 418–419; 1995 [1984], 18).

[33] Similar accounts (although with somewhat different purposes) are developed by Mario Bunge (1969; 1979, 13-14, 44, 74, 84, 123, 184, 209, 251) and Basarab Nicolescu (2002; more briefly, 2010).

For example, atoms are assemblages of subatomic particles, which are assemblages of fermions (quarks and leptons). Chemical elements are particular configurations of atoms. Molecules are assemblages of elements. "Things" are assemblages of molecules. Organisms are "living" assemblages of molecules. Societies are assemblages of organisms.[34]

Similarly, individuals in a society are themselves natural and social assemblages.[35] Some kinds of their interactions become assembled into networks – some of which become assembled into institutions and organizations. And networks, institutions, and organizations are assembled into increasingly broad and complex structures (e.g., families, neighborhoods, cities, states, states systems).

These hierarchies of scale and complexity, however, do not imply an ontological hierarchy, in the sense that lower levels are "more real" (or even "more basic").[36] The things of the world are larger and smaller and simpler and more complex. None, though, is more real than any other. Each type is differently, but equally, real.

Higher-level "stuff" is indeed made up of (and obeys all the laws of) lower-level "stuff." The higher-level whole, however, is not reducible to its lower level(s) parts. Quite the contrary, its distinctive nature emerges from (and thus "resides in") the higher-level assemblage – although as an assemblage it does not reduce its parts to their place in the whole. Conversely, if there is a basic level beneath which we cannot penetrate, it would appear to be quantum fields, in which the very idea of "stuff" would seem to disappear into process.

For the social sciences, an assemblage perspective is particularly attractive because it highlights the simultaneous irreducibility and inseparability of individuals and social groups;[37] their dialectical or recursive relationship. Social groups, as systems, are not reducible to their individual parts. But as assemblages they do not reduce individuals to parts of social wholes.

We are who we are (and act as we act) as parts of complex (and historically variable) arrays of social assemblages. Those assemblages, however, are assemblages of individuals (and other elements). But the "personal identity" of those individuals is in large measure an assemblage of identifications as parts of multiple social assemblages …

3 The Modern State as a Type of Political System

"State" in contemporary English has at least three common political senses: a polity of any sort, a social institution that exercises differentiated politico-legal functions, and "a community of people living in a defined territory and organized under its own government."[38] "The modern state" is a particular type of state in this third sense.

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[34] Working along a different chain, minerals are assemblages of chemical compounds; rocks are assemblages of minerals; the lithosphere is the assemblage of rocks that make up the rigid shell of a planet; the geosphere, in one standard use of that term, is the assemblage of lithosphere, hydrosphere, cryosphere, and atmosphere; a planet is an assemblage of geosphere, mantle, and core; planetary systems are assemblages of planets …

[35] For example, Luhmann (???) presents human beings as combinations of biological, psychological, and social systems. Harrison White (2009) begins with "identities" that aggregate into persons only at several levels up.

[36] On the idea of a "flat" ontology see DeLanda ???, Latour ???, (Bryant 2011, ch. 6). On thinking of levels and hierarchy in ways that do not privilege either higher or lower levels, see (Bunge 1960, 1969).

[37] As an assemblage, any particular group is (partially) divisible. But categorically social groups *are* assemblages of individuals.

[38] *Oxford English Dictionary.*

3.1 The Modern/Weberian State

Most accounts of "the modern state" are rooted in Max Weber's definition[39] of a compulsory (rather than consensual or contractual)[40] administrative and legal order regulated by legislation (rather than custom, contract, or natural law)[41] that claims territorial monopolies on jurisdiction and the legitimate use of force;[42] "*one* compulsory association of the state, now claiming to be the sole source of all 'legitimate' law."[43] And the modern state is "absolutely dependent upon a bureaucratic basis."[44] The modern state is "the bureaucratic state, adjudicating and administering according to rationally established law and regulation."[45]

The modern state

> possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, to which the organized activities of the administrative staff, which are also controlled by regulations, are orientated. This system of order claims binding authority … over all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory organization with a territorial basis. Furthermore, today, the use of force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it is either permitted by the state or prescribed by it.[46]

These features also imply the depersonalization of the state[47] and an understanding of its subjects as formally equal individuals (rather than members of corporate social groups).[48]

For clarity, I avoid using "state" to mean "polity," which, at best, wastes a perfectly good term. We are not interested here in the distinction between "state" and "non-state" societies. Early modern polities did become increasingly unitary and territorial – creating "states" in the third sense. But the *poleis* of Classical Greece and the "states" of Warring States China were "states" in this sense but not "modern states."[49] And the same, I will argue, was true of early modern "states."

3.2 Types of Political Systems

To move beyond ad hoc comparisons of particular cases, I introduce a simple typology of political systems based on a) the number of political centers in the system, b) how those centers are

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[39] (Bendix 1977 [1960], 381-456) is a standard secondary overview. See also (Poggi 2006, ch. 7) and, very briefly, (Swedberg and Agevall 2016, 338-340). (Pierson 2011) is quite a good textbook on "the modern state." The leading alternative account sees the modern state as a polity sharply differentiated from "the market" and from "civil society," that triad usually being seen as rooted in (industrial) capitalism. See, e.g., (Anderson 1974) and, in IR, (Rosenberg 1994). Cf. (Teschke 2003). See also Polanyi (???), approaching the distinction through the distinctiveness of modern markets. In this account as well, not all "states" are modern states (a type of polity that first becomes recognizable in late-eighteenth century Britain). Cf. n. 448.

[40] (Weber 1978, 52-53, 653).

[41] (Weber 1978, 667, 810).

[42] (Weber 1978, 314, 318-319, 904-905).

[43] (Weber 1978, 666 [emphasis in original]).

[44] (Weber 1978, 971).

[45] (Weber 1978, 1394. Cf. 1393).

[46] (Weber 1978, 56).

[47] (Weber 1978, 600, 602 n3, 959, 998).

[48] (Weber 1978, 259, 983).

[49] For broad accounts of "early states" or "archaic states," see, (Claessen and Skalník 1978), (Claessen and van de Velde 1987), (Feinman and Marcus 1998), and, from a more critical perspective, (Yoffee 2005).

distributed in political space, c) their homogeneity or heterogeneity, and d) the homogeneity or heterogeneity of their relations with their peripheries.[50]

Imagine a layered political "space" in which lower levels represent greater degrees of detail, not hierarchical relations of super- and subordination. Entities on a higher level spatially encompass (but do not necessarily rule) those on lower levels. Figure 3.2.1 shows a three-level model of such a spatial grid.

Figure 3.2.1: A Three-Layer Spatial Grid

Figure 3.2.2: A States System

Populate these layered political spaces with "polities," understood as political organizations capable of corporate (and at least semi-autonomous) action. (International societies are composed of polities but usually are not themselves polities.)[51] Then map the channels of authority, control, influence, and communication between polities, both on and across levels. The result is a model of the spatio-political structure of the system.

For example, the mid-twentieth-century global political system can be modelled as a three-level system. "States," occupying the middle (national) level, exercised authority (and often control) over lower-level polities (e.g., provinces, cities, churches, ethnic groups) within their territory. These states, however, were formally equal. And although differences of capabilities created an oligarchy of great powers, there were no polities of significance at the system's highest level.

This is an example of what I will call systems of *single-level governance by multiple polities*; "states systems." (See Figure 3.2.2.) The "terminal polities" of the system – the polities above which there is no higher central political authority – are located on the same level and provide most of the

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[50] IR is most familiar with center-periphery analysis through world systems theory and dependency theory (e.g., Wallerstein 1974, 2011 [1976]; Amin 1974, 1990), which I understand as particular takes on centralization in the capitalist world economy. §3.3 looks briefly at the substantive implications of focusing on centers.

[51] (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996) is a classic application of a broad understanding of "polity" to comparative history.

governance in the system, both nationally, within their domains, and inter-nationally, both bilaterally and through inter-governmental organizations.[52]

Now add one polity on the top level with significant authority and some control over lower level polities. Such systems of *single-center governance* (see Figure 3.2.3) may encompass an entire system (or regional subsystem) or be a polity within a larger system. They can be further distinguished by the nature of the relations between the center and its peripheries – a distinction that, as we will see, lies at the heart of the differences between early modern polities and modern states.

Figure 3.2.3: A Single-Center Governance System	*Figure 3.2.4: A Heterarchic System*

In what might be called "integrated polities," relatively homogeneous peripheries stand in fundamentally similar relations to the center. Modern states are examples, in both their federal or two-tier (e.g., American or German) and unitary or single-tier (e.g., French) forms.

I will call such integrated polities *States*, with a capital S. ("The modern state" is, in these terms, a type of State, characterized by legal-rational bureaucratic rule.) All historical States have been parts of states systems; the logical possibility of a "world State" (or even a "regional State" encompassing a substantial geopolitical region) has never been realized.

In "agglomerated polities," heterogeneous peripheries stand in varied relations to the governing center, as in historic land empires such as the Chinese, Sassanid, Moghul, and Austro-Hungarian empires. Such *empires* often have been parts of states systems (e.g., the nineteenth century British and French empires). Sometimes, though, an empire (e.g., Rome in the first and second centuries) has largely encompassed most of a geopolitical region.

One additional type of system is required to characterize the political structures of medieval and modern Europe: systems of *multi-level governance by heterogeneous centers*. (See Figure 3.2.4.) High-medieval Christendom and contemporary Western Europe are classic examples. I call such systems

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[52] Although terminal polities logically and conceptually might be fundamentally different from one another, empirically there seems to be a tendency for the great powers in an established states system to, over time, become similar. Waltz (1979, ???), I think plausibly, explains this by competition and socialization.

heterarchies;[53] the root *arkhē* (rule) or *arkhon* (ruler) combined with the prefix hetero-, indicating difference or variety.

Heterarchies are multi-actor systems; they are composed of political centers of different types (e.g., secular and ecclesiastical princes in medieval Europe and states and regional organizations in contemporary Europe). Heterarchies are also multi-level systems; not all of the system's political centers are on the same level. The result is multiple divergent (and often cross-cutting) hierarchies.

Using a somewhat different formulation, we might describe rule within States as territorial; all of a territory is ruled by a single center in fundamentally similar ways. Heterarchic rule is non-territorial; a particular place is subject to multiple centers that are not hierarchically subordinated to one another. Rule within empires, then, might be described as quasi-territorial – making the distinctions with the other two types very fuzzy at the edges.[54]

To summarize, this typology identifies three types three types of societies of polities ("international systems"[55]) and three types of polities relevant to medieval and modern Eurocentric politics.

- *States systems*: systems of single-level governance by multiple terminal polities. (See Figure 3.2.2.)
- *Heterarchic systems*: systems of multi-level governance by heterogeneous centers. (See Figure 3.2.4.)
- *Imperial (or hegemonic) systems*: one actor predominates in a system that is more an "international" system than a "national" empire.[56]
- *States* (with a capital S): single-center polities with relatively homogeneous peripheries that stand in similar relations to the center.
- *Empire-states:* single-center polities with heterogeneous peripheries that stand in varied relations to the ruling center.
- *Heterarchy-states*: polities composed of heterogeneous centers that stand in varied relations and operate on different scales.

I will use these categories to tell a story of *two* transitions to "modernity." The heterarchic medieval system gave way to a states system by the mid-seventeenth century. The "states" in this system, however, although significantly different from medieval polities, were not modern states. Only following the French Revolution did the form of State that we call "the modern state" emerge.

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[53] The language of heterarchy was, I believe, used in IR for the first time in a major and sustained way in (Donnelly 2009, 63-69), which cites uses in other fields (in both the natural and social sciences) and similar ideas in IR. More recent applications include (MacKay 2013), (Pulkowski 2014), (Sperling and Webber 2014), (Baumann and Dingwerth 2015), (Donnelly 2016), (Zwolski 2016), (Aggestam and Johansson 2017), (Gertheiss et al. 2017), (Spruyt 2017).

[54] On the case of the early modern Holy Roman Empire, which can be understood as both a heterarchy and an empire, see §6.5. In addition, in heterarchies the distinction between "polity" and "international system" may be unclear – or even beside the point. For our purposes below, though, the distinction "states systems" and "heterarchic systems" is vital.

[55] I use the generic term "international system" to refer to the highest-level political system in a large territorially delimited space – at the risk of anachronism and implicit statism (the term "international" arose only with the mature European states system) because no other term is readily available (and this does not seem a promising place for new jargon).

[56] In modern Europe, all efforts to establish such a system failed. The threat or fear of hegemony/empire, however, was recurrently central to modern international relations (e.g., Louis XIV, Napoleon, Hitler).

3.3 Centralization and Peripheralization

The framing of centers and peripheries presents social and political systems as structured around specially valued "places." As Edward Shils puts it

> Society has a centre. There is a central zone in the structure of society. … Membership in the society, in more than the ecological sense of being located in a bounded territory and of adapting to an environment affected or made up by other persons located in the same territory, is constituted by relationship to this central zone.[57]

A society may have more than one center. Centrality may be rooted in normative, institutional, coercive, productive, or status resources. Relations between centers and peripheries (and between centers) may take many shapes. Whatever the form, though, how centers are related to individuals, groups, institutions, values, and places is essential to the structure of a social or political system.

"Centralization," as I understand it here, is not a matter of concentrating authority in a single place. That is indeed a standard ordinary-language sense of the term. By "centralization," however, I mean a social process that constructs centers, peripheries, and their relations – which can take varied forms. For example, States are not "more centralized" than empires (or states systems or heterarchies). They are *differently* centralized.

Similarly, peripheries are defined not only (or even primarily) by their physical or social distance from a center but also by their subordination. Peripheralization is a constitutive process that transforms formerly autonomous peoples, polities, or places (or peripheries of another center) into peripheries of a particular center. Peripheries, as I use that term, only exist in relation to particular centers. (I call distant but autonomous (unperipheralized) entities "marginal," "fringe," or "outlying.")

Centralization suggests thinking of systems as composed not of stratified layers but of zones lying at varying distances from a center. Authority and control flow not down from the top but out from the center.[58] Therefore, although the layered representations above explicitly do not represent hierarchical super- and subordination, it might be better to use models in which political space is represented as flat – as in Figures 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 (which re-present Figures 3.2.3 and 3.2.2).

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[57] (Shils 1961, 117) = (Shils 1975, 3) = (Shils 1982, 93). This essay and (Eisenstadt 1993 [1963], xxii-xxxiv, xlix-lv, lxii-lxiv) are classic accounts of centers and centralization as crucial features of the structure of political systems. See also (Rokkan 1987). Another interesting take is "modern systems theory," which recognizes center-periphery differentiation as a master principle of differentiation comparable (and in addition) to segmentation, stratification, and functional differentiation. (Luhmann 2013 [1997], 42-50).

[58] Ranking, in addition to being top-bottom and center-periphery may also be front-back. (Consider diplomatic precedence, being at the front of the line, or sitting at the head of the class.) There are important differences between being at the front of the pack, on top of the pile, and at the center of the action.

Figure 3.3.1: A Single-Center Governance System   Figure 3.3.2: A States System

Whatever the representation, the central point is that not all authority is best understood as higher authority. Neither is all rule best understood as rule from above.

Centers attract (and are attractive), exerting a "gravitational" pull on their peripheries. Centers also radiate influence. This mix of attractive and radiating power exercised by central authorities differs fundamentally from the penetrating power of higher authorities reaching down into lower levels.[59]

Crucial to what follows is the idea of centralization (and peripheralization) as a set of social processes that can create polities and international systems of quite varied sorts. It is an empirical question how political centers are distributed and related to one another (and to their peripheries).

IR's standard Waltzian structural models of "states" (units) and states systems understood as in Figures 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 are in fact special cases (not generic models of internal and international politics). Not all international systems are states systems. (Many international systems have been heterarchic or imperial.) And not all units ("states") are States – let alone modern States.

PART TWO: EARLY MODERN POLITIES

Standard accounts of the rise of the modern state see a late-medieval[60] or even earlier origin to the process. I thus begin by sketching a central/high-medieval baseline (§4). This heterarchic system was indeed replaced by an early modern states system (§5). The members of this states system, however, were not modern states (§§6-10).

What follows will be overly long for many (most?) readers. Skim or skip sections or subsections as that seems appropriate. I suspect, though, that §0, which deals with the division of jurisdiction, and

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[59] Even where center and periphery can be translated into top and bottom, something usually is lost in the translation. And the reverse translation regularly fails. (Many tops are not centers.)

[60] Medieval history is conventionally divided into early (ending around 1000), high or central (c. 1000 – c. 1300), and late (c. 1300 – c. 1500) periods. The beginning of the medieval era is often dated as early as 300 (the "barbarian invasions"). The deposition of Emperor Romulus Augustulus by (Flavius) Odoacer in 476 is perhaps the most common starting date (although formalistic almost to the point of being arbitrary, especially in its precision). Politically, though, late-sixth or seventh century beginning is also plausible, focusing on the stabilization of rule in the post-Roman world. ((Halsall 2007) is a useful introduction to the impact of the migrations and the result forms of society in the fifth and sixth centuries.) And for my purposes here, I start the story at the turn of the ninth century.

§8, on the use of force, will be of greatest interest to most readers. And §9, which both summarizes the argument and contrasts it with the standard story of "the rise of the modern state," may be sufficient for those interested primarily in an assemblage account of change – which is the focus of Part Three.

4   Central/High-Medieval Christendom: A Heterarchic System

On Christmas Day 800, Pope Leo III crowned the Frankish king Charles (742-814) *Imperator Romanorum* (Emperor of the Romans) in Saint Peter's Basilica in Rome. Charlemagne's domain, assembled over the preceding three decades (and building on the military successes of his father, Pepin the Short, and grandfather, Charles Martel) encompassed more than a million square kilometers, including most of modern France, much of modern Germany (as far east as Saxony and Thuringia), the low countries, Bavaria, Carinthia, much of northern and central Italy, and even a small slice of Spain.

This was a stunning achievement. And although short-lived – this empire was divided by Charles' grandsons in 843, never to be reunited – the idea of a universal (Western) Christian polity retained immense normative power into the seventeenth century. Furthermore, the successors of Charles and Leo established political parameters that persisted for many centuries.[61]

The ninth and early tenth centuries were marked by steady declines in the extent of both the domain and the power of the Carolingian successor regimes in both West Francia ("France") and East Francia ("Germany"). In the east, the line died out in 911, leading to decades of disorder. In the west, where "Viking" and Norman raids greatly exacerbated internal weakness, the reach of tenth-century Carolingian kings did not extend much beyond 100 or 150 kilometers from Paris.

Otto I (the Great) (912-973), however, reassembled most of the eastern portion of Charlemagne's empire, including much of northern Italy, and received the imperial crown from the Pope in 962. In the west, "France" began to emerge with the establishment of the Capetian dynasty in 987. And in the late eleventh and twelfth centuries, most of western and central Europe experienced what is often rightly called a renaissance, both culturally and politically.[62]

The following account glosses over great variations across both time and space to present a broad general picture of the structure of medieval politics around 1200, give or take a century or so, focusing primarily on the Empire, the papacy, and France[63] – in order to establish a baseline from which to chart late-medieval and early-modern political changes. (Those with no interest in this period or who are willing to accept the depiction of medieval Europe as radically heterarchic may prefer to skim or skip this section.)

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[61] (Southern 1953) remains a useful introduction to early medieval history. See also (Collins 1999), (Davis and Moore 2013 [1957]), (Rollason 2014 [2012]), and, for economic history, (Duby 1974 [1973]). General medieval histories with good discussions of society and politics include (Wickham 2016), (Blockmans and Hoppenbrouwers 2014), (Holmes 2001), (Keen 1991 [1968]), (Koenigsberger 1987b). (Epstein 2009) is a social and economic history of the central and late medieval periods. (Hodgett 1972), although somewhat dated, is also useful.

[62] (Haskins 1927) introduced the term renaissance (and is still well worth reading). See also (Swanson 1999). (Cotts 2013) is a recent general history of the period.

[63] There were important regional differences in Britain, Iberia, and southern Italy, both because they were never part of Charlemagne's empire and because of local history. The general picture, though, is similar.

4.1 Sacerdotium and Imperium

Authority over the Christian community was divided functionally into *sacerdotium* (supreme spiritual authority; priesthood) and *imperium* (supreme secular authority; empire) or *regnum* (secular rule; government), creating parallel hierarchies that jointly governed (Western) Christendom. This is often referred to as the two powers or two swords doctrine.[64]

"Religion" and "politics" were not, as in modern societies, separate domains, only one of which was truly or fully "political." Medieval politics had essential ecclesiastical and secular dimensions. For example, John Watts, in his extremely useful survey of late-medieval politics, identifies three empires – the papacy, the Holy Roman Empire, and the eastern (Byzantine) Empire – that provided the highest level of political structure in medieval Europe.[65] The papacy was an ecclesiastical polity. The western Empire a secular polity. The eastern Empire was a combined secular and ecclesiastical polity.

Spiritual authority was one branch of *political* authority.[66] And religious issues were no less political than secular issues.[67] In fact, if the two branches were to be ranked, the spiritual had precedence. The most important *political* task in medieval Europe was the regulation of religious belief and practice – the path to eternal salvation.[68]

At the top of the ecclesiastical hierarchy was the Pope, the Bishop of Rome; the successor to Peter, to whom Jesus gave the keys to heaven.[69] *Sacerdotium* was exercised territorially by archbishops, bishops, and parish priests,[70] who governed nested communities of decreasing scale.[71]

Spiritual authority, however, was more loosely layered than strongly hierarchical. Only in the twelfth century did the Pope obtain the right to appoint ("invest") most archbishops (who

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[64] The classic statement is in a letter from Pope Gelasius I to Emperor Anastasius in 494. "There are two powers, august Emperor, by which this world is chiefly ruled, namely, the sacred authority of the priests and the royal power. Of these that of the priests is the more weighty, since they have to render an account for even the kings of men in the divine judgment. … If the ministers of religion, recognizing the supremacy granted you from heaven in matters affecting the public order, obey your laws, lest otherwise they might obstruct the course of secular affairs by irrelevant considerations, with what readiness should you not yield them obedience to whom is assigned the dispensing of the sacred mysteries of religion." (https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/source/gelasius1.asp (Internet Medieval Sourcebook). (Robinson 1988, 288-300ff.) provides a good brief introduction to the Gelasian doctrine and its development. Cf. (Dyson 2007).

[65] (Watts 2009, 48-68).

[66] (Watts 2009, 116-122) briefly surveys the varied political forms that high medieval churches and religious communities took.

[67] (Nelson 2013), although not using this terminology, provides a nice brief illustration of the interpenetration of religious and secular politics in the reign of Charlemagne.

[68] For a good, if dry, overview of the history of medieval struggles against heresy, see (Peters 1980). (Ames 2015) is much more readable. R. I. Moore (2007 [1987]) even defines medieval Europe as "a persecuting society." ((Frassetto 2006) offers a sympathetic critical evaluation of Moore's thesis.)

[69] (Ullmann 1972) and (Whalen 2014) are single-volume histories of the medieval papacy. See also (Collins 2009, ch. 7-15).

[70] (Lynch and Adamo 2014) is a useful textbook on the medieval Church. (Southern 1970) and (Logan 2002) are good general surveys. (Robinson 2004a) is a brief introduction to the structure of the central medieval Church. See also (Swanson 2015, ch. 2, 3).

[71] Monastic communities (e.g. Benedictines) and mendicant orders (e.g., Franciscans and Dominicans) were outside the official clerical hierarchy. (This was especially significant where large monasteries held substantial estates and controlled considerable wealth.) (Arnold 2014, ch. 8, 22) offers a brief introduction to medieval monasticism. See also (Berman 2007), (Wollasch 1999). (Lawrence 2015) is a very readable book-length introduction.

previously had usually been appointed by the secular ruler)[72] – and even afterwards, ecclesiastical princes remained strongly influenced by their secular counterparts who, north of the Alps, were much closer than the Pope. Furthermore, most parish priests were appointed by local or provincial lords, who provided the benefices that literally sustained them.[73]

The secular hierarchy also had four levels.[74] Again, though, these were loosely layered on top of each other. A general "acceptance of some level of [hierarchy]" was "accompanied by informal measures to preserve as much independence or influence for different layers as possible."[75] Some "lower-level" polities thus were more or less autonomous centers; polities that had not been (or had escaped from being) peripheralized.

The top secular level was occupied by the Emperor, who was understood as the successor of the emperor of Rome. For most of the medieval period, though, *imperium* over the whole Christian community was not even theoretically claimed by the *Imperator*.[76] And in practice, in realms outside the territorial boundaries of the (reduced) Empire – including, most prominently, France, the British Isles, southern Italy and the Mediterranean, and Iberia – the Emperor also usually lacked the resources to exert much influence. Furthermore, even within its boundaries, "the Empire was a state based on personal [feudal] ties."[77] And imperial control depended was especially problematic in "subordinate" parts of the Empire that had been ruled by a particular family for more than a generation.[78]

Although the ninth- and tenth-century rulers of both "France" and "the Empire" tried to rule through appointed royal officials[79] – originally, "counts" (*comites*) – those positions soon came under the control of local notables and often became hereditary. In addition, local variations began to proliferate. A group of increasingly autonomous dukes (*duces*, *ducs*, *Herzöge*), leading counts, and

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[72] On the Investiture Controversy (ca. 1075 – 1107/1122), see (Blumenthal 1988 [1982]), (Miller 2005), (Tellenbach 1959), and, more briefly, (Fuhrmann 1986 [1983], 81-87, 97-109). (Haldén 2017) is a recent discussion in the context of IR theory.

[73] In some places, clergy were elected by parishioners, either with the agreement of the patron or as a matter of custom. {Reynolds, 1984 #10245@93}.

[74] (Wickham 2005, ch. 2-6) surveys politics and aristocratic power in the fifth through eighth centuries. (Blockmans and Hoppenbrouwers 2014, ch. 5) is a good textbook presentation of early medieval social and political structure. (McKitterick 2001) provides an introductory overview of early medieval politics.

[75] (Watts 2009, 216).

[76] This was particularly true of the Carolingian (800-911), Ottonian (919-1024), and Salian (1024-1125) Emperors. As Robert Folz [, 1969 [1953] #3096@63} puts it "Otto I was faithful to Charlemagne's example and never in any way claimed *dominium mundi*: neither he nor any of his successors ever raised any claims to Byzantium or France." Even under the Hohenstaufen emperors at the peak of imperial power, "the Emperor's high assertions were mainly restictred to the territorial space of his own kingdoms." (Watts 2009, 59).

[77] (Fuhrmann 1986 [1983], 33).

[78] (Leyser 1984) [=(Leyser 1994, ch. 2)] offers an account of the Saxon uprising of 1073 that nicely illustrates the complexities of political relations within the Empire. (Reuter 2013 [1991]), (Fuhrmann 1986 [1983]), (Haverkamp 1988 [1984]) are general histories of the Empire in the early and central medieval periods.

[79] (Ganshof 1968)@pt. 1) provides an overview of the structure of Charlemagne's monarchy. (Pages 26-34 look at counts and other territorial officials.) See also (Riché 1993 [1983]). (Costambeys, Innes, and MacLean 2011) is a thorough survey of the Carolingian world. (Chapters 4 and 8 cover politics in the ninth century.) (Verhulst 2002) examines the Carolingian economy. See also (Costambeys, Innes, and MacLean 2011, ch. 5, 7). (Nelson 1988) examines Carolingian ideas of kingship and empire. (Leyser 1982, ch. 4) surveys Ottonian government. See also (Werner 1979 [1968], 248-252ff.). (Latowsky 2013) is a fascinating account of the idea(s) of Charlemagne's empire in shaping visions and practices of imperial authority in the following four centuries.

margraves (*Markgrafen*, marcher lords), along with a proliferation of kings, began to acquire greater shares of *imperium*.[80]

The second level of the secular hierarchy – which was the highest occupied level outside of the Empire – can be called the *regnal* level, using a neologism created by medievalist Susan Reynolds[81] to indicate that kings were the typical (but not only) actors on this level, without suggesting anything else about the character of these polities. Rulers such as the kings of France, England, and Léon, the Duke of Brittany, and the Count of Foix acknowledged no higher secular authority and asserted (limited) legal and political claims against rulers of lesser rank in their realms.

Thinking of the Emperor as a regnal-level ruler is, although in some ways anachronistic, useful. "In most respects, the 'Empire' was essentially a territorial monarchy."[82] Although the imperial crown was an important ideational power resource, the material power of the man who held it rested largely on the resources he could mobilize as the king of "Germany," "Italy," and Burgundy[83] (and from his dynastic domains).

Secular rulers on what I will call the *provincial* level stood in varying relations to the Emperor and regnal-level rulers.[84] A few, such as the dukes of Saxony and Burgundy, rivalled their status superiors in power and wealth. In addition, autonomy increased with distance from the imperial or regnal center. In most places at most times in the central middle ages, "provincial" rulers were subject only to limited direction and oversight by their titular superiors,[85] who were more suzerains than sovereigns; feudal overlords rather than rulers in a strong modern sense of that term. As Watts puts it, there was "a thin royal crust over a mass of independent jurisdictions."[86]

Below this were *local*, largely rural, communities, often organized around customarily defined villages,[87] where secular authority was exercised by lords (*seigneurs*, *Herren*), usually with little higher supervision.[88] In the language introduced above, most localities were fringe, marginal, or outlying

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[80] (Nelson 1995b, 1999) and (Reynolds 2004) are brief introductions to secular governance from the ninth through the eleventh centuries. (Reynolds 1984) is a now-classic study of forms of community in the early and central middle ages. See also (Nelson 1995a), (Airlie 1995), (Fried 1995), (Leyser 1982, ch. 7), (Müller-Mertens 1999), (Dunbabin 1999), (Bates 1999), (Zimmerman 1999), (Vollrath 2004), (Bouchard 2004), (Arnold 1991, ch. 1-3). (Reuter 1979, esp. ch. 7, 8) looks at the aristocracy in France and Germany.

[81] (Reynolds 1984, ch. 8, esp. 254). (Watts 2009, 376-380) provides a powerful brief application of the concept to the rise of early modern polities.

[82] (Watts 2009, 60).

[83] "Imperium or Imperial rule was the personal right of governance and justice which the king exercised in his three kingdoms." (Arnold 2004).

[84] {Reynolds, 1984 #10245@ch. 7} surveys early and central medieval provincial communities and governance.

[85] In France, though, even this represented a considerable rise in the power of the king. In the tenth and eleventh centuries, "royal rights … were simply held by the *princeps*" – what I have called "provincial" and local rulers – who "had reached the height of [their] power, while the king by comparison cut a sorry figure." (Werner 1979 [1968], 248, 244). By the beginning of the reign of Philip II (Augustus) in 1179, however, the monarchy had become a significant political force in most of the realm. See (Baldwin 2004) and, at much greater length, (Baldwin 1991).

[86] (Watts 2009, 84). We should not, however, overestimate the robustness of governance at the provincial or local levels. Quite the contrary, "many lordships … were little more than private estates, without odd scraps of jurisdiction attached – often insecurely." (Watts 2009, 97).

[87] {Reynolds, 1984 #10245@ch. 5} surveys early and central medieval village communities and rural neighborhoods, with an emphasis on multiple overlapping communities that were distinguished both functionally and spatially.

[88] (Wickham 1995), (Fossier 1999, 2004) and (Epstein 2009, ch. 2) survey rural conditions in the ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries. See also (Hodgett 1972, ch. 2, 3). (Postan 1966), although dated, is also of interest. (Bur 2004) provides a particularly interesting look at seigneurial rule in twelfth century France. In Italy, however, towns became the

polities that had not been peripheralized. Although this was where the vast majority of the population lived, the relations between nobles on the provincial, regnal, and imperial levels were the stuff of high politics. And, looking forward, the leading late-medieval and early modern polities emerged from the regnal level.

These two hierarchies were not only functionally separate they diverged territorially. Regnal polities usually included (at least parts of) multiple archbishoprics. Archbishoprics rarely if ever corresponded to duchies, counties, or earldoms. And local lordships (*seigneuries*) typically did not correspond to church parishes.[89] "It was an essential feature of medieval institutions that they tolerated a high degree of local autonomy and variety."[90]

In addition, relations between these hierarchies were contested, often hotly, and varied with place and time. Most importantly, during the Carolingian (800-888) and Ottonian (919-1024) dynasties, religious authorities generally were subordinate to secular rulers.[91] After the Investiture Controversy of the late-eleventh century, however, many archbishops (and some important bishops) became increasing autonomous from secular rulers, as a result of their closer ties (and more effective subordination) to the increasingly powerful Vatican[92] – which was coming to be something more like a rival to the leading regnal rulers.

Relations between levels in the secular hierarchy also varied over time. For example, supra-local order largely collapsed in much of Europe around the turn of the millennium, making local "castellans" [rulers of castles] major actors.[93] With the development of "feudalism,"[94] however, lower-level actors were re-linked to higher authorities through reciprocal (but unequal) relations of

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centers of polities even in the early medieval period. (Jones 1997, ch. 2), (Tabacco 1989, ch. 3-5), (Wickham 1989 [1981], ch. 4. 7), (Gelichi 2002). And in transalpine Europe, towns began to emerge again in the tenth and eleventh centuries. (Verhulst 1999) is an excellent brief introduction. (Keene 2004), (Epstein 1999), and (Reynolds 1984, ch. 6) look briefly at towns in the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries. (Pounds 2005) and (Nicholas 2014 [1997]) are useful general surveys of medieval towns. (Pirenne 1923), (Weber 1958), and (Rörig 1967) are older works still worth reading.

[89] Furthermore, clerically defined parish communities often became the basis for the development of lay parish communities. {Reynolds, 1984 #10245@79ff.}. "The untidy overlaps of secular and ecclesiastical units, combined with the apparent indifference of medieval people about the particular unit in which to act at any moment, often make it difficult to separate parish activity from the activity of villages or units of lordship." {Reynolds, 1984 #10245@90. Cf. 96}.

[90] {Reynolds, 1984 #10245@9}.

[91] (McKitterick 1999), (Reuter 2006, ch. 19).

[92] On the Investiture Controversy, see n. 72. (Luscombe and Riley-Smith 2004, ch. 8-11) discusses changes in the Church in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. On the rise of the papacy, see (Blumenthal 2004), (Robinson 2004b), (Watt 1999). (Tierney 1961) discusses high-medieval church-state relations more generally.

[93] (Barthélemy 2009 [1997], esp. 119-126, 231-235), (Bisson 2009, ch. 3), (Poly and Bournazel 1991 [1980], esp. ch. 1, 2, 8). "The 'feudal revolution' has become the conventional shorthand for the disappearance, around the millennium, of a 'centre' able to control the localities, and the appropriation by those bent on local domination of the shell of legitimate authority which this process left behind." (Reuter 2006, 72). {Reynolds, 1984 #10245@117-122} suggests a somewhat less bleak reading of this crisis, emphasizing the resilience of rural communities. {Moore, 2000 #11136} is a good general history of the eleventh and twelfth centuries.

[94] The nature of "feudalism" is a matter of immense historiographic controversy. (Bloch 1961), (Ganshof 1964), and (Strayer 1965) are standard older sources. For more recent accounts, focusing on its development, see (Poly and Bournazel 1991 [1980]), (Bonnassie 2009 [1985]), and (Reynolds 1994), as well as, more briefly, (Bisson 1994), (Barthélemy and White 1996), (Reuter and Wickham 1997). (Teschke 1998; 2003, ch. 3) is also very useful. In my account here I have largely followed Susan Reynold's {, 1984 #10245@9} claim that "'feudalism' and 'feudal' are meaningless terms which are unhelpful in understanding medieval society."

pledged fealty. This new hierarchy, however, operated in tandem with, rather than replaced, the old hierarchy. And both became increasingly tangled with time.

The result was a heterarchic interpenetrating of systemic, regnal, provincial, and local secular authorities and a parallel system of ecclesiastical jurisdictions organized according to its own principles and on its own scale.[95] And overlaid on all this was a social hierarchy that was often expressed in a functional division between those who prayed, those who fought, and those who worked the land (to support all three orders).[96] Control over the use of force was similarly shared across levels, with regnal rulers raising armies of self-armed and self-provisioned (usually noble) men through feudal levies.[97]

Any particular place thus typically was subject to multiple secular and ecclesiastical "princes" – who usually stood in complex (and contested) relations. And "everything we know about the overlapping communities … suggests that people were prepared to act collectively at many levels."[98] "Many people must have thought of themselves (if they thought consciously about the subject at all) as belonging to overlapping communities within their immediate locality and also to layers of collective activity beyond it."[99]

4.2 Unity through Hierarchy

This complex layering of authorities, however, is evidence not of "fragmentation" – a formulations that may mistakenly imply that an unfragmented ("hierarchical" or "unitary") state is somehow normal or desirable – but of the wide distribution of authority across multiple centers of differeing character. Although the particularism of these multiple hierarchies stands out to us today, the emphasis at the time was on their unification in an all-encompassing cosmic hierarchy.

The most influential expression of this vision was that of (Pseudo-) Dionysius (Denys the Areopagite) – a late-fifth- or early-sixth-century Greek author who presented himself as the Athenian convert of St. Paul[100] – who coined the term hierarchy.[101] According to Dionysius, all of reality was arranged in an elaborate level structure, based on closeness to God. God, "having fixed all the essences of things being, brought them into being."[102] And He arrayed them hierarchically, hierarchy being "a sacred order and science and operation, assimilated, as far as attainable, to the likeness of God."[103] "Each rank of the Hierarchical Order is led, in its own degree, to the Divine co-operation, by performing, through grace and God-given power, those things" appropriate to its nature.[104] Just as angels are above men, so on this earth men, as rational beings, are placed at the

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[95] (Watts 2009, 43-129, 205-254, 264-270, 393-410) provides a useful overview of the various forms of political organization and their changes in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. See also (Guenée 1985 [1981]).

[96] (Duby 1980 [1978]) is a standard account of this "three orders" framework. On the idea of orders more generally, see (Denton 1999) and, in the early modern context, (Mousnier 1972).

[97] See, for example, (Contamine 1984 [1980], ch. 2, 3, 8), (Brown 2001). (Firnhaber-Baker 2014) is a fascinating regional study focusing on seigneurial warfare in Languedoc. (Firnhaber-Baker 2010) is a shorter version of the argument.

[98] {Reynolds, 1984 #10245@125}.

[99] {Reynolds, 1984 #10245@138}.

[100] His works are available in translation online at http://www.ccel.org/ccel/dionysius/works.html. (Rorem 1993) provides a commentary on the texts and their influence.

[101] (Rorem 1993, 19, 21; 2005, 59).

[102] (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *On the Heavenly Hierarchy* (cited here as HH), 4.1.

[103] HH 3.1.

[104] HH 3.3.

top, closer to God than irrational sentient beings (who are in turn higher than "things which merely exist").[105] Hierarchy is also the rule in heaven.[106]

The political implications of this vision are clear. "The inferior Ranks cannot cross to the superior functions."[107] As St. Boniface (c. 675-754) put it, there are "several dignities, each having its own function: there is an order of commanders and an order of subjects, an order of the wealthy and an order of the poor, an order of the old and an order of the young … each with its own path to follow, as in the body each part has its own function."[108]

Proper social and political order was understood as a matter of correspondence to the divine order of creation. And that hierarchical ordering established a fundamental unity that was the principal focus of social and political attention. Despite the profound phenomenological particularism of local life and feudal relations, the hierarchical ontological unity of these disparate parts – the unity of Christendom, understood as the privileged polity that provided the path to eternal salvation – expressed the true meaning and purpose of earthly life.

5 From Heterarchic Christendom to a European States System

This heterarchic medieval system did give way to an early modern states system through a series of changes that can be traced back into the thirteenth century[109] and were largely realized by the end of the sixteenth century.

5.1 Late Medieval Political Changes

The Emperor reached the peak of his powers during the reigns of Frederick I (Barbarossa) (r. 1155-1190) and his grandson Frederick II (r. 1220-1250).[110] Although the Hohenstaufen Emperors (1138-1254) were wont to suggest that they held a sort of universal monarchy,[111] such claims were of no more practical significance than the parallel contemporaneous claims of some popes.[112] What Robert Folz nicely calls "the great duel between the imperialism of the Hohenstaufens and the

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[105] HH 4.2.

[106] HH 6.

[107] (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy* 5.7. Cf. HH 3.2.

[108] Quoted in (Duby 1980 [1978], 74-75). Georges Duby nicely summarizes the superiority of the ruling elements of society that prayed and fought, as expressed in Gregory the Great's (c. 540-604) influential meditation on *Job*. "All hierarchy originated in the unequal distribution of good and evil, of flesh and spirit, of the heavenly and the terrestrial. As men were by nature differently inclined to sin, it was proper for the least culpable to assume responsibility, with care, affection, and firmness, for the leadership of the flock." (Duby 1980 [1978], 67). Cf. (Duby 1980 [1978], 67): "One part of society was worthy to rule over the remainder. Because they were morally of lesser value, 'those behind' were subordinated to 'those in front' (*prelati*) 'who speak' (*predicators*), 'who govern' (*rectores*), who are 'powerful' (*potentes*)." On the persistence of the "three orders" framework in the early modern era, see (Zagorin 1982a, ch. 3)

[109] For an introductory overview of central medieval politics, see (Weiler 2006). See also (Watts 2009, ???). Many of the sources cited in the preceding section, especially those in nn. 80, 81, and 85, are also relevant.

[110] See, especially (Leyser 1988), (Munz 1969), and, more briefly, (Arnold 2004), (Toch 1999), and (Barraclough 1956, ch. 6, 8). (Cotts 2013) is a good recent general history of twelfth and early thirteenth centuries.

[111]

[112] The most notorious example is Pope Boniface VIII's 1302 Bull *Unam Sanctum*. "Both, therefore, are in the power of the Church, that is to say, the spiritual and the material sword, but the former is to be administered for the Church but the latter by the Church; the former in the hands of the priest; the latter by the hands of kings and soldiers, but at the will and sufferance of the priest." https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/source/B8-unam.asp.

imperialism of the papacy"[113] was carried out largely at the level of propaganda. And even their repeated wars were largely about control over northern Italy and had little (and only local) impact elsewhere.

Within the Empire, the balance of power began to shift towards the provincial polities, which also achieved a new status. For example, the title count was "releas[ed] … from its previous association with public justice exercised under the crown, to apply instead to the cluster of hereditary rights which the dynasty in question exercised."[114] There was a steady (although uneven) absolute rise in the capabilities and autonomy of provincial-level polities, producing a relative (but not necessarily absolute) decline in the significance of the imperial level.[115]

Outside the Empire, the motto *rex imperator in regno suo* [the king is emperor in his realm] was being regularly used by the end of the thirteenth century.[116] Although the Emperor retained a higher status, which was of real significance in the status-conscious medieval world, he did not claim to rule in, or even over, kingdoms such as England, Castile, and France – making the Empire one of many regnal level European polities.

The rulers of regnal polities, however, had extremely limited control beyond their personal dynastic domains. Although their superior status was a significant power resource, their material and coercive resources were drawn almost entirely from their dynastic domains, which often were not significantly greater than those of (other) leading nobles. "Provincial" polities thus were usually largely autonomous – and the leading ones were centers rather than peripheries. Furthermore, local lords throughout the middle ages remained subject to only the most minimal higher supervision.[117]

The papacy was also at or near the peak of its power in the early thirteenth century.[118] The Pope stood at the pinnacle of an ecclesiastical hierarchy that spanned all of (Western) Christendom. He also employed a bureaucracy more advanced than that of any secular ruler, giving the Vatican both considerable power in most archbishoprics (and even some important bishoprics) and a much more effective system for extracting revenues than most if not all other polities. (Parishes, though, remained largely controlled by local lords.)

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[113] (Folz 1969 [1953], 175).

[114] (Arnold 1991, 112). Arnold's book surveys the rise of (secular and ecclesiastical) territorial princes in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, which he sees as resulting "not from the fragmentation or usurpation of imperial authority" – the significance of which in earlier centuries is often overestimated – "but rather from the creative political and juridical outlook [and actions] of the riches prelates and dynasts located in the various German regions." (1991, 5). Much more briefly, see (Fuhrmann 1986 [1983], 168-171, 180-186), (Haverkamp 1988 [1984], 150-155, 157-162, 281-287). Cf. also (Harding 2002, 99-108) on the idea of "state" in the late medieval German principalities.

[115] Nonetheless, the Emperor had significantly more authority and power in his realm in the eleventh and twelfth centuries than did the kings of France and England. Considered as a regnal polity, the Empire at this time was more politically homogeneous and more subject to central authority – in part because of the status of the Emperor and in part because of the concrete achievements of Hohenstaufen imperial rule. Very briefly, see (Fuhrmann 1986 [1983], 31, 49-50, 142-157). At greater length, see (Leyser 1988).

[116] (Hinsley 1986, 88-89). Cf. (Canning 2003, 97 n. 16), (Pennington 1993, 31-36), (Ullmann 1979), (Ullmann 1975, 96ff.), (Rivière 1924), (Bossuat 1961, 371-373) = (Bossuat 1971), (Watts 2009, 68).

[117] (Reynolds 1984, ch. 5), (Sivéry 1999), (Freedman 2000), (Dyer 1998).

[118] On the high-medieval papacy see (Ullmann 1972, ch. 9, 10), (Blumenthal 2004), (Robinson 2004b), (Watt 1999), (Meyer 2007), and, most briefly, (Watts 2009, 49-59). (Robinson 1990) covers the period 1073-1198 in great detail, with central emphasis on the mechanisms of papal governance. (Tellenbach 1993) covers the church more broadly in the tenth, eleventh, and early twelfth centuries. (Cotts 2013, ch. 3) provides a brief overview of the Church in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries.

In the fourteenth century, the power of both the Emperor and the Pope began a steady, although uneven, decline, especially after the devastation of the Black Death, which in the late 1340s and early 1350s killed at least a third of the population of Europe.[119] And no new system-level actor(s) emerged.

The decline of the Empire was relative rather than absolute. Emperors Sigismund (r. 1410-1437), and Frederick III (r. 1452-1493) were in many ways not merely competent but successful rulers.[120] They focused more on their dynastic domains, though, than on the Empire, failing, until the end of Frederick's reign, to keep pace with institutional changes elsewhere. The formal change of name of the Empire in 1512 to the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation reflected the fact that the Emperor had in effect become king of Germany.

The decline of the Papacy was absolute as well as relative. The Church never fully recovered from the move to Avignon (1309-1377) and the Great (Western) Schism (1378-1417), when competing popes, and their political backers, crassly competed for ecclesiastical control.[121] Even after the Council of Constance (1414-1418) restored ecclesiastical unity[122] the churches in France,[123] (Catholic) Germany,[124] and even Spain[125] became increasingly national and subordinated to the secular ruler. The Reformation[126] fractured the doctrinal and ecclesiastical unity of Christendom, on which much of the Pope's authority rested. And over the course of the Italian Wars (1494-1559)[127] the secular power of the papacy was effectively reduced to that of an Italian regional actor.[128]

Meanwhile, leading kings and dukes expanded their systems of law courts and substantially improved their administrative, fiscal, and military capabilities.[129] More and more political activity began to take place at the regnal level. Regnal-level rulers began to be able to push their authority

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[119] (Epstein 2009, ch. 9) is a useful brief introduction to the plague and its impact. See also (Herlihy 1997), (Kelly 2006),

[120] (Herde 2000), (Hlavacek 2000), (Scott 1998).

[121] For brief introductions, see (Ullmann 1972, ch. 11, 12), (Zutshi 2000), (Kaminsky 2000), (Logan 2002, ch. 15, 16) and, at greater length, (Rollo-Koster 2015; 2009). It was during the Schism that kings, especially in France and Castile, "began to wield powers that had formerly been exercised by popes" (Watts 2009, 296), including taxation to support the (regnal) Church. (Watts 2009, 291-301) provides a brief summary of the decline of papal power in the first half of the fifteenth century.

[122] (Black 1998, 67-76) and (Watts 2009, 291-301) are brief accounts of the Council and its successors.

[123] Small, 1995 #6210@8-25} briefly addresses the link between kingship and religion in late-medieval France. On the late-medieval French Church more broadly, (Lewis 1968, ch. 3, sect. iv) is a useful brief introduction. On the Church, politics, and society in late-sixteenth and seventeenth-century France, see (Bergin 2014, 2009).

[124] A useful introduction to the the *Reichskirke* (Imperial [Catholic] Church) can be obtained by following the index entries in (Wilson 2016).

[125] (Payne 1984, ch. 2), (Rawlings 2002).

[126] (Greengrass 2014, ch. 10, 11) and (Marshall 2009) are useful, recent, brief overviews. (Cameron 2012) and (Marshall 2015) are thorough but accessible book-length introductions, as are (Pettegree 2000) and (MacCulloch 2005 [2003]) at greater length. (Greengrass 1998) is another good broad overview. (Bainton 1985 [1952]) is also still useful. (Scribner, Porter, and Teich 1994) looks at the Reformation nationally in a dozen countries. (Bagchi and Steinmetz 2004) is a useful introduction to Reformation theology. (McGrath 2012) is a textbook introduction to Reformation thought more broadly understood.

[127] (Mallett and Shaw 2014 [2012]) provides a good recent historical overview.

[128] (Ullmann 1972, 332) concludes his history of the medieval papacy with the observation that "on the threshold of the modern period" the papacy had been "reduced … to a power situated in central Italy."

[129] (Watts 2009, 43-129, 205-263, 393-419) provides a relatively brief survey of changing late-medieval governmental structures and practices. See also (Guenée 1985 [1981]).

deeper down into their realms. And some kings who managed to succeed in the brutal dynastic wars of the fifteenth century began to distinguish themselves from all other actors.

5.2 New Monarchies and the Rise of a European States System

In France, England, and Spain, several decades of crisis – the last three decades of the Hundred Years' War (1337-1453),[130] the Wars of the Roses (1455-1485),[131] and a series of wars and succession crises from 1412 to 1469 within and between the crowns of Castile and Aragon,[132] followed by the War of the Castilian Succession (1475-1479) – opened spaces for vigorous and effective kings to establish something like political hegemony in their realms.[133] Provincial-level centers began to be transformed into the peripheries of regnal polities that were becoming less heterarchic and more unicentric.

Although a single Christian polity remained an almost universally endorsed ideal, over the course of sixteenth century the heterarchic medieval system of multi-level governance gave way to a system of single-level governance; a states system. Regnal polities became the focal point of both "national" and "international" politics. Dynastic political particularism and a grudging tolerance for the coexistence of polities of (a few) different Christian confessions replaced the ideal of a single Christian commonwealth.

Charles V (1500-1558) made the last serious attempt to re-establish something resembling a universal Christian polity.[134] Through dynastic good fortune, he acquired rule over both Spain (in 1516) and the Empire (in 1519), creating a polity that rivaled Charlemagne's in size and power. In addition, he strongly supported Christian unity – that is, efforts to suppress, by force if necessary, heresy (Protestantism) – and military efforts to stop the advance of the Ottomans.

But Charles' domain did not include France (or England). And near the end of his life, disillusioned, he effectively renounced both political and religious universalism. In 1556, Charles abdicated and divided his domains, giving Spain and the Netherlands to his son Philip and the Empire to his brother Ferdinand. No less importantly, in 1555 he agreed to the Peace of Augsburg, which established the principle *cuius regio, eus religio* [whose realm, his religion], allowing princes within the Empire to choose Catholicism or Lutheranism as the official religion of their polity. Along with the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis (1559), which finally ended the Italian (Hapsburg-Valois) Wars, these changes can be seen to mark the replacement of the heterarchic medieval system by an early modern states system. And over the following century this new states system became a central and increasingly institutionalized feature of European politics.

Some kings retained visions of universal grandeur. Even the Peace of Westphalia (1648) presented itself, somewhat wistfully, as "a Christian and Universal Peace" for "the Benefit of the Christian World."[135] In practice, however, there was no politically significant actor at the system level after the 1550s. And during the reign of Louis XIV (1643-1715), a world of multiple regnal polities became the near-universal expectation. Although Louis strove (or at least was widely feared to be striving)

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[130] (Vale 1998), (Neillands 2001, ch. 13-16).

[131] (Carpenter 1997), (Horrox 1998), (Pollard 2013, ch. 5, 6), (Grummitt 2013, ch. 7, 8).

[132] (Hilgarth 1978, pt. 2), (Ruiz 2007, ch. 5), (Del Treppo 1998), (MacKay 1998).

[133] We will return to the theme of crisis and transformation in §11. (Watts 2009, 340-)

[134] ???

[135] Treaty of Munster, Article 1 and preamble. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp.spu.

to establish an imperial or hegemonic system, successful resistance preserved a states system, which became highly institutionalized following the Peace of Utrecht (1713).

5.3 Growth and Crisis in Early Modern Europe

Before plunging into the details of early modern polities, a broad overview of the early modern period – understood as roughly the late-fifteenth century through the middle- or late-eighteenth century[136] – may be helpful. Generalizations across multiple centuries are always problematic. Nonetheless, I want to suggest that the early modern era was a time of political growth, expansion, and transformation, punctuated by sustained and devastating crises, that led to the re-centering of European politics around larger and more consolidated kingdoms.

In agrarian societies, population is a good proxy for general prosperity. Although statistics for this period are notoriously speculative, the population of Europe (excluding Russia), which dropped from perhaps 75-80 in 1300 to perhaps 55-60 million in 1400, returned to around 70 million by 1500 – and then grew relatively rapidly to about 90 million by 1600.[137] Bernard Chevalier's assessment of France is generally applicable: "As centuries go, growth was certainly the chief characteristic of the 'wonderful sixteenth century' which began about 1460."[138] More modest population growth continued through the seventeenth century, leading to a population of about ??? in 1700 (and ??? in 1750).

The early modern period was characterized by the political consolidation and deepening of regnal polities. In particular, Spain, France, and Britain acquired boundaries approximating those of their "modern" successors and became much more capable, both administratively and militarily, allowing their kings to establish their superiority over other nobles and build more integrated polities in which the royal center provided a growing share of governance.

The early modern period, however, also was characterized by repeated, deep, and widespread crises that emerged and developed along at least five (often-interacting) dimensions.

First, the institution of kingship suffered from disputed successions, royal minorities, and excessive dependence on the personality of the king, leading to recurrent dynastic crises that provided occasions for often complex multidimensional conflicts. For example, both the French Wars of Religion (1562-1598/1629)[139] and the Fronde (???)[140] began during royal minorities.

Second, as we will see in some detail below, many conflicts involved noble and regional resistance to growing royal power.

Third, religious heterodoxy, especially after the Lutheran and Calvinist reformations, was both an independent source of conflict, as in the Schmalkaldic War (1546-1547) and the French Wars of Religion, and a complicating or intensifying factor in dynastic disputes, centralization conflicts, and international wars.

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[136] (Duindam 2010) and (Scott 2015a) are useful brief surveys of the concept of early modernity and its ambiguities. (Black 2004) and (Greengrass 1991b) are useful political histories. A superb general history of the early modern period that is strong on politics and society is provided by (Bonney 1991) and (Doyle 1992), the relevant volumes in the *Oxford Short History of the Modern World* series. For broad overviews of the period, variously delineated, see (Scott 2015b), (Weiesner-Hanks 2013), (Cook and Broadhead 2006), (Cameron 1999), (Koenigsberger 1987a).

[137] (Malanima 2009, 9), which is also used in (McCants 2015, 125).

[138] (Chevalier 1998, 421).

[139] See §9.1.

[140] See §11.1.

Fourth, disease and famine, especially as they interacted, remained important sources of demographic crisis, especially at the provincial level. For example, in Castile and Andalusia plague in 1599 and famine in 1600 killed about ten percent of the population, bringing "the demographic upsurges of the sixteenth century to a sharp halt."[141] "Mortalities" in France in 1630-1632, 1648-1653, and 1660-1662 killed as much as a third of the population in particular regions.[142]

Finally, international wars – often driven by dynastic or confessional rivalry – were regular, extended, of greatly growing expense, and immensely destructive, especially when accompanied by famine and disease. Most dramatically, during the Thirty Years' War the population of Germany was probably reduced by about a third.[143]

At the risk of an even more gross oversimplification, I want to suggest that conflict and crisis predominated at the end of the middle ages (from the mid-fourteenth through the mid- to late-fifteenth century). The "long sixteenth century" – which (depending on the place) begins roughly between 1460 and 1490 – by contrast was fundamentally a period of growth, creative transformation, and consolidation. The middle-decades of the seventeenth century were again dominated by crisis.[144] But the era of the mature ancien regime – beginning in the 1670s, 1680s, or 1690s and running to the French Revolution – was again one of transformation, growth, and consolidation. And, as I will argue in §11, both early modern periods of creative transformation and consolidation were in significant measure catalyzed by the preceding crises.

The focus of the following sections is the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, with limited excursions into the eighteenth century. The intent is to show that nothing like a modern state existed anywhere in Europe at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714) or even the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748). And lurking behind the story is the fact – to which we will turn in §11 – that however we think of "the rise of the state" during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it led to the century-long apotheosis of the Ancien Regime under Louis XIV (d. 1715) and Louis XV (d. 1774), the Restoration in Britain, and the eighteenth-century emergence as great powers of Austria, Prussia, and Russia – polities that, with the partial exception of late-eighteenth century Britain, bore almost no resemblance to "modern states" in their nineteenth- and twentieth-century incarnations.

6 Monarchical Consolidation of Composite Polities

"The modern state has been constructed to create a uniformity or universality of life within its borders."[145] "A single system of governance … [and] law applies to (virtually) all who find themselves within these boundaries."[146] By contrast, early modern France, Spain, and Britain, which will be our principal focus here, were variegated aggregations of "a myriad of smaller territorial and

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[141] (Elliott 1970, 439).

[142] (Mousnier 1971 [1946], 480).

[143] ???

[144] The impact of the seventeenth century crisis is evident in the dramatic slowing of the population growth rate (and its reversal in some countries for some decades in the middle of the century) – and then an explosive growth in at the end of the seventeenth century and in the eighteenth century. (Malanima 2009, 9) suggest a growth rate of over 25% in the sixteenth century, not much more than 10% in the seventeenth century, 20% in the first half of the eighteenth century, and another 25% in the last half of the eighteenth century.

[145] (Migdal 1997, 209).

[146] (Morris 2004, 197).

jurisdictional units jealously guarding their independent status."[147] Their "parts had different social structures [and] different laws and institutions."[148]

"Our contemporary definition of a 'rational' or 'modern' state is hopelessly anachronistic when applied to an early modern state."[149] Early modern polities were what I have called empires-states: single-center polities composed of differentially incorporated peripheries. Historians today often call them "composite states."[150] And these "non-integrative unions"[151] were very much assemblages: systems of extrinsic relations in which the constituent parts retained some of their prior identity, often some autonomy, and at least the potential to be removed or reassembled; "their constituent pars ha[d] a meaningful and partly independent existence."[152]

Although the account that follows is relatively detailed, three major omissions should be noted.

First, I largely ignore finance – because although improved revenue-extraction was essential to early modern state building,[153] it is not central to the Weberian account of the modern state.

Second, although Weber identifies the separation from religious legitimation as characteristic of the modern state[154] but early modern polities were religiously legitimated (and viewed the regulation of religious belief and practice as an essential political function), I largely ignore religion, which is an obvious and relatively "easy" case for my argument.[155]

Third, I do not seriously consider temporal or spatial variation, treating "early modern Europe" as a much more homogeneous political space than it in fact was. (I partly redress this omission in §§11 and 12.)

6.1 Castile/Spain

The marriage in 1469 of Isabella, future queen of Castile, and Ferdinand, future king of Aragon, laid the foundation for "modern Spain." The Crown of Aragon, however, comprised an (agglomerated) Iberian core of Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia and a Mediterranean periphery of Naples, Sicily, Majorca, and Sardinia, "each with its own laws and institutions."[156] Although the Crown of Castile

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[147] (Elliott 1992, 51).

[148] (Koenigsberger 1986).

[149] (Collins 1995, 2).

[150] (Elliott 1992) is an excellent brief account. (Koenigsberger 1978; 1986, ch. 1) is the classic exposition. More briefly, see (Nexon 2009, 68-72). Cf. (Hintze 1975, 161 "composite territorial state"), (Gustafsson 1998, "the conglomerate state"). (Greengrass 1991b) is a useful collection of case studies. (Hayton, Kelly, and Bergin 2010) applies the concept to eighteenth-century polities.

[151] (Hayton and Kelly 2010b, 4).

[152] (Watts 2009, 380).

[153] For broad general accounts that give roughly equal weight to coercion and capital, see (Tilly 1992 [1990]) and (Elias 2000 [1939]). (Bonney 1995) and (Bonney 1999) provide a good general introduction to the financial dimensions of early modern state building. See also (Yun-Casalilla, O'Brien, and Comín 2012) and (Kindleberger 1984). For cases studies, see (Tracy 2002) on Charles V, (Drelichman and Voth 2014) on Philip II, (Bonney 1981b) on early Bourbon France, (Potter 2003a) on Louis XIV, (Rowlands 2012) on Louis XV, and (Brewer 1990 [1988]) on Britain in the late-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

[154] (Weber 1978, 600-601).

[155] (Nexon 2009) provides an excellent account of the religious dimension of early modern international relations. On the religious dimension of early modern politics more generally, see (Gorski 2003), ???, and nn. ???.

[156] (Elliott 2002 [1963], 31). For introductory overviews of fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Aragon, see (Forey 2000), (Del Treppo 1998).

was geographically compact, its major towns enjoyed substantial self-rule[157] and noble families in the countryside operated as largely independent authorities.[158] And the two crowns were conjoined rather than united. (Ferdinand did not become king of Castile when Isabella died,)

It may be a bit harsh to call the resulting polity "a ramshackle assemblage."[159] The early modern *monarquía españa*, however, was "a plural, not a unitary state."[160]

When Carlos I (r. 1516-1556) inherited the "Austrian" Hapsburg holdings in 1519 and was elected Holy Roman Emperor (where he reigned as Charles V), "Spain" became the Western anchor of a vast and heterogeneous Hapsburg dynastic empire. Charles, however, on abdicating, re-divided his realm, giving his son Philip,[161] who was king consort of England (through his marriage to Mary I), the crowns of Castile and Aragon (and Navarre) along with the Hapsburg holdings in the low countries.

This in some ways represented a political "rationalization." "In place of the vast and cumbersome geographical monstrosity that passed for an empire under Charles V, Philip II would rule an empire of three logical units: England and the Netherlands, Spain and Italy,[162] and America."[163] But compared to a territorial or national state, both "England and the Netherlands" and "Spain and Italy" were geographical monstrosities. And Spanish America was both huge and immensely distant.

Even "the Spanish peninsula was not a single economic or administrative unit, but a complex of kingdoms and territories: Castile, Aragon, Valencia, Catalonia, Navarre, Vizcaya, Galicia, and Portugal [which was added to the crown of Castile in 1560]."[164] Each "remained in its own compartment, governed by its traditional laws."[165] Even in the seventeenth century, the terms "'Spain,' 'Castile,' and their derivatives were used rarely by policy-makers, usually inconsistently, and hardly ever by common people, whose concerns did not embrace such large geographic expanses."[166]

Furthermore, strong local identities facilitated regular resistance and recurrent rebellions (usually led by nobles and urban elites who benefited from the "ancient" rights and liberties of towns and regions).[167] For example, during the Catalan Rebellion of the 1640s and 1650s – more than a century and a half after the creation of "modern Spain" – J. H. Elliott notes that "the rebels found it easier

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[157](Kamen 2014, 25-28), (Fernández Albaladejo 1989, 725-726).

[158] (Elliott 2002 [1963], 26, 86-99, 113), (Kamen 2014, 23), (Anderson 1974, 62-63, 66), (Thompson 1994, 142-145).

[159] (Anderson 1974, 62).

[160] (Elliott 2002 [1963], 84). (Cardim et al. 2012) employs the frame of polycentric monarchy.

[161] (Kamen 2014, ch. 3) provides a brief overview of Philip's reign. In more detail, see (Kamen 1997), (Woodward 2013 [1992]).

[162] Sicily and Naples were parts of Aragon and Philip had dynastic claims in northern Italy.

[163] (Elliott 2002 [1963], 210).

[164] (Elliott 1970, 437-438).

[165] (Elliott 2002 [1963], 78). Cf. (Elliott 2002 [1963], 29-30, 40-41, 81-82, 279-280, 282, 283), (MacKay 1999, 21). In addition to assemblies of estates (*Cortes*)(see §7.3), the *Justicia* in Aragon and the *Disputació* in Catalonia and Valencia oversaw application of the law. (Elliott 2002 [1963], 29-30, 40-41, 81-82, 279-280, 282, 283). Similarly, on the Catalan *Generalitat*, see (Vergés and Cruañas 1986).

[166] (MacKay 1999, 15).

[167] On the 1591 revolt of Aragon, see (Elliott 2002 [1963], 277-284), (Elliott 1963, 12-18), (Lynch 1991, 472-481), (Kamen 2014, 131-135).

to rally support, because the oppression came from foreign [i.e., Castilian] rulers, foreign officials and foreign troops."[168] Seville, Córdoba, and Grenada also revolted in the same period.

Even in Castile, "the immensely wealthy and potentially disruptive Castilian aristocracy had been neutralized by the clever use of royal patronage and favoritism and by the toleration accorded to its seigneurial properties and prerogatives"[169] – not subordinated by higher authority or superior capabilities. "Through litigation, direct appeals to the king, and invocation of privilege and precedent, and by skillfully playing one jurisdiction off against another, individuals and institutions throughout Castilian society often got their way."[170] And for much of the seventeenth century, the Castilian high nobility (composed of about ten dozen leading noble families) was able to control, or at least resist, Spain's weak and often disinterested kings.[171] Identity remained primarily local, centered on towns and vast estates that were ruled by grandees largely independent of the crown.

Elliott's assessment at the time of the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella holds throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: Spain "diverged in so many respects from the theoretical model of the 'new monarchy'" – a unitary territorial or national state under royal control; an embryonic modern state – "as to make it either appear that it must be entirely excluded from the European model, or alternatively that the model itself is at fault."[172] Britain and France show that the latter is the case – or, more precisely, that the model of "the modern state" has little relevance to early modern Europe.[173]

6.2 England/Britain

Although medieval England was one of Europe's most unitary polities,[174] and Wales became fully integrated into the Kingdom of England in 1543, the early modern English crown came to rule a complex imperial agglomeration. In 1542 Ireland became a separate kingdom, held by the English crown but subject to a very different system of rule.[175] And in 1603 James VI of Scotland succeeded Elizabeth I as James I of England, creating a personal dynastic union of the two kingdoms.[176]

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[168] (Elliott 1969, 51). (Elliott 1963) is an extended study of the Catalan Rebellion.

[169] (Jago 1981, 308-309).

[170] (MacKay 1999, 13). For an illustration, see Elliott's (1986, 146-162) account of the resistance of Castilian cities to the centralizing reforms of Olivares in 1623.

[171] See (Casey 1999, ch. 7) for a brief introduction to the early modern Spanish nobility.

[172] (Elliott 2002 [1963], 77).

[173] As Ruth MacKay (1999, 2) puts it, that Spain "did not conform to any of our available models… suggest[s] not that Spain was an exception but, rather, that the models are deficient."

[174] ???. For an "imperial" reading of the development of high medieval England, however, see (Davies 1990, 2000), (Crooks 2011). And the *relative* uniformity of royal rule in medieval England should not be overemphasized. As Catherine Patterson (1999, 122) puts it, "jurisdictional confusion" was the inescapable result of a polity that "had coalesced under a dynasty of strong monarchs from a patchwork of pre-Conquest administrative units, feudal holdings, near-independent regions, and royal enclaves."

[175] See (Connolly 2007, 2008) for a general history of early modern Ireland. On Ireland under the Tudors, see (Brady 1991), (Moody, Martin, and Byrne 1991 [1976], ch. 2-4). (Canny 2001) is a detailed study of the imposition of the plantation system, up through the rebellion of 1641. More briefly, see (Moody, Martin, and Byrne 1991 [1976], ch. 7-9). Cromwell's reconquest was particularly brutal. See (Connolly 2008, ch. 3), (Moody, Martin, and Byrne 1991 [1976], ch. 13, 14), (O'Siochrú 2008). And resistance to foreign (English) domination persisted into the twentieth century.

[176] (Cantry 1995) examines regional responses to the growing power of Tudor and early Stuart monarchs. (Brown 2015-2016) briefly covers late medieval Scotland and Ireland. On the problems posed by multiple kingdoms, see (Russell 1990, ch. 2), (Bucholz and Key 2009, ch. 7).

It may be an exaggeration to say that "England and Scotland had little more than their king in common."[177] Nonetheless, throughout the seventeenth century Scots identity remained strong, Scots law operated in tandem with English law, and the Parliament of Scotland remained independent.[178] The parallel with Aragon is striking. And the Scots were as obstreperous as their Iberian counterparts.

Charles I's attempt in 1637 to impose the Anglican (English) Book of Common Prayer led to the Bishops' Wars (1639-1640), which concluded when the Scots crossed the Tweed and took Northumberland and Durham, which they continued to hold as surety for the indemnity Charles agreed to pay in the Treaty of Ripon (1640). This was the beginning of what are now often called the Wars of the Three Kingdoms[179] – the most famous of which were the English Civil Wars (1642-1651). The Scots – who pursued an independent foreign policy, courting both the Dutch Republic and Sweden[180] – fought, and in 1646 defeated and captured, the king, who they handed over to the English Parliamentary authorities (who put him to death in 1649). And in 1650, the future Charles II (r. 1660-1685), seeking to restore royal rule, concluded the Treaty of Breda with the Scots, provoking another decade of warfare.[181]

As in Spain, differentially incorporated polities retained much of their original character within a dynastic assemblage. And it is especially telling that a growing overseas empire was understood not as an external addition to a territorial polity but as just another differentially incorporated part of the monarch's realm.

6.3 France

When Louis XI became king in 1461, the English had been expelled from all of "France" except Calais and the kingdom had a shape similar to that of modern France. "France," however, did not include Lorraine, Franche-Comté, Savoy, Provence, Picardy, Flanders, or Hainaut. Many peripheral areas, most notably Brittany and Burgundy, were not part of the royal domain.[182] And even "core" holdings often passed out of royal rule as *apenages*, heritable fiefs given to younger sons of the king.[183]

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[177] (Koebner 1961, 63).

[178] (Mitchison 1983) traces the progress of union from a Scots-centric but relatively balanced perspective. See also (Mitchison 2002, ch. 10-19) and, more briefly, (Wormald 2005, ch. 5, 6). (Brown, Tanner, and Mann 2004, 2005) covers the early modern Scottish Parliament in great detail.

[179] (Gentles 2014 [2007]) is an extended history that treats the conflict in all three kingdoms. See also (Wheeler 2002). On the Irish dimension, see (Moody, Martin, and Byrne 1991 [1976], ch. 11-14).

[180] (Young 2001, 87-103). Cf. (Scally 2005).

[181] The Scots rebelled again in 1715 and 1745, on behalf of the Stuart/Scots pretenders. (Szechi 2012) is a brief introduction that focuses on the broader international context.

[182] http://www.emersonkent.com/map_archive/france_1461_map.htm and http://www.emersonkent.com/map_archive/france_1461.htm are useful maps showing the fragmented character of Louis' realm.

[183] For significant parts of the sixteenth century, Orleans, Angouleme, Anjou, the Bourbonais, Maine, Berry, Touraine, Châtellerault, Auvergne, and La Marche were outside of the royal domain. Louis XIII granted Orleans, Chartres, Blois, and Valois to his brother Gaston, with the territories returning to the crown only in 1660. And Louis XIV's grants of Orleans, Chartres, Valois, and Nemours to his brother Philippe were not abolished until 1790.

Furthermore, newly acquired territories usually were differentially incorporated.[184] Early modern French kings, like their medieval predecessors, "assembled their kingdom piecemeal, layer on layer. They accreted different customs, legal systems, and privileges."[185] Two fifths of the king's subjects in the sixteenth century, most notably in Brittany, Burgundy, Languedoc, Provence, and Dauphiné, retained their traditional laws and representative institutions. Even Louis XIV (r. 1643-1715) added Flanders to his realm through agglomerative compacts that produced "two governmental systems corresponding to very different historical traditions [that] found themselves having to work side by side."[186]

The resulting "conglomeration of duchies, counties, and provinces"[187] was "under the domination of the king of France"[188] but "only partially under royal control."[189] And whatever the formal legal status of a place, "political control … always ebbed at the extremities of the country, progressively decreasing in the more recently acquired provinces farthest from Paris."[190] "The French king's writ did not extend equally across his kingdom even when Bourbon power was at its most complete."[191]

Malcolm Vale's assessment of mid-fifteenth century applies across the early modern period. "Dynastic loyalty and a recognition of the crown's theoretical sovereignty was as much as could be expected from many of the kingdom's inhabitants. Divided by law, language and custom, France was not a 'nation' in the modern sense."[192]

Early modern France was "a polyglot empire" – as late as 1789, half of the population did not speak French[193] – "with a wide range of local institutions adapted to the many local cultures."[194] It "had no common legal code or administrative system …and individuals, towns, corporations, and provinces all possessed a bewildering array of privileges."[195] Even "the famous hexagon [the shape of modern France] can itself be seen as a colonial empire shaped over the centuries."[196] And that shape largely reflected French failures in the Italian (Hapsburg-Valois) Wars (1494-1559) and Louis XIV's failed efforts to take the Spanish king's Italian and Catalan holdings.

6.4 The Interdependence of Centralization and Peripheralization

Kings in early modern France, Spain, and Britain did successfully subordinate most of their principal "internal" challengers. More precisely, they *made* them "internal" parts of realms in which power

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[184] In contrast to (directly incorporated) *pays d'élection, pays d'état* (e.g, Brittany, Burgundy, Provence) retained their local representative institutions, and thus influence over the terms of taxation and some degree of local control over part of its expenditure. *Pays d'imposition* (e.g., Franche-Comté) had more limited local privileges.

[185] (Briggs 1977, 2).

[186] (Lottin 1991, 86). (McCluskey 2013) is a fascinating study of Louis' military occupations of Lorraine and Savoy, providing considerable insight into the nature of politics in the peripheries of the kingdom.

[187] (Major 1971, 57). Cf. (Clark 1995), (Sturdy 2004, 9).

[188] (Mousnier 1979 [1980], 251).

[189] (Kettering 1986b, 5). Cf. Mousnier, 1979 [1980] #9191@251}, (Hoffman 1994, 227), (Salmon 1975, 62).

[190] (Anderson 1974, 85-86).

[191] (Hayton and Kelly 2010a, 245). Cf. (Anderson 1974, 85-86), (Brewer 1990 [1988], 6).

[192] (Vale 1998, 407).

[193] (Hobsbawm 1992, 60).

[194] (Collins 1995, 5). P. S. Lewis' (1968, 4) observation on the late medieval period is equally true of the early modern period: "we must begin … with this concept of a France highly regional in mentality."

[195] (Swann 2001, 145).

[196] (Weber 1976, 485).

was increasingly concentrated in the royal center. The British Isles, "Spanish" Iberia, and "France" became less heterarchic and more single-center polities – but agglomerated not integrated polities; empire-states rather than States (let alone modern (Weberian) states).

This "centralization" of politics, however, is better understood as a re-centering, in which former centers and margins were gradually and differentially peripheralized by the royal center. And thses re-centerings were not imposed from above but "negotiated," and continuously renegotiated, with both center and peripheries regularly employing the instruments of force, interest, and authority to establish, maintain, or improve their positions.

Furthermore, there was no contradiction between "centralization" and regionalization. Rather than competing political projects they were two sides of the early modern process of agglomerative polity formation. "The acceptance of decentralization was a characteristic of nearly all the Renaissance monarchies."[197] And that acceptance was part of the reason that new provinces accepted their incorporation into the realm.[198]

Provincial institutions were not merely maintained but entrenched in the sixteenth century. And they remained powerful well into the eighteenth century. In fact, new provincial institutions were actually created as mechanisms of agglomerative incorporation. For example, Alex Harding notes that "in 1539 conquered Piedmont was given a [regional] *parlement*. This was *not*, as it has sometimes been represented, a 'decentralization of justice and administration': it was rather a concomitant of the establishment of fixed centres [plural] of government and an extension of the Parisian style of administration to the provincial capitals of France."[199]

Bernard Chevalier's assessment of France at the ascension of Francis I (r. 1515-1547) is true of most early modern monarchies: "the gradual elimination of the principalities and the centralisation of power in the person of the king enforced a decentralisation in geographical and institutional terms which respected the strength of provincial particularism."[200] Or as Mario del Treppo puts it in the case of the fifteenth-century kings of Aragon "on the one hand they strengthened the centralised authority of the state, above all by extending the general competence of certain … authorities … to include the entire crown of Aragon. At the same time these same functions submitted to a process of decentralisation."[201]

Early modern polities were based on what Angelo Torre nicely calls "empowering interactions and entwining jurisdictions;"[202] "a *reciprocal* sequence of 'crossed legitimations' between different social,

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[197] (Major 1971, 47).

[198] In fact, this dual dynamic goes back to the central middle ages. As John Watts (2009, 122, 123) puts it, by 1300 we can see "the gradual emergence of more powerful and plural 'regnal' polities" but an "equally pronounced" development was "the proliferation of overlapping, and at some level autonomous, political and governmental structures." But where Watts (2009, 122) describes these as "two contradictory developments" I am arguing that they were – in the medieval and early modern periods alike – two sides of the process of agglomerative polity formation.

[199] (Harding 2002, 288). Similarly, "the establishment at Bordeaux, after its conquest in 1451, of *Grand Jours* [a regional *parlement*], marked the final incorporation into the French kingdom." (Harding 2002, 168). On Louis XIV's differential incorporation of Flanders, see n. 186.

[200] (Chevalier 1998, 419-420).

[201] (Del Treppo 1998, 194).

[202] (Torre 2009).

juridical and political actors."[203] Kings ruled not so much over their provinces (and the privileged groups that dominated them) but in conjunction with them.

6.5 *The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation*

Viewed in this light, the early modern Empire does not look anywhere near as different as the conventional story of the rise of the modern state suggests. Although probably best understood as a heterarchy-state (a heterarchic polity within an international system) it can (not im)plausibly be seen as an extremely heterogeneous empire-state.

The early modern Empire underwent a series of "modernizing" reforms similar to those in Spain, France, and Britain. In 1495 an independent imperial court, the *Reichskammergericht* (Imperial Chamber Court), was created to replace the *Hofgericht*, the personal high court of the medieval Emperor.[204] The other high court, the *Reichshofrat* ("Aulic Council"), was reorganized in 1497/1498 and reformed further in 1559.[205] The *Reichstag* (Imperial Diet), which was reorganized in 1489, had by the mid-sixteenth century become a significant representative institution.[206] The Empire also "modernized" its taxation and defense administrations,[207] with results broadly comparable to those of its geopolitical rivals. All of this left the Emperor (*Kaiser*) and the imperial institutions *stronger*, both absolutely and relatively, than they had been in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. In a very real sense, the Hapsburgs revived a polity that had been in serious decline for two centuries, "modernized" it, and made it a force to be reckoned with for the following two centuries.

The heterarchic character of the Empire, though, even in its (early) modern form, cannot be ignored. The other principal political centers were the so-called "territorial states" (*Territorialstaaten*);[208] "provincial" polities in my terminology – which very both internally diverse and differentially incorporated.[209] The (secular and ecclesiastical) princes that ruled these polities included seven Electors (*Kurfürsten*) – the Archbishops of Cologne, Trier, and Mainz, the King of Bohemia, the Count Palatine (*Pralzgraf*) of the Rhine, the Duke of Saxony, and the Margrave (*Markgraf*) of Brandenburg[210] – who exercised a wide range of rights that elsewhere generally were held by kings, including rights to hear appeals from lower tribunals, collect taxes, levy customs duties, and mint coins. Imperial Princes (*Reichsfürsten*) – in 1582, 43 held votes in the Prince's Chamber (*Reichsfürstenrat*) of the *Reichstag* – had, in addition to their elevated status and imperial rights, important juridical, fiscal, and governmental rights. And both Electors and Imperial Princes had rights to make alliances with other princes, both within and outside the Empire. In addition,

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[203] (Torre 2009#319 [emphasis added]).

[204] (Wilson 2011, 70-75), (Wilson 2004, 177-182), (Holborn 1959, 43-44).

[205] (Whaley 2012, 364-365). On the jurisdiction of the supreme courts, see (Härter 2013, 124-129).

[206] (Whaley 2012, 355-356, 370-371).

[207] (Whaley 2012, 361-362, 439-440, 443-444, 494-497, 512-521, 570-572), (Wilson 2011, 85-93), (Wilson 2004, 157-169).

[208] (Wilson 2016, 353-396) is a good recent survey of territorial political organization in the Empire from the early twelfth through the end of the fifteenth century, emphasizing not the "*failure* to centralize" but rather the *successes* in "revising and recombining earlier methods into a new, more collective form of imperial governance by the emperor and a more self-conscious princely elite." (Wilson 2016, 353). (Arnold 1991) considers the medieval background at greater length. On territorial political organization in the early modern period, see (Wilson 2016, 396-421), (Barraclough 1963 [1947], 320-381), (Whaley 2012, 47-49, 255-271, 275-280, 486-491), (Wilson 2011)@33-36, 99-102}.

[209] Watts' caution (2009, 306) about the late medieval Empire, however, holds in the early modern period as well: "too much should not be made of the supposed 'dualism' of the Empire."

[210] New Electorates were created for Bavaria in 1623 and Hanover (Brunswick-Lüneburg) in 1692/1708.

Imperial Counts (*Reichsgrafen*) – there were about 140 in the mid-sixteenth century – exercised a variety of governmental rights.[211]

Not all of the territory of the Empire, however, was subject to a "territorial prince." The imperial knights (*Reichsritter*)[212] owed direct allegiance to the Emperor, placing some 1,500 estates encompassing 4,000 square miles and hundreds of thousands of inhabitants outside of any territorial principality. Even more importantly, the Free Imperial Cities (*Freie und Reichsstädte*)[213] – there were about five dozen in the late sixteenth century[214] – also enjoyed "imperial immediacy" (*Reichsunmittelbarkeit*); i.e., direct subordination to the Emperor, without incorporation into a subordinate "territorial" unit.

Furthermore, the *Territorialstaaten*, as the high medieval origin of the term clearly indicates, were not *territorial* states, as we understand that term today. They were aggregated into dynastic composites of different, usually geographically scattered, holdings.[215] For example, sixteenth-century Electoral Palatine was composed of a large but wildly irregular "Swiss cheese" centered on Heidelberg plus some two dozen small and half a dozen intermediate-sized pieces. Electoral Cologne was more compact but also included the Duchy of Westphalia some fifty miles to the east. And processes of territorial agglomeration continued throughout the early modern period.[216] Most notably, in 1618 the Margrave of Brandenburg added Prussia to his domain, creating Brandenburg-Prussia, which included not only its two widely separated, amoeba-shaped named components but also Cleves, Ravensberg, and Mark to the southwest (to which Minden and Halberstadt were added in 1648). The result was "a completely artificial, composite state, spread in three main blocks across northern Germany and Poland."[217]

In other words, both the Empire and its "territorial states" were, like France, Britain, and Spain, fundamentally non-territorial dynastic agglomerates. And although the Emperor in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was weaker than strong kings, we should not overstate either the (relative) weakness of the Emperor or the (relative) strength of kings, especially when inexperienced, inept, uninterested, or unlucky.

It is true that "the emperor wielded power and influence to very different degrees in different areas"[218] and that "in each area, different dynastic and legal traditions gave rise to differing degrees

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[211] Furthermore, in most of the leading "territorial states" princes shared rule with "estates" (*Landstände* and *Landtage*); that is, corporately-organized representative institutions that were the second-tier parallel to the *Reichstag*. We will look at the mixed rule of princes and estates – which was common across Europe in the sixteenth century – in §7.3. (Carsten 1959) is the standard English-language introduction to the "German" estates.

[212] (Wilson 2004, 41-42, 199-200, 245, 249, 341-342; 2011, 12, 14, 29-30), (Whaley 2012, 42-43, 80, 210, 353).

[213] (Wilson 2004, 37-38, 72-74, 147-148, 347-348, 378-379), (Whaley 2012, 26, 41, 43, 249-251, 351-352, 531-540).

[214] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Free_Imperial_Cities provides a list.

[215] Bohemia was the exception that proves the rule.

[216] (Wilson 2016, ch. 8) is a good recent introduction, pp. 431-475 covering the period of Hapsburg rule. My account parallels Wilson's (2016, 9) presentation of "kingship" (Empire), territory, and dynasty as the three "bas[es] of imperial governance." I would suggest, however, that the frame of heterarchy is more penetrating than Wilson's description (2016, 9) of the Empire as a polity with "a dominant, if shifting core" that, in varying ways across time, "ruled its population through a complex hierarchy defined by socio-legal status." (Wilson's sharply drawn distinction between federalism and the "complex hierarchy" of the Empire, however, makes me suspect that he might accept the frame of heterarchy.)

[217] (Koenigsberger 1987a, 193).

[218] (Whaley 2012, 19).

of imperial jurisdiction."[219] These descriptions, though, also fit Spain, France, and Britain (although by the late-seventeenth century not to the same degree). Similarly, although "attempts to establish an effective system of royal government, either in south Germany or in the Reich as a whole, remained piecemeal and only intermittently effective"[220] much the same was true of Spain, France, and Britain. Even the ethnic diversity of the Empire was not distinctive.[221]

We also should not overlook the considerable attractions of the Empire's structure. It both fostered and embodied local autonomy and diversity. It kept its monarch in check as well as in Britain and better than in France. Its geopolitical orientation was largely defensive not aggressive. And the Empire provided a context for a not-entirely-unsuccessful experiment in peaceful coexistence among its many and diverse polities. Abandoning nationalist and statist prejudices, we might even see the Empire as an attractive historical model for thinking about regional integration[222] and globalization – more a precocious foretaste of a postmodern future than a relic of the medieval past.

Voltaire was right: the early modern Empire was neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire.[223] We should take this, though, as ironic rather than pejorative. And we certainly should not follow Samuel Pufendorf in describing it as a "monstrosity."[224]

At the time of the Peace of Westphalia (1648), there was little to suggest that the Empire had a less robust future than France, Britain, or Spain. (I am aware of no argument at this time that the Empire was doomed by its structure.) In fact, the Empire escaped the tumult of the civil wars that wracked Britain and France in the 1640s and 1650s.[225] And Spain, not the Empire, dropped from the ranks of the great powers in the following decades.

Only in the wars of the absolutist era, beginning in the 1670s and reaching frightening scope in the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), did the weakness of the Empire begin to become evident. And even then the problem was not that the Empire was less modern in the Weberian sense but that it was less "absolutist;"[226] less able to coerce resources from its population to fund the huge armies of the era.[227] In the eighteenth century, the Empire lost out not to modern states but to a different type of pre-modern state, the fiscal-military state.[228]

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[219] (Whaley 2012, 24).

[220] (Whaley 2012, 80).

[221] The Empire of the German Nation was no more multiethnic than Philip II's "Spain," even ignoring its non-European holdings. Bretons, Normans, Gascons, and Provencals were arguably less "French" than their Rhenish, Swabian, Saxon, and Austrian counterparts were "German." And the differences between Scots, Irish, Welsh, and English were at least as great as those between Bohemians, Bavarians, Lothringians, and Westphalians.

[222] ??? [Add note on *Kreise*]

[223] "Ce corps qui s'appelait et qui s'appelle encore le saint empire romain n'était en aucune manière ni saint, ni romain, ni empire." *Essai sur l'histoire générale et sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations* (1756), ch. 70. Cited in http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Voltaire.

[224] *Die Verfassung des deutschen Reiches* (On the State of the German Empire), published in 1667 under the pseudonym Severinus de Monzambano. See (Seidler 2007, x-xv and esp. xvii-ixx), (Wilson 2006).

[225] On the Fronde in France, ee §11.1.

[226] See §11.2.

[227] On the French army of this era, see §9.2.

[228] See §11.4.

7 The Politics of Corporations and Privilege

Early modern European societies,[229] like early modern polities, were aggregates. They were complex assemblages of legally recognized corporate groups: social corporations, especially the clergy,[230] nobility, and burghers; economic corporations, especially guilds, banks, and trading corporations; and the differentially incorporated provinces discussed in the preceding section, which were understood as territorial corporations.[231]

Each corporation enjoyed specific privileges, in the root sense of "'private laws,' that is, laws allowing members of one particular group or territory to enjoy advantages that others did not possess."[232] "Privileges were both disseminated horizontally among territories such as provinces, cities, and seigneuries, and assigned vertically along a hierarchy of social status."[233]

"Nearly every class and group of people, from the high nobility and clergy down to the craftsman in his guild, had specific rights and privileges."[234] To our ears, the exclusion from this list of the great majority of the population (that is, rural peasants) sounds offensive. The dominant (elite) understanding of the time, though, was that legal and political personality was largely a matter of possessing privileges as a member of one or more corporations. In this system of "ranked subjects with unequal rights,"[235] rights "were not the universal rights of citizens: they were part of one's station and locality."[236]

> Society was commonly regarded as a series of hierarchically ordered social groups, all of whom were expected to fulfil particular roles in order to maintain social harmony. It was these groups that gave an individual his or her identity and set the general scope for life opportunities. Individuals were bound by their place in the family, by the negative or positive obligations imposed by rank, by the rights ascribed to particular localities and professions, and by the dictates of religion.[237]

Furthermore, it must be emphasized that "the network of privileges was as much, or perhaps even more, a construction of the early modern period as the medieval. Its vast increase in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and its routinization in the eighteenth occurred in tandem with the growth

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[229] (Gestrich 2015) and (Hunt 2015) are good brief recent overviews of early modern society. See also (Huppert 1998), (Kamen 2000). For country studies, see on France (Beik 2009); Britain (Wrightson 2017), (Sharpe 1997 {1987]); Spain (Casey 1999).

[230] In line with my general downplaying of religion, I largely ignore religious corporations and clerical privileges.

[231] On France, see Mousnier (1979 [1974], ch. 10-14).

[232] (Bossenga 1991, 5). The reference here (and in the following note) is to France but the point is generally applicable.

[233] (Bossenga 1991, 5).

[234] (Koenigsberger 1987a, 189).

[235] (Bossenga 2001, 52).

[236] (Bossenga 2012, 157).

[237] (Bossenga 2001, 43). Charles Loyseau, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, offers an early modern account of hierarchy that closely mirrors that of (Pseudo-)Dionysius (see §4.2). "We cannot live together in a condition of equality, but of necessity it must be that some command and others obey. Those who command have several orders or degrees … And the people, who obey all of these, are again divided into several ranks and orders … [But] by means of these multiple divisions and subdivisions, one general order is formed out of many orders, and of many estates a well-ordered state where there are good harmony and consonance and a correspondence and interrelationship from the highest to the lowest: so that, through order, an infinite number results in unity." (Loyseau 1994 [1610], 5-6 [Preface §§3, 4]).

of the state and the economy."[238] Until the end of the *ancien regime*, European societies remained "societ[ies] of corporations and communities, retaining their own powers, liberties, and privileges."[239]

7.1 The Nobility

"Every state in Europe except certain Swiss cantons recognized the existence of a nobility, a social group enjoying some form of legally established hereditary superiority."[240] And the early modern nobility was "not just another part of society, but a constitutive principle of its organization."[241] "Rulers all over Europe expected to base their domestic regimes upon partnership with their nobilities, whose local power they continued to harness."[242]

Although the shape and powers of national nobilities varied considerably,[243] all enjoyed extensive legal[244] and fiscal privileges,[245] usually – England was the principal exception – including exemption from most direct taxes. Politically, nobles often held a privileged place in representative institutions and had preferential (and sometimes exclusive) access to certain offices.[246] Nobles also enjoyed extensive social privileges.[247] And into the early seventeenth century leading nobles controlled substantial armed forces.[248]

Landowning nobles[249] often enjoyed lucrative monopolies – for example, residents often were required to mill their grain at the lord's mill or bake their bread in his ovens[250] – and benefited from services and dues with medieval roots. Many also controlled seigneurial courts,[251] which helped to solidify their domination of the countryside.

The relative positions of king and nobility did change during the early modern period. Sixteenth-century nobles at the highest levels thought of themselves as the peers of the king (who they understood as simply the highest ranking noble). For example, in France "Henry II [r. 1547-1549] had presented himself as like other nobles, had shared their ideals, and interacted with them on relatively equal terms. A century later, Louis XIV permitted no one to feel such likeness. His reign stressed instead the distance between king and all subjects, nobles included."[252]

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[238] (Bossenga 2001, 52). Cf. §6.4.

[239] (Mousnier 1979 [1974], 640).

[240] (Doyle 1992, 73).

[241] (Zmora 1991, 2). Cf. (Maczak 1996, 189), (Bonney 1981a, 818).

[242] (Scott and Storrs 2007, 39).

[243] (Dewald 1996) offers a general overview. (Munck 1990, ch. 5) and (Doyle 1992, ch. 4) briefly survey the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century nobility.

[244] (Bush 1983, 66-71).

[245] (Bush 1983, 27-64).

[246] (Bush 1983, 79-120), (Storrs and Scott 1996, 13-23).

[247] (Bush 1983, 120-143).

[248] For the case of late-sixteenth century France, see §9.1.4.

[249] (Bush 1983, 144-185), (Dewald 1996, 65-73).

[250] (Bush 1983, 154-156).

[251] (Bush 1983, 157-162), (Collins 1995, 5).

[252] (Dewald 1996, 122).

What we might call monarchic aristocracies became aristocratic monarchies. But these changes occurred within what J. H. Elliott nicely calls "the resilient framework of the aristocratic-monarchical state."[253]

7.2 Towns

Non-noble society was organized around communes;[254] local communities understood as corporate groups of families.[255] "Villages," where the great bulk of the population lived, were largely detached from regnal, and often even provincial, authorities. They thus will not be considered here.[256] The larger urban communities, however, were important political actors at the provincial and regnal levels.[257]

Towns were urban corporations of citizen families. More or less broad powers of self-rule typically were exercised by a council,[258] which usually was dominated by "an ill-defined group of notables who seem generally to have attained the prestige necessary to participate through some combination of wealth, occupational status, age, length of time resident in the city, and proper moral behavior."[259]

Towns enjoyed a variety of fiscal privileges. Rights to hold markets and to produce particular goods made them centers of commerce. Some enjoyed commercial monopolies.[260] Many had rights to levy excise taxes on regionally important products.[261] In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, many continental towns also enjoyed military privileges, including (often sizable) militias and fortified walls.[262] In addition, most large towns in France and Spain, like the nobility, were exempt from most ordinary direct taxes.[263]

Towns, however, were major sources of the "extraordinary" taxes, assessments, and loans that paid for the wars that were by far the largest element of the royal budget. Towns were also important administrative hubs and vital to the economic health of the region and the realm. They thus were

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[253] (Elliott 1969, 55; 1989, 112).

[254] (Kamen 2000, 9-14). Germans in particular used the language of *Gemeinde* (commune) to refer to "a sworn association of heads of household for the purposes of governance," in both rural and urban areas. (Brady 1996, 274). (Bickle 1998, ch. 1) is a powerful brief argument for the centrality of communalism. (Brady 1998, ch. 10) examines the development of communal forms. (Scribner 1994) surveys some of the historiographic controversy that the concept has provoked. On the medieval background of communes, see {Reynolds, 1984 #10245@170-183}, (Watts 2009, 98-101), (Quillet 1988, 522-526ff.).

[255] (Rowlands 1999) provides a brief introduction to rural and urban conditions of life in the sixteenth century. See also ???.

[256] See ???.

[257] (Friedrichs 1995, 2000)} surveys early modern towns. See also (Rowan 1994), (Clark 2009, ch. 11), (Blonde and van Damme 2013), and (Blockmans 1997, 126-138, 285-293), as well as (Benedict 1992) on France and (Archer 2000) on Britain. (Colson and van Steensel 2017) briefly addresses medieval and early modern towns as communities.

[258] (Friedrichs 2000, 12), (Scribner 1996, 310).

[259] (Benedict 1992, 19). Cf. (Friedrichs 2000, 18). {Reynolds, 1984 #10245@184-202} surveys municipal governance in the central middle ages.

[260] For example, in France Lille had a monopoly on long-stapled wool; Marseille on imports from the Levant; Lyon on silk imports. (Bossenga 2001, 69).

[261] ???

[262] On France see the last paragraph of §9.1.4.

[263] (Farr 1992, 131). Thus "almost anyone who was not a peasant managed to avoid paying some portion of the tax." (Kwass 2000, 24-25).

regularly both courted and coerced by both monarchs and provincial and local nobles, producing "a constant give-and-take between the city and the other elements of the political system."[264]

For example, Christopher Friedrichs notes that "princes always wanted money from cities, but in an age when rulers' military resources were limited and unstable they normally had to resort to negotiation to get it."[265] Friedrichs does not even consider the option of imposing legislation or otherwise exercising supreme authority over subordinate administrative units. Much like the nobility, towns had to be dealt with through a mixture of bribes, threats, and negotiation.

During the seventeenth century, "the balance of political power swung … fundamentally and definitively away from cities."[266] Cities, though, were tamed but not fully subordinated. They not only retained numerous privileges and considerable power but also continued to exercise "a number of functions on behalf of the state or in collaboration with the state's agents."[267]

7.3 Estates

In most realms, select social corporations were politically represented through the institution of "estates" (*états*, *Stände*, *staten*, *stati*, *stamenti*, *brazos*) organized into the "composite representative assemblies of the composite monarchies of the later middle ages and the early modern period."[268] (In France, *parlements* – national and regional courts, the functions of which included registering royal ordinances – were at least as important.[269])

In the ideal-type *Ständestaat*[270] (polity of estates) "the territorial ruler and the *Stände* [estates] make up the polity jointly, but as separate and mutually acknowledged political centers. Both constitute it, through their mutual agreement."[271] An assembly of estates "claims to represent a wider, more abstract, territorial entity – country, *Land*, *terra*, *pays* – which, they assert, the ruler is entitled to rule only to the extent that he upholds its distinctive customs and serves its interests."[272] "The supreme or sovereign power, which belongs to the prince, is limited by the liberties granted to various privileged orders of the community … [T]he prince governs with the concurrence – and under the surveillance – of the legitimate representatives of the order or orders privileged by law … regularly convoked into assemblies."[273]

In other words, these assemblies, rather than precursors of modern legislatures, were mechanisms by which the prince and select corporations shared rule. In fact, the basic conception of shared

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[264] (Friedrichs 1995, 44).

[265] (Friedrichs 2000, 67).

[266] (Clark 2009, 202).

[267] (Mousnier 1979 [1974], 569). The reference here to seventeenth-century Bordeaux is generally applicable.

[268] (Koenigsberger 1988, 101). For introductory overviews of late-medieval and early modern assemblies of estates see (Graves 2001), (Myers 1975). Cf. (Stasavage 2011, ch. 3), (Downing 1992, 30-38, 90-97, 113-136, 238-246). (Blockmans 1978, 1998) surveys medieval representative institutions, as does (Hébert 2014) at greater length. See also (Harding 2002, 221-240), (Guenée 1985 [1981], 221-226). (Quillet 1988, 554-572) explores late medieval theories of representation.

[269] For a brief introduction, see (Swann 2001, 155-160; 2012). (Lewis 1971) is a useful brief discussion of the relative weakness of the French Estates General. See also (Lewis 1968, ch. 4).

[270] See (Weber 1978, ch. 13), (Poggi 1978, ch. 3).

[271] (Poggi 1978, 48).

[272] (Poggi 1990, 41).

[273] (Lousse 1964 [1958], 45-46). (Del Treppo 1998, 592-593) briefly summarizes the constitutional structure of late-medieval Aragon, where the institution of estates was especially highly developed.

corporate rule was fundamentally late-medieval – as suggested by the fact that sssemblies of estates developed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

The powers and procedures of assemblies of estates – which existed both at the "national" level (e.g., the "Estates General" in France and the Netherlands) and the "provincial" level (*états particuliers*)[274] – varied considerably. The central dynamic, though, involved royal requests for taxes, subsidies, and loans that were met by invocations of the right to advise and consent, insistence on the crown's obligation to protect existing privileges, and, often, demands for new privileges.

The groups represented also varied. One pattern involved three estates, corresponding to the three medieval social orders of clergy, nobility, and commoners – although the "third estate" typically represented towns (and in Britain the gentry) not the people generally. In Castile, however, both the clergy and nobility were excluded after 1538 – because the king had no realistic prospect of getting much money from them.[275] In Britain, by contrast, both sat together in a single chamber. And in parts of Scandinavia and Germany, the peasantry was represented as a separate estate.[276]

In other words, to the medieval "ruling orders" of clergy and nobility were added (usually urban) propertied interests. H. G. Koenigsberger thus speaks of "the crystallization of powerful social groups into estates."[277] The estates were "the watchdogs of privilege and power-sharing"[278] – which were inextricably linked in early modern composite-corporate polities. As Weber puts it, "proprietors of privilege … came together in joint congresses for the purpose of ordering political matters by means of compromise."[279] And in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, provincial assemblies of estates often were a crucial mechanism for achieving and maintaining composite rule – although later "absolutist" rulers were increasingly able to circumvent (but not entirely overcome) their constraints.[280]

7.4 Patronage

Patronage provided the other principal integrative and representative mechanism in early modern polities. "Patron-client ties … were a form of political association, a method of achieving political goals, and a motive for political action. They were also an underlying social structure."[281]

Political power in early modern Europe was fundamentally a matter of (mostly noble) elites deploying their status, lands, children, offices, wealth, and other resources through vast patronage

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[274] See, for example, in the Empire (Carsten 1959), (Oestrich 1982, ch. 11); in France (Major 1980), (Collins 1994), (Miller 2010), (Swann 2003); in Spain (Jago 1981, 1992), (Sanz 1994).

[275] There are several good short studies of the Castilian *Cortes* in the early modern period, including (Thompson 1982, 1984), (Jago 1981, 1992), (Palos 1993), and (Forteza Pérez 2007).

[276] (Bulst 1996, 50-51), (Graves 2001, 20), (Myers 1975, 88, 90).

[277] (Koenigsberger 1995, 160). Cf. (Poggi 1990, 42).

[278] (Graves 2001, 3-4).

[279] (Weber 1994, 101).

[280] On the persisting significance of regional estates in "absolutist" France, see (Swann 2003, 2012). And in Britain, the estates of the realm – Parliament – gained the upper hand. On "absolutism" see §11.2.

[281] (Kettering 1986a). Cf. (Patterson 1999, 15), (Peck 1993 [1990], 4).

networks to achieve local control and national influence.[282] And the king was less a qualitatively different kind of actor than "the greatest patron;"[283] "the archpatron."[284]

Kings "far from struggling against privilege, found it a resource they could not live without."[285] They ruled "through the manipulation and management of factional groups within the government and the court elites."[286] As Koenigsberger puts it, early modern kings are "best visualized as sitting, spider-like, at the centre of a kingdom-wide network of patron-client relations."[287]

Clientelism, in James Scott's well-known definition, involves "a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services."[288] Even today, centers and peripheries are often linked clientelistically in societies "with a relatively weak and ineffective state apparatus."[289]

The generalized description offered by Shmuel Eisenstadt and Louis Roniger fits early modern Europe almost perfectly.

> The center impinges on the local … communities mainly in the form of administration of law, the maintenance of peace, exaction of taxation, provision of some distributive goods and the maintenance of cultural and/or religious links to the center ... But, with few exceptions, most of these links were effected through existing local kinship-territorial and/or ritual units and subcenters, and/or through patrimonial-like bureaucracies.[290]

Clientelism seems to us today fragmented and inefficient. In early modern Europe, however, it was not only hierarchical and "centralizing" (compared to feudalism) but "necessary to stable government."[291] "The central authority of a territory needed figures of sufficient standing, as well as of assured loyalty, for its policies to be implemented effectively at the local level."[292] Kings, lacking both the authority to command and the capabilities to control peripheral provinces, used patronage "to establish vertical ties strong enough to counter the horizontal and centrifugal forces of society."[293]

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[282] (Lind 1996) is a brief introduction to patronage and early modern state building. For a brief introduction to early modern patronage networks in France, see (Major 1964). Cf. (Salmon 1975, 15-16, 25-26, 92ff., 117-121), (Knecht 2001, 273-274, 279). The standard study of seventeenth century French patronage is (Kettering 1986b). See also (Major 1986), (Schalk 1986). (Peck 1993 [1990]) is a useful study of patronage in early Stuart Britain.

[283] (Major 1964, 643).

[284] (Salmon 1975, 92).

[285] (Kwass 2000, 31).

[286] (Parrott 2012b, 284). I almost completely ignore the role of royal courts here. (Duindam 2015) is a recent overview, emphasizing the distinctiveness of early modern courts.

[287] (Koenigsberger 1987a, 42).

[288] (Scott 1972, 92). Cf. (Stokes et al. 2013, 6-14 and Figure 1.1).

[289] (Stokes 2009, 1 [on-line version]).

[290] (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1980, 65).

[291] (Patterson 1999, 2).

[292] (Aylmer 1996, 66). Cf. (Cohn 1971, 29).

[293] (Major 1992, 865). The reference here is to France but applies generally.

In return, peripheral elites obtained a voice at the center. For example, "so important was it to have a governor with influence that in 1630 the three estates of Brittany petitioned the King to name Richelieu their governor, and a few years later Provence asked for his demented brother."[294]

In the sixteenth century "kings made no serious effort to control the patronage system … They depended on the clientage networks of the magnates to maintain the vertical ties of society."[295] In the seventeenth century, although noble patronage networks did become incorporated within and largely subordinated to those of the monarch, politics remained fundamentally clientelist. Feudal relations of pledged personal loyalty were replaced not by impersonal bureaucratic rule but by a different type of unequal relations between unequal persons and groups.

Throughout the early modern period, societies and polities were "grouped into corporations, divided into orders, and linked vertically by powerful ties of kinship[296] and clientage."[297]

8   Early Modern Administration

The modern (Weberian) state is a very particular type of bureaucratic state that "adjudicate[es] and administer[s] according to rationally established law and regulation."[298] Early modern bureaucracies were quite different – and in most ways less professional and less "bureaucratic" than their contemporaries in Ming and Qing China.[299] I look here at Spain and France, the most administratively advanced great powers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

8.1 Spain

Ferdinand and Isabella created the Council of the Inquisition in 1488 and the Council of Orders in 1489, laying the foundation for the Spanish practice of administration by councils.[300] By the late sixteenth century, Philip II ruled through six geographical and eight functional councils,[301] giving Spain what J. H. Elliott describes as administratively "the most advanced state of sixteenth-century Europe."[302] Typically, though, each council was staffed by just six to ten professionals. Thus two sentences later Elliott describes this bureaucracy as "cumbersome, corrupt, and appallingly slow."[303]

Charles and Pihilp did substantially regularize of provincial administration, which typically was exercised by a viceroy, the chief executive of the jurisdiction, and an *audiència*, which administered

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[294] (Major 1964, 642).

[295] (Major 1992, 870). The reference to France here applies generally across Europe.

[296] It would be entirely appropriate to give much greater emphasis to kingship than I have here. For example, (Tadmor 2001) explicitly links household, kinship, and patronage and (Adams 1994, 2005a) explores what she calls "the familial state." I have in effect treated kinship as a particular type of patronage. An even more thorough account would consider the full range of non-governmental political networks, including "lordship and service, patronage and clientage, families, dynasties, and clans" (Watts 2009, 153) – the relative significance of which varied with time and place in both medieval and early modern Europe.

[297] (Elliott 1969, 42).

[298] (Weber 1978, 1394. Cf. 971, 1393).

[299] (Wang and Adams 2011) provides an interesting account of the centrality of patrimonialism in Qing China and early modern Europe. [Need more cites] ???

[300] On the late medieval background, see (Ruiz 2007, ch. 6)

[301] (Elliott 2002 [1963], 170-181). (Thompson 1967) examines the Council of War under Philip II.

[302] (Elliott 1989, 14).

[303] (Elliott 1989, 14). Cf. (Dover 2016 [2012]), (Poole 1981).

justice. In cities and towns, the king was represented by a *corregidor*.[304] But patronage and court politics regularly intervened. "Few Viceroys could expect to serve out their term with a reputation intact. … Sooner or later, the King's representative would be brought down by faction in Madrid or complaints from the province – as often as not orchestrated from the capital."[305]

The Spanish bureaucracy was an instrument of patrimonial and personal – not legal-rational – rule. "The administration was really an *ad hoc* system of councils with the king at the center."[306] Philip also made extensive use of *juntas* (unofficial committees),[307] to maintain his independence from the official bureaucracy – underscoring the simple and fundamentally non-bureaucratic character of sixteenth century Spanish government.

"Only in Castile was any real attempt made to centralise the administration, and even here effective control of the towns and countryside fell to the grandees and nobility."[308] And in the seventeenth century the system became even more patrimonial and dependent on patronage.[309]

8.2 France

France's burgeoning bureaucracy[310] – Louis XII (r. 1498-1515) had perhaps 5,000 officials; Louis XIV (r. 1643-1715) had more the 50,000 – neither penetrated very deeply into the provinces nor was entirely under royal control. Provincial governors, drawn principally from the upper nobility, were semi-independent powers[311] and "the great nobles exercised considerable influence over the appointment and behavior of royal officials in their fiefs."[312] Major towns were semi-autonomous.[313] And, as we saw above, provincial legal and political institutions and identities remained strong in many places.

The early Bourbon kings did significantly increase central administrative capabilities. Most notably, after 1634 *intendants* exercised general administrative oversight in two dozen *généralités* (new administrative districts).[314] In typical early modern fashion, though, they were layered on top of, rather than a replacement for, older jurisdictions, institutions, and practices. And *intendants* acted not as legal-rational bureaucrats but as agents of their families – "what mattered above all to most of

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[304] (Elliott 2002 [1963], 75-84), (Woodward 2013 [1992], 17).

[305] (Lovett 1977, 142).

[306] (Woodward 2013 [1992], 12).

[307] (Lovett 1977, 144-146, 63-73, 97-100, 194-210).

[308] (Woodward 2013 [1992], 16)

[309] The first half of the century was the era of the *privado* or *valido*, the royal favorite who was not just a first minister but virtually the alter ego of the king. (On the broad phenomenon in early modern Europe, see (Elliott and Brockliss 1999).) Francisco Gómez de Sandoval, Duke of Lerma, effectively ruled Spain from 1599 until 1618. (Williams 2010), (Feros 2000). Gaspar de Guzmán, Count-Duke of Olivares, dominated Spanish politics from 1621 to 1643.(Elliott 1986). And in the second half of the seventeenth century politics became so fragmented there often there was little central direction.

[310] See (Collins 1995, 5-22), (Major 1994, 32-47).

[311] (Mousnier 1979 [1980], ch. 22), (Harding 1978).

[312] (Major 1964, 640).

[313] (Mousnier 1979 [1974], ch. 13). (Finley-Croswhite 1999) provides an extended case study of towns during the reign of Henry IV.

[314] (Mousnier 1979 [1980], ch. 26).

those associated with the state, from the highest ranking to the lowliest, was the situation of their family"[315] – and as brokers in the patronage networks of the king and his ministers.[316]

Furthermore, almost the entire judiciary and much of the royal administration *owned* their offices[317] – which after 1604 were fully transferable private property.[318] By 1664 there were more than 45,000 venal offices in the judiciary and financial administration alone.[319] And even *intendants* (and other royal officials who did not own their offices) typically owned (or were parts of families that owned) other offices.

Nonetheless, the King and his councilors were so desperate financially[320] that they had no choice – given that directly taxing the nobility was unthinkable.[321] In fact, they had strong financial incentives (which they regularly indulged, to the considerable chagrin of both office holders and the population that they serviced [i.e., on whom they preyed]) to create unnecessary and duplicative offices.

A similar logic underlay "tax farming," the practice by which specified tax receipts were "leas[ed] by the crown … to a private contractor for a set number of years in return for a fixed annual rent, any additional profits of the farm accruing to the contractor."[322] And this practice continued through Bourbon rule, with the "general farm" (*ferme–générale*), established by Colbert in 1681, providing about half the crown's annual revenues until the Revolution.[323]

In addition, kinship and patronage remained central to the system. For example, "from 1680 to 1700 the closest circle of ministers around Louis XIV of France consisted, with one exception, exclusively of members of the family clans of Colbert and LeTellier-Louvois."[324] The king and his ministers "ruled through the manipulation and management of factional groups within the government and the court elites."[325] And they continued to rely on the still semi-independent power of provincial and local elites to implement their designs and directives.

Louis XIV did significantly weaken the independent power of the provincial nobility. Nonetheless, "a major problem for Louis, as for his predecessors, was to ensure the loyalty and cooperation of his

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[315] (Rowlands 2002, 12). (Adams 2005a) develops idea of what she calls the early modern "familial state."

[316] (Kettering 1986a, 233, 235). Cf. (Collins 1995, 65). (Major 1994, ch. 8-10) presents a story of Richelieu's administration that combines the themes of nobility, estates, and patronage.

[317] (Mousnier 1979 [1980], ch. 5) is a good introduction to *officiers*.

[318] (Mousnier 1979 [1980], 35-52). (The *droit annuel* (or "Paulette," named for its proposer, the financier Charles Paulet) required an annual payment (initially one-sixteenth of the price of the office), making even past venality a *continuing* source of royal revenue.) In Spain and England it was common for office-holders to rent out their offices. (Descimon 1996, 108).

[319] (Doyle 1996, 6, 11). (Mousnier 1971 [1946]) and (Potter 2003b) look at venality in the seventeenth century. (Doyle 1996) considers the eighteenth century. For a broad survey of venality in seventeenth-century Europe, see (Swart 1949) and, much more briefly, (Blockmans 1997, 227-234).

[320] The extreme case would appear to be 1633, when income from the sale of offices amounted to half of total royal receipts. (Mousnier 1970, 492).

[321] (Kwass 2000, 23, 31), (Parker 1983, 139). Similarly, in Britain "the options of eighteenth-century fiscal legislators were severely limited as long as they refused to countenance a properly policed tax on wealth." (Brewer 1990 [1988], 217).

[322] (Bonney 1979, 11).

[323] (Bonney 1979, 11).

[324] (Reinhard 1996a, 8).

[325] (Parrott 2012b, 284).

officials."[326] A. Lloyd Moote thus titles an article on the period 1615-1683 "The French Crown versus Its Judicial and Financial Officials."[327]

Governance in Bourbon France was, as Sharon Kettering puts it, "quasi-bureaucratic at best."[328] "On paper, the king possessed an impressive officialdom, but it should not be confused with a modern bureaucracy."[329]

8.3 Administering Early Modern Polities

"Nowhere in Europe, not even in Prussia, did a fully developed professional civil service exist before the end of the eighteenth century."[330] Administratively no less than legally, politically, and socially, early modern polities were complex and variegated agglomerations that did not aspire to be rationalized unitary wholes. Early modern bureaucracies instead "facilitated the administration of composite entities."[331]

As David Parrot argues,

> Administrations where the agents were directly employees of the crown typically remained small, overburdened, and staffed by favour and established influence or direct patronage. Seeing in these structures an embryonic bureaucracy of motivated and specialized officials, cooperating closely and independently of external influences to enforce the directives of an ever-more exigent central state authority, is an anachronistic imposition of what, even in the nineteenth century, may have been an idealized view. … [O]fficials worked within the constraints of fiscal, legal and territorial privilege at almost every level of early modern society, and encountered provincial, institutional, and individual autonomy, influence and obstructionism just as inevitably.[332]

In Weber's ideal-type account, administrators in a bureaucratic/legal order are 1) "personally free." They are 2) "organized in a clearly defined hierarchy of offices" in which 3) "each office has a clearly defined sphere of competence." 4) "The office is filled by a free contractual relationship."   5) Modern bureaucrats "are selected on the basis of technical qualification" and 6) "are remunerated by fixed salaries in money." 7) "The office is … the primary occupation of the incumbent" and 8) "constitutes a career." 9) "The official works entirely separated from ownership of the means of administration and without appropriation of his position" and 10) "he is subject to strict and systematic discipline and control in the conduct of the office."[333]

By the mid-seventeenth century, administrators were personally free and a growing number were making administration both a career and their primary occupation. But even in the eighteenth century, all the other features of modern bureaucracy were, at best, embryonic or restricted to

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[326] (Parker 1983, 137). Cf. (Potter 2003a).

[327] (Moote 1962).

[328] (Kettering 1988, 422).

[329] (Swann 2001, 146).

[330] (Reinhard 1996a, 13).

[331] (Nexon 2009, 91).

[332] (Parrott 2012b, 328).

[333] (Weber 1978, 220-221 Cf. 956-959).

particular departments. And the entire apparatus was driven by the personal and dynastic interests of a patrimonial ruler – and the no less patrimonial interests of most office holders.

Even in the most "modern" of mid-*eighteenth* century bureaucracies, most officers still fit G. E. Aylmer's model of "the old administrative system."

> (i) entry to office by means of patronage, patrimony, purchase, or some combination of these; (ii) tenure of office either for life or during pleasure; (iii) entry often through the acquisition of a reversionary interest; venality; the treatment of offices as if there were subject to normal rights of private property; (iv) the employment of deputies by part-time or wholly absentee office-holders, and the (*de facto*) acceptance of sinecurism; (v) the remuneration of officials by means of fees, gratuities, and perquisites, as much as, often more than, by salaries, stipends or wages from the Crown or the State; … (vi) the regarding of office as a private right or interest, rather than as a public service.[334]

Furthermore, whatever the aspirations of reformist ministers, even the most advanced early modern bureaucracies were ad hoc aggregations that reflected and perpetuated the balance of interests between the crown and the nobility (and, increasingly in the eighteenth-century, non-noble elites). And, as in the case of *intendants*, "'new' administration did not replace but was added on to existing institutions … [A]dministrative innovation … either worked around existing office-holders and their interests or reached an accommodation with them by combining the old and new to their mutual satisfaction."[335]

9 Armed Force in Early Modern Europe: The Case of France

Charles Tilly's pithy observation that "war made the state and the state made war"[336] captures an essential insight. Early modern kings built their polities and aggrandized themselves in large measure through war,[337] the expenses of which drove administrative and financial reforms – which further increased their absolute and relative power …

But empires that make war and wars that make empires have been common in both Western and non-Western history. China's Kangxi Emperor (r. 1667-1722) deployed even larger forces than his French contemporary Louis XIV. And early modern kings had nothing like a monopoly on armed force.

To examine the control of force in relatively great detail, I look here at just one country: France, (the sole top-tier military power across the early modern period). To allow even greater detail, I consider two examples: the Wars of Religion and the armies of Louis XIV.

9.1 Force and Faction in the Wars of Religion

The Wars of Religion (1562-1598/1628) illustrate not only the dispersion of control over military force but also the composite nature of early modern French polities. They also allow us to

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[334] (Aylmer 1980, 92).

[335] (Brewer 1990 [1988], 69. Cf. 74).

[336] (Tilly 1975, 42). Cf. (Tilly 1985, 1992 [1990]). (Nexon 2013) cautions against simplistic readings of this maxim. See also (Teschke 2010), (Burkhardt 2010). (Porter 1994) is a good historical survey of the relationship between war and the rise of the state.

[337] I take no position on the historiographic question of a "military revolution" in early modern Europe. See, for example, (Parker 1976, 1988), (Black 1991), (Rogers 1995) .

introduce, briefly, the issue of religion, which for reasons of space has largely been excluded from the account so far.

9.1.1   *Chronology*

The Wars of Religion[338] began in March 1562 when troops of (the arch-Catholic) Duke of Guise killed some sixty Calvinist Protestants (Huguenots) worshipping in a barn in Vassy. The wars formally ended in 1598 with the Edict of Nantes, which granted limited protections to Huguenots. Religious violence, however, broke out again in 1610 and continued until 1628.[339]

In addition to eight conventional "wars," irregular or popular violence – persecution, repression, massacres, and riots – was common.[340] Deaths probably totaled about two million.[341] Given France's prewar population of about 16 million, a rough contemporary comparison is Afghanistan, which had a population of about 15 million in 1979 and has seen about one and a half million war deaths since then.

The first three wars (1562-1563, 1567-1568, 1568-1570)[342] were characterized by "desultory military operations and unsatisfactory peace agreements, which allowed each side to prepare for its revenge."[343] Conflict became more ferocious after the St. Bartholomew's massacres in 1572, in which more than ten thousand Protestants, including most of their noble leadership, were murdered.[344] When the brother of King Henry III (r. 1574-1589) died in 1584, leaving Henry of Navarre, a major Protestant leader, the successor to the throne, a Catholic rebellion, led by Henry, Duke of Guise, broke out. As the "War of the Three Henrys" [Valois (King Henry III), Bourbon (Henry of Navarre), and Guise] dragged on, law and order and the economy broke down across much of France.[345]

In 1589, Navarre became King Henry IV. But despite military successes against both his Protestant and Catholic rivals, he was unable to retake Paris (which had been under revolutionary Catholic rule since May 1588). In 1593 he abjured, having been said to quip that Paris was worth a mass.[346] With moderate Catholic sensibilities thus accommodated and moderate Protestants reassured by Henry's dedicated efforts to suppress the ultra-Catholic forces, he established sufficient mastery over the next five years to impose the Edict of Nantes.[347]

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[338] (Holt 2005) is an excellent general history. See also (Knecht 2000, 1996). (Mentzer 2000) is a solid single-chapter overview. (Nexon 2009, ch. 7) offers an account largely parallel to mine, although with a slightly different focus.

[339] (Holt 2005, ch. 7).

[340] (Tulchin 2012). On early modern popular violence more generally, see (Zagorin 1982a, b), (Bercé 1987 [1980], 1990 [1974]), (Beik 2007), (Slack 2008), (Ruff 2001). On the many dimensions of violence in early modern France, see (Carroll 2006). (Firnhaber-Baker and Schoenaers 2017) is a good recent introduction to late medieval revolts (which are strikingly similar to their early modern successors).

[341] (Knecht 1996, 96, 97), (Salmon 1975, 276), (Wood 1984, esp. 139-143, 152-156, 166-167).

[342] (Holt 2005, ch. 2), (Knecht 2000, ch. 5-7; 2001, ch. 19-21), (Salmon 1975, 146-185).

[343] (Knecht 1996, 34).

[344] (Holt 2005, ch. 3), (Knecht 2000, ch. 8; 2001, ch. 22). On the next four wars (1572-1573, 1574-1576, 1576-1577, 1579-1580) see (Holt 2005, ch. 3-4), (Knecht 2001, ch. 24; 2000, ch. 9-10).

[345] (Holt 2005, 123-136), (Knecht 2000, ch. 11; 2001, 439-452), (Salmon 1975, ch. 9, 10). Cf. (Knecht 1996, ch. 10, esp. 90-96).

[346] For a subtle reading that sees sixteenth century France as inextricably linked to Catholicism, but not in a particularly partisan fashion, see (Roelker 1996). Cf. ???.

[347] (Holt 2005, 136-177), (Knecht 2000, ch. 12-13; 2001, 454-471), (Salmon 1975, 257-306).

9.1.2 *Religion and Community*

Religion was a central political issue in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century politics, all across Europe, both internally and internationally. In France, religion had a distinctive register and resonance. French kings had used the honorific "most Christian king" (*Rex Christianissimus*) since the thirteenth century and French kingship, as the coronation ceremony emphasized, was widely understood as sacred.[348] And the unity of the realm had long been formulated in the slogan *un roi, une loi, une foi* (one king, one law, one faith). Religious heterodoxy thus was not merely heresy but *lèse majesté*.

In addition, in the early modern world, as in its medieval predecessor, there was general agreement that there was no more important social and political issue than getting religion "right" – making religion an intensely public and social, not private and individual, issue. Furthermore, Christianity "was perceived by Protestants and Catholics alike as a community of believers rather than a body of beliefs."[349] Minority religions thus undermined public order not simply through heresy but by dividing the community.

There thus was general agreement that "religious toleration was intolerable."[350] Across Europe in the third quarter of the sixteenth century, the prevailing view was that "no realm could be at peace with itself with two religions worshipped simultaneously."[351]

Some moderate French Catholics were willing to accept private Huguenot practice (and perhaps even discrete public worship outside of towns). But only grudgingly, in the interests of civil peace,[352] as a short run expedient until religious unity could be restored through more peaceful (although still coercive) means – as Louis XIV ultimately did in revoking the Edict of Nantes in 1685.

Huguenots,[353] however, demanded not just full rights of public practice but also the right to control local institutions where they predominated. (Although only about ten percent of the total population, they were the majority in a few major cities and a sizable minority in many others.[354]) Accepting the idea of one king, but not one faith (and thus not one law), they *did* want to divide the realm into separate Protestant and Catholic communities – which is exactly what they did from their initial victories in 1562 to the fall of La Rochelle, the last armed Protestant city, in 1628.

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[348] (Holt 2005) and, at much greater length, (Jackson 1984). See also (Bloch 1973).

[349] (Holt 2005, 23). "Rather than" is probably too strong; "more than" or even "as well as" seems to me more accurate.

[350] (Dunn 1979, 8).

[351] (Greengrass 1987, 69). In England, Catholics or Protestants were persecuted, depending on the religion of the monarch. In Spain, Protestant communities were not permitted to emerge, repression of Muslims and Moriscos intensified, and forced orthodoxy was an important source of the Dutch War of Independence, which began in 1568. In the Empire, when it became clear that Lutheranism could not be extirpated, the Peace of Augsburg (1555) established an intolerant accommodation, allowing each "territorial prince" to choose Catholicism or Lutheranism as the official religion of his "state" (and repress other religions).

[352] Greengrass (1987, 69) stresses the difference between permitting heterodoxy (for purely instrumental reasons) and tolerating it – which even most Catholic moderates found intolerable.

[353] (Parker 1968, 89-125) and (McNeil 1954) are still-useful introductions to the rise and spread of Calvinism. See also (McKim 2004), (Hart 2013). (Spicer 2016) explores the diversity of early modern Calvinist Churches (dealing with France in ch. 4). Cf. (Mentzer 2007). (Meyer 1996) covers the coming of the reformation to La Rochelle, France's most important Calvinist city. (Reid 2000) is a brief survey of the course of the Reformation in France. (Pettegree, Duke, and Lewis 1994), (Murdock 2004), and (Grell 2011) emphasize the internationalism of the Reformed movement.

[354] (Greengrass 1987, 42-46), (Salmon 1975, 131-138), (Holt 2005, 30-36). At somewhat greater length see (Major 1964; 1994, ch. 3), (Mousnier 1979 [1974], ch. 4).

By the 1580s, radical Catholics were equally willing to divide "France" in the name of religion. They took up arms against the king, aided by Spanish troops, and created their own Catholic polity, which ruled Paris and much of the rest of the country for several years. Their organizing principle was one faith, with king and law subordinate to this imperative.

9.1.3   Kings and Nobles

My focus here, however, is on regional and factional rivalry, which interacted complexly with genuine religious motivation. H. M. Salmon's description of the Hundred Years War (1337-1453) as "a civil war between feudal princes, whose power rested upon territorial sub-states"[355] largely fits the Wars of Religion as well – although both the relative and absolute power of the French king was much greater at the end of Valois rule than it had been at its beginning.

Both the Valois monarchs and their competitors, such as the Bourbons and Montmorencys, pursued personal, familial, dynastic, and regional interests rather than anything that could plausibly be considered a national interest.[356] The king could not even count on the loyalty of his own family. (Henry III's brother, Francis, Duke of Alençon and Anjou, the heir to the throne, joined the Protestants in the fifth war.[357]) And such factionalism was so normal that leading rebel nobles often escaped punishment. For example, after the first war the Protestant leader Louis of Bourbon, Prince of Condé, received the office of Lieutenant-General, which had been held by his brother, who had been killed in the fighting.[358] (This example also illustrates the common pattern of even non-venal offices being passed down within a family.)

The centrality of dynastic/familial politics is perhaps clearest in the case of the Guises.[359] Claude of Lorraine (1496-1550) became the first Duke of Guise (in 1527). In 1558, his eldest son Francis, the second Duke of Guise, led the military campaign that recovered Calais from England, making him a genuine national hero. That same year, the dauphin [successor to the crown] Francis married Mary Stuart, Claude's granddaughter. When the weak, sickly, and inexperienced Francis became king in 1559, at age 15, he effectively turned the government over to his wife's uncles, Duke Francis and his brother Charles, Cardinal of Lorraine.

"The Conspiracy of Amboise," a Protestant plot to "rescue" the young king, failed miserably.[360] King Francis, however, died soon after and was succeeded by the ten-year-old Charles IX. His mother and regent, Catherine de Medici, dismissed the Guises from court and set out on an independent royal policy – which all the (other) great families resisted.

The Guises, however, soon returned, and pressed an increasingly radical Catholic vision that simultaneously sought to magnify their power. Henry, the third Duke of Guise – ably assisted by his brothers, Louis, Cardinal of Guise, and Charles, Duke of Mayenne (and governor of Burgundy) –

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[355] (Salmon 1975, 20).

[356] (Salmon 1975, ch. 5) surveys the French nobility in the lead-up to the Wars.

[357] (Holt 1986) examines Alençon's political life. (Chapter 3 covers the fifth war.)

[358] Even more strikingly, in 1620 Marie de Medici, King Louis XIII's mother (and the former regent), led an ill-fated rebellion. At its conclusion "Marie and her followers were given full pardons, captives were freed without ransom, offices were restored, salaries and pensions were paid for the period of the revolt, royal taxes that had been appropriated were written off, and Marie herself received six hundred thousand livres to pay her [war] debts." (Major 1986, 404-405).

[359] For a brief but penetrating summary of the Guise role in the wars, see (Kaiser 1990, 54-57). (Konnert 2006) and (Carroll 1998) provide detailed studies of the Guises in Champagne and Normandy respectively. (Carroll 2009) looks at the Guises in a broader European context.

[360] ???.

planned the Saint Bartholomew massacre, formed the Catholic League in 1576, and led it to war against the king in 1585.

The Guises were finally pushed from the center of French politics only when Henry III had Henry and Louis assassinated in 1588. Even then Charles (Mayenne), along with Henry's son Claude, led the Catholic League until 1595. And the last Catholic holdout proved to be their cousin Philippe Emmanuel de Lorraine, Duke of Mercœur, governor of Brittany.

9.1.4 *Force and Violence*

Although the King fielded substantial armies, Protestant towns and nobles raised roughly comparable military forces. And the royal army was only tenuously under the king's control.

The king's (more or less) permanent peacetime army numbered about 16,000 in the 1560s and 1570s. For the first three wars, the king fielded roughly 48,000, 72,000 and 68,000 troops by doubling his French forces in the first war, tripling them in the second and third, and adding, respectively, 18,000, 26,000 and 18,000 foreign mercenaries.[361] In other words, two thirds to three quarters of the royal forces were temporary additions.

The unreliability of mercenaries is notorious. The king, however, did not have all that much more control over many of "his own" forces. All the officers and most of the cavalry were nobles, with their own family and local interests and agendas. And the wartime additions to the "French" forces "were little more than the armed clients of their noble commanders."[362] "Such an army was but a small step forward from the feudal levies of the middle ages."[363]

Consider the following description of reinforcing the king's army.

> In September, 1568, at Saumur, Montpensier with some companies of gendarmes and a Poitvin infantry regiment under Richelieu was joined by a Breton infantry regiment and cavalry contingent under Martigues. By October, at Châtellerault, Montpensier had been reinforced by … veteran French infantry under Brissac and Strossi, and two advance groups of gendarmes under Guise and Longueville. … At Dissay in mid-December … Brissac and Strossi were joined by another three French infantry regiments and large continents of infantry and cavalry raised in Languedoc by Sarlaboz and Joyeuse. … [I]n late January, 1569 … the count of Tende had arrived from Dauphiny [sic] and Provence with another infantry regiment and more cavalry. … In June, at Saint-Benoit, the worn-out but still substantial elements of Aumale's eastern army added to the total … [and] Jehan de Monluc joined the army with his regiment of Gascon infantry.[364]

We see here two Guises – Aumale is Claude of Lorraine, duke of Aumale, the third son of Duke Claude – plus several members of the Guise network: Louis of Bourbon, duke of Montpensier;[365] William, viscount of Joyeuse;[366] and three soldiers who had previously fought in Scotland for Mary of Guise, regent for her daughter Mary Stuart (Sebastian of Luxembourg-Martigues, governor of

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[361] (Wood 1996, 44-66, 71-72, 233, Table 9.2).

[362] (Collins 1995, 14).

[363] (Major 1962, 119).

[364] (Wood 1996, 232).

[365] Two years later he married Catherine of Lorraine, the sister of Duke Henry.

[366] His son Anne was a favorite of Henry III, who arranged a marriage with his sister-in-law (the daughter of the Duke of Mercoeur).

Brittany, Corbeyran de Cardaillac de Sarlaboz, governor of Le Havre, and Philippe Strossi [Filippo Strozzi]). We also see Valois clients: Francois du Plessis, seigneur of Richelieu,[367] Timoleon de Cossé, count of Brissac, and Léonor of Orleans, Duke of Longueville. The "French" additions to the royal army, in other words, essentially represented a Valois-Guise military alliance of largely independent provincial forces.

Ronald Asch describes the French army in the mid-*seventeenth* century as "almost a republic of semi-independent warlords."[368] (For example, at the siege of La Rochelle in 1627, the Duke of Rochefoucald arrived with 1,500 mounted men – on four days' notice![369]) The king persuaded, cajoled, and coerced the high nobility more than he commanded them. He allied with, rather than ruled over, the leading nobles – when he was not struggling with or fighting against them.

Many towns also held considerable autonomous military power. Royal garrisons were small (and usually influenced by local loyalties). Conversely, town militias could be significant forces. (For example, in 1597 Amiens had a force of 3,000 men.[370]) In fact, well-armed and well-fortified towns were essential to Protestant resistance.[371] And the Edict of Nantes required the king to pay for garrisons in some fifty Protestant-controlled *places de sûreté* (garrisoned urban strongholds) and permitted Protestant communities, at their own expense, to maintain another hundred fortified *places de refuge*. (Only in 1629 were fortified *places de sûreté* finally eliminated.)

9.1.5   Internal and International Politics

Also striking to a twenty-first-century reader is the fact that noble leaders of rebel communities made treaties with foreign rulers as a matter of course. For example, both the 1562 Treaty of Hampton Court between Condé and Queen Elizabeth of England and the 1584 Treaty of Joinville between the Guises (on behalf of the Catholic League) and Philip II of Spain brought "foreign" forces (and foreign funds) to France. Treaties were agreements between "princes," in the broad sense of that term, not states (or even kings). Guise, Bourbon, and Valois were equally free to enter into treaties with foreign princes. (That the former usually were less attractive allies is a different matter.)

More generally, internal and external politics were not sharply demarcated. Early modern politics was fundamentally aristocratic and dynastic (rather than national or territorial). The support of Britain and some German princes for the Protestants and of Spain for the Catholic rebels was perfectly "normal" – as was the king fighting provincial nobles and even members of his own family.

In the hundred years between 1560 and 1660, France experienced "internal" warfare during 49 years and "external" war during 47 years.[372] And "internal" "French" politics often looked more like relations between polities than relations within a state. For example, the royal edicts the ended individual "wars" were essentially peace treaties among the various "French" parties. And the fact that leading rebels regularly returned to their prior positions looks very much like the treatment of

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[367] The famous seventeenth-century Cardinal was his son.

[368] (Asch 2014, 110).

[369] (Collins 1995, 28).

[370] (Major 1994, 33).

[371] (Wolfe 2000) provides an overview of walled towns during the wars. (Gould 2008) examines the struggle over fortified cities in the southwest in the early wars. For a case study of Rouen, see (Benedict 1981).

[372] (Lynn 1997, 11, Table 1.1).

foreign princes after a war: restoration of the status quo ante, with adjustments based on the balance of power.

The boundaries of royal domains were not irrelevant. They were not central either, though. For example, efforts to regulate "international" trade, in order to tax it, were not fundamentally different from efforts to regulate (in order to tax) inter-provincial trade. And people and ideas moved across "international" borders with little more difficulty than they moved across provincial borders.

Consider the Guises, whose homeland was in Lorraine[373] – in the Empire, not France. The Duke of Guise thus was both a foreign prince and a leading "French" noble – or, more accurately, he was neither, as we understand those terms today.

9.2 The Sun King's Army

Louis XIII (r. 1610-1643) and XIV (r. 1643-1715) did largely suppress local military forces. Most nobles could no longer raised forces independently[374] and the walls of most towns were breached or razed.[375] Furthermore, "internal" wars declined dramatically after 1660 – and disappeared during the reigns of Louis XV and XVI (until the Revolution).[376]

The king's army also grew dramatically. Louis XIV's largest army, of about 350,000, was more than double the largest French force during the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) – which itself was three times the largest French army during the Italian Wars (1494-1559).[377] Furthermore, France developed a substantial military bureaucracy[378] and modernized and expanded the navy.[379]

Nonetheless, Louis XIV had not a "modern army"[380] but what John Lynn aptly calls a state commission army.[381] It was in a real sense an army of the state (rather than an agglomeration of royal and noble forces). But it relied centrally on private commissioning and contracting.

The French state neither raised nor provisioned "its" forces. Rather, the crown contracted both with (noble) colonels, who recruited soldiers (usually through local and patronage networks) and then equipped and paid them,[382] and with what David Parrott calls "enterprisers,"[383] who supplied the troops (usually at a considerable profit).[384] (The government only began to directly provide arms

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[373] On this dimension of the Guises, with a focus on the seventeenth century, see (Spangler 2009).

[374] (Rowlands 2002, 354-361), (Lynn 1997, 347). Even Louis XIV, however, tried (unsuccessfully) to revive the feudal levy in 1674, 1685, and 1695. (Storrs and Scott 1996, 5). Cf. (Corvisier 1979 [1976], 25-27).

[375] ???

[376] (Lynn 1997, 11, Table 1.1).

[377] (Downing 1992, 69), (Parrott 2012a, 65), and, in greater depth, (Lynn 1997, ch. 2).

[378] (Lynn 1997, 79-95ff.), (Corvisier 1979 [1976], 63-77).

[379] (Parrott 2012b, 278, 291, 305).

[380] For a brief overview of French armed forces during the *ancien régime*, see (Parrott 2012a). On *ancien régime* warfare in Europe more generally, see (Anderson 1998 [1988]), (Childs 1982),

[381] (Lynn 1997, 9; 2001, 52).

[382] This, however, reflected some "progress" from the Thirty Years' War, when entire armies were raised by entrepreneur-generals like Wallenstein. (Anderson 1998 [1988], Pt. 1) is a good overview of military entrepreneurship in the half century before Louis XIV assumed personal rule.

[383] (Parrott 2001, 549; 2012b, ???).

[384] For example, more than half a French private's pay in the late seventeenth century went back to his commander and enterprisers to purchase his uniform and daily bread and meat. (Childs 1982, 62).

to soldiers in 1727[385] and bread in 1799.[386]) This was not all that different from the fourteenth century practice of "the enlistment of magnates as tax-funded recruiters of armies over which they could expect to exercise a fair measure of informal control."[387]

Furthermore, Louis XIV institutionalized venality in military office.[388] Colonels "were officially allowed to sell the captaincies to suitable candidates. In their turn the captains sold lieutenancies … until each commission from the lowest to the highest came to be regarded as a piece of property."[389] The best the king and his ministers could do was to try "as far as possible to keep major military commands in the hands of family, clients and allies."[390]

"The development of the army [under Louis XIV] was shaped primarily not by an agenda of 'modernisation' and 'rationalisation' but by the private interests of thousands of members of the propertied elite, from the monarch down to the humble provincial nobility and urban bourgeoisie."[391] This "public-private partnership" also had an administrative basis: private actors had skills and capabilities to organize and act locally to provide needed "products" more rapidly and at lower prices.[392] Primarily, though, it reflected "the compromise that the crown and war ministers needed to establish with French elites if the latter were to continue to provide large-scale financial support for the state's military activity."[393]

This system was simply the military application of the royal-noble-elite alliance, rooted in privilege and patronage, that dominated early modern politics. As Parrott puts it, "military devolution was no more problematic than any other delegation of the authority of the ruler."[394] And even the notions of devolution and delegation falsely suggest that authority and capabilities had previously been centrally controlled. This system in fact involved centralization, not devolution.

The French crown, like rulers across Europe, "sacrificed any possibility of eliminating the intermediate authority of its privileged subjects in return for their willingness to underwrite the costs and burdens of royal policy."[395]

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[385] (Anderson 1998 [1988], 106).

[386] (Corvisier 1979 [1976], 93).

[387] (Watts 2009, 223).

[388] (Parrott 2012b, 69, 291, 292-294). Cf. (Rowlands 2002, 166-171, 343-353), (Lynn 1997, 230-231), (Potter 2003b). Even Britain sold army offices – in 1720, the government published an official pricelist (Guy 1985, 138) – although not naval offices. (Brewer 1990 [1988], 44-45), (Bruce 1980).

[389] (Childs 1982, 78-79). In Prussia, officers in times of peace not only continued to be paid for their regiment but were allowed to have their soldiers work for them as peasants or artisans. (Kindleberger 1984, 173). Cf. (Brewer 1990 [1988], 58).

[390] (Harding 1978, 284).

[391] (Rowlands 2002, 1).

[392] (Parrott 2012b, 320-321).

[393] (Parrott 2012b, 292). Cf. (Rowlands 2002, 2, 7, 346).

[394] (Parrott 2012b, 281). Cf. (Parrott 2001, 69, 553, 554), (Lynn 1997, 354-355).

[395] (Parrott 2012b, 291). Cf. (Lynn 1997, 25). Robert Descimon (1996, 110-121) offers an interesting reading of the early modern state "as a form of business" run jointly by kings and nobles.

10   Early Modern Polities Were Not Modern States

In an Appendix (§16), I look at the early modern language of "states." This section summarizes the contrast between early modern polities and modern states and contrasts the account above with IR's standard "rise of the modern state" story.

10.1 Early Modern Composite Polities

Early modern polities differed from modern states in at least six fundamental ways.

1) Modern states were relatively tightly integrated, "unitary" polities: a single system of law and administration applied across the territory of the state. Early modern polities were composite agglomerations of territories governed by different laws, institutions, and practices.

2) In modern states the center ruled directly over its peripheries. The centers of early modern polities, even as the balance of power shifted in their favor, ruled indirectly. There was a complex collaboration and sharing of power between center and peripheries.

3) Modern states were defined territorially or nationally, legitimated legally and rationally, and ruled bureaucratically. Most early modern polities were defined dynastically, legitimated through a combination of dynasticism, tradition, and religion, and ruled patrimonially.[396]

4) Modern states were abstract entities clearly differentiated from their rulers. Early modern polities were patrimonial possessions of princes, aristocrats, and propertied elites.

5) Modern states had citizens who were individually equal before the law. Early modern polities had subjects who were members of hierarchically organized corporate groups, all but the lowest of which enjoyed particularistic privileges.

6) Modern states were multifunctional entities that monopolized not only law and force but also identity, social policy, and economic regulation. Early modern polities provided little more than (limited) access to justice, some degree of internal order, and ruinous foreign wars (during which they offered partial protection against external attack).

10.2 The Logic of Composition in Early Modern Europe

The composite dynastic empire-states of early modern Europe, however, were neither an incoherent mess nor a passing phase on the way to the modern state. They were a distinct type of polity that was the European norm for three centuries[397] – in large measure because they reflected the values of the time.

Limited transportation, communication, administrative, and coercive technologies certainly impeded the uniform integration of peripheries. Part of the explanation for "the actual inability of any of the

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[396] I have not emphasized the Weberian ideal type of patrimonial rule as much as I might have (in order to focus on more concretely structural dimensions of early modern polities and on the particularities of the early modern case). Weber sketches the type, emphasizing its military-bureaucratic character, at (1978, 231-232, 643-644, 1006-1011, 1055-1059). See also (Bendix 1977 [1960], 334-359), ???. For applications to early modern Europe, see, for example, (Ertman 1997, 2005), (Gorski 2003, 2005), ???. (Adams 2005a, b) applies an explicitly gendered version of the model to early modern Europe, especially the Netherlands. ((Wang and Adams 2011) compare early modern Europe and Qing China.) On applications to contemporary polities, see (Crouch 1979), (Bendix and Roth 1980, ch. 8), (Theobald 1982), (Callaghy 1987), (Zabludovsky 1989), (van Zon 2001), (Hanson 2011), (Bach 2011), (Bach and Gazibo 2012), (Woods 2012).

[397] The three other major powers of the era, which rose to prominence in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, were also composites. The Netherlands was a confederal agglomeration in which most power was vested in the (very diverse) provinces. Austria was "a dynastic union of separate provinces with little else in common except the ruler." (McKay and Scott 1983, 67). Brandenburg-Prussia, as the name clearly indicates, was a composite polity assembled by Hohenzollern Electors of Brandenburg.

various permutations of power convincingly to expunge any of the others,"[398] though, was normative. People typically did not desire the triumph of any one level. "If we look at the general character of early modern Europe, with its profound respect for corporate structures and for traditional rights, privileges and customs" a composite empire-state "seems to fit well with the needs of the times."[399]

This is vividly illustrated by the prevalence of an agglomerative logic both within the subordinate units of early modern composite polities and in smaller polities. In Renaissance Florence, for example, where size was not much of an issue, "what stands out is the division and complementarity of functions between a central authority and local political institutions. … Especially in matters of local government, old communal institutions, such as statutes, councils, and offices, were maintained beside those of the central power."[400] Even the Medici "followed a policy for preserving the dominion, rather than for structuring an administrative state able to (or intended to) counterbalance putative centrifugal tendencies in the pluralism of local territorial experiences."[401] The goal was "not so much to achieve a unitary administrative entity … but rather to 'rule' politically a territorially variegated dominion."[402]

Even in the eighteenth century, "few European states had any obvious geographical, ethnic, or linguistic unity, nor was it widely felt that they should have."[403] Society continued to be understood as an "organic" union of groups with fundamentally different ontological and legal statuses. People saw themselves and each other as members of corporations. And they believed that a legitimate government recognized and respected corporate privileges (including the privileges of territorial corporations).

Although early modern rulers fought hard to establish their superiority over social and economic corporations, they ruled with and through those corporations. They simply did not aspire to a unitary sovereign state. "Full incorporation of distant provinces was seldom attempted and even more rarely accomplished"[404] – because that was desired by neither the center nor the peripheries. "[C]omposite monarchies were built on a mutual compact between the crown and the ruling class of their different provinces which gave even the most arbitrary and artificial of unions a certain stability and resilience."[405] "The price to be paid for a formal political unity was a respect for local rights and customs."[406]

This was, to be sure, the path of least resistance. It was the path of least resistance, though, in large measure because in reflected the nature of contemporary identities and conceptions of legitimacy. As James Collins puts it in the case of the French legal system, "the thicket of jurisdictions, seemingly so absurd, in fact served a very important political purpose: it protected the contracts between the king and members of French society."[407]

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[398] (Watts 2009, 125). This passage refers to the middle ages but is no less applicable to the early modern period.

[399] (Elliott 1992, 68-69).

[400] (Chittolini 1989, 699).

[401] (Zorzi 2000, 21).

[402] (Zorzi 2000, 22).

[403] (Doyle 1992, 221).

[404] (Scott and Storrs 2007, 37).

[405] (Elliott 1992, 52). Cf. (Tilly 1989, 582).

[406] (Myers 1975, 73).

[407] (Collins 1995, 9). Cf. (Mousnier 1979 [1980], ch. 16).

Different laws and institutions for different places and different groups of people within a single realm was the expression of a system of rule based on a coherent interplay of material, institutional, and normative logics – not a deviation from an as-yet-unimagined unitary ideal. Early modern composite polities were not "an unsatisfactory prelude to the construction of a more effective and permanent form of political association" but rather a distinctive type, representing what proved to be a quite successful attempt "to reconcile, in terms of contemporary needs and possibilities, the competing aspirations towards unity and diversity that have remained a constant of European history."[408] The medieval world of a "patchwork of jurisdictions, operating under a (sometimes very light) co-ordinating authority"[409] had become more centralized but remained fundamentally a patchwork – because that seemed to suit the political needs and aspirations of early modern peoples.

10.3 A Succession of Types of Polities

I have told a story of the succession of different types of polities. This is in sharp contrast to the standard story of a (long and irregular but more or less continuous) development of "the modern state" as a type of polity that was present, in essence or in embryo, from the start.

 For example, Hendrik Spruyt argues that as early as the late eleventh century "we find the beginnings of the modern state," although "the process came to full fruition [only] in the wake of the French Revolution."[410] Such a reading is hopelessly anachronistic, to the point of ignoring the obvious evidence.

For example, Spruyt titles a chapter "The Rise of the Sovereign Territorial State in Capetian France."[411] In fact, though, when the last king of the house of Capet, Charles IV ("The Fair"), died (in 1328) his realm was a patchwork of disconnected, dynastically agglomerated holdings.[412] Rather than the sovereign ruler of a territorial polity, Charles was the feudal overlord of various duchies and counties that were almost entirely independent polities. And thirty years later, dynastic war had brought "the near-disintegration of the French kingdom"[413] – a condition that persisted for the better part of the following century.[414]

More generally, if, as Spruyt argues, the key element of a modern polity is "territorial exclusivity"[415] then, as we saw above in considerable detail, there was nothing even close to a modern state in early modern Europe. And it is simply false to say, as Spruyt does, that "in late medieval Europe … states became synonymous with sovereign territorial rule"[416] or that the thirteenth century – or even the seventeenth century – saw the emergence of "homogeneous governance."[417] Similarly, Joseph

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[408] (Elliott 1992, 71).

[409] (Watts 2009, 127).

[410] (Spruyt 2002, 132, 133).

[411] (Spruyt 1994, ch. 5).

[412] http://www.pitt.edu/~medart/image/france/france-l-to-z/mapsfrance/sf076fra.jpg is a readily accessible map. For a graphic illustration of the fundamentally non-territorial character of France even in 1461, see n. 182.

[413] (Watts 2009, 180).

[414] In the 1420s, 1430s, and 1440s, "there were two kingdoms in France: one centred on Bourges and the royal estates in Poitou, Berry, Auvergne and the south; the other centred on Paris and Normandy and afforced by armies from England." (Watts 2009, 319). And it was not inevitable that the first would defeat and (re-)absorb the second – or that it would defeat and incorporate the Duchy of Burgundy.

[415] (Spruyt 1994, 3).

[416] (Spruyt 2002, 131).

[417] (Spruyt 2002, 132).

Strayer's claim that by the early fourteenth century "basic loyalty shifted from Church, community, and family to the emerging state"[418] is just plain wrong – as the French Wars of Religion so vividly illustrate.

Strayer's *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State*, which is especially popular in IR,[419] tells an explicitly teleological story.

> What we are looking for is the appearance of political units persisting in time and fixed in space, the development of permanent, impersonal institutions, agreement on the need for an authority that can give final judgments, and acceptance of the idea that this authority should receive the basic loyalty of its subjects.[420]

By this definition, though, as Strayer notes two sentences later, Han China and the Roman Empire were "states." (This corresponds to the third definition of "state" above: "a community of people living in a defined territory and organized under its own government.") And the fact that "states" in this sense were becoming common in Europe in 1600 or 1700[421] tells us nothing about their modernity. (Not everything that occurred in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was "modern" – or, if we insist that it was, then the term becomes merely chronological, with no analytical content.)

Strayer and Spruyt rightly emphasize the demise of both feudal particularism and papal and imperial universalism.[422] These changes, which may indeed be traced back to the thirteenth century, can reasonably be read to mark the end of the medieval era.[423] Again, though, these are irrelevant to the (Weberian) modernity of early modern polities.[424]

Similarly, although early modern polities were, as Michael Mann puts it, "relatively centered and relatively territorial,"[425] this was in comparison to the polycentric non-territorial heterarchy of the medieval world. Compared to modern states they were very loosely and incompletely "centered;" empires rather than States. And although early modern polities did become less patchworks and more integrated, they were unquestionably dynastic composites rather than territorial polities.

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[418] (Strayer 1970, 36).

[419] In a Google Scholar search in July 2017, the first five citing works listed were by Robert Gilpin, Michael Mann, Steven Krasner, John Ruggie, and Lisebet Hooghe and Gary Marks, with further citations by Matthias Albert, Mohammed Ayoob, Bertrand Badi, Karen Barkey, Michael Barnett, Martin van Creveld, Kenneth Dyson, Francis Fukayama, Ted Gurr, John Hall, Rodney Hall, Aidan Hehir, Jeffrey Herbst, Ronald Jepperson, Christer Jönsson, Herbert Kellman, Stephen Korbin, Friedrich Kratochwil, John Mayer, Joel Migdal, Guillermo O'Donnell, Daniel Philpott, Karen Rassler and William Thompson, Hendrik Spruyt, David Stasavage, Sidney Tarrow, Janice Thomson, R. B. J. Walker, Immanuel Wallerstein, Kenneth Waltz, and Aristide Zolberg.

[420] (Strayer 1970, 10).

[421] Strayer (1970, 10, 110) uses both dates.

[422] (Spruyt 1994, 36-57), (Strayer 1970, 22, 27-28, 43, 53, 57).

[423] Even this, though, is not beyond question. See below at n. 482.

[424] In addition, *these* changes were largely complete by the late sixteenth century – indicating, as I will argue in the next section, that Spruyt and Strayer confuse the rise of a states system with the rise of modern states (which Spruyt rightly argues was not fully realized until the nineteenth century, *long* after papal and imperial universalism were long dead).

[425] (Mann 1986, 455).

10.4 Premodern Polities in an Early Modern States System

In Sections 12 and 13 I will argue that the standard "rise of the modern state" story rests on an implausible notion of historical change. Here I want to suggest that a large part of the problem arises from confusing the rise of a "modern" *states system* with the rise of "modern states;" from assuming that the "states" of the early modern states system somehow must be "modern states."

For example, Spruyt claims that his principal concern is "the origins of the state system" and especially the fact that "the feudal order was gradually replaced by a system of sovereign states."[426] But this *systemic* transformation entailed nothing for the internal character of the "states" in the system (other than their sovereign separateness from other such states). And, as we have seen, most of the great powers of the early modern states system were *empire-states*.[427]

The fundamental political transformation from a heterarchic system to a states systems was indeed associated with important internal political changes. Those changes, though, were largely matters of scale – larger polities, larger armies, more officials – and of the balances between kings and aristocrats and the regnal center and the provinces of the realm. And to the extent that these changes involved new forms of state, those forms – as we will see in §§11.2 and 11.4, were antithetical to, not expressions of, "the modern state." Early modern polities were distinguished from their medieval predecessors primarily by their separateness – by the fact that they were parts of a states system – not by their internal character (let alone by legal-rational bureaucratic territorial rule).

Another way to draw the difference is to distinguish two types of "sovereignty" and "territoriality." By the end of the seventeenth century, early modern polities were *externally* (or internationally) sovereign and territorial, in the sense that they mutually recognized one another's sovereign jurisdiction over a territory: other sovereigns were understood to have no rights in that territory (except those granted by treaty or established by custom). This *international* territorial jurisdiction, however, was not accompanied by *internal* territorial jurisdiction. Sovereigns, as we have seen, did not rule their territories territorially.

We should even be careful not to read too much "modernity" into the Renaissance (or even the Baroque) states system. Just as early modern polities were rooted in "a ruler's attempt to increase his dynastic patrimony and optimize its management"[428] – activities that simply cannot be understood in terms of the modern state – the primacy of *dynastic* wars in the early modern states system, from the beginnings of the Italian (Hapsburg-Valois) Wars in 1494 through the War of the Austrian Succession in 1748, strikingly illustrates the pre-modern nature of Renaissance and Baroque international relations – understanding "modern international relations" on the model of the era between Vienna and San Francisco (or the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and the Cold War).

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[426] (Spruyt 1994, 3. Cf. 16-17.).

[427] And even this description is significantly misleading. Through the seventeenth century, and in most places well into the eighteenth century, the holders of sovereignty were "kings, and persons of sovereign authority," as Hobbes put it. (*Leviathan*, ch. 13). The idea of a "state" as an abstract institutional entity was, at best, an eighteenth century phenomenon. (See §16.) Furthermore, there was more internal structural variation in early modern polities than the account so far suggests, as we will see in §11.

[428] (Poggi 2001, 106). Similarly, Strayer (1970, 23) speaks of late medieval rulers developing "the art of estate management."

PART THREE: (RE-)ASSEMBLING POLITIES

So far, I have compared two very different types of political assemblages, saying almost nothing about processes of assembly. I have also downplayed systematic differences across time and by place.[429] I now want to try to begin to remedy these defects – and to begin to set the early modern case in a broader framework for thinking about political change.

11 Crisis and Variation

In §5.3 I suggested that sustained violent conflict in the fifteenth century catalyzed the rise of early modern polities. Here I want to argue that crises in the 1640s and 1650s – which were effectively anti-imperial "internal" wars waged against subordinate incorporation in a dynastic composite polity, entwined with major international wars[430] – were similarly catalytic. They had very different results, though, in France and Britain, which for reasons of space will be my principal focus.[431]

11.1 *The* **Fronde** *in France*

In France, the expenses of the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) and the Franco-Spanish War (1635-1659) strained the fiscal and administrative talents and imaginations of even the effective and experienced duo of Louis XIII (r. 1610-1643) and Cardinal Richelieu (1585-1642). Their death within six months of each other created a dynastic crisis for the government of the four-year-old Louis XIV under the direction of the regent, his mother, Anne of Austria, and new first minister, Cardinal Mazarin.

In 1643 and 1644 peasants across the country rebelled against taxation, in many places with the support of the local gentry and even some nobles. And as the king increasingly resorted to multiplying venal offices, as well as imposing special fees and assessments on office holders and cutting their salaries and dues, discontent moved steadily up the social ladder. It thus was "not surprising that the Fronde began in 1648 with a revolt of public servants."[432]

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[429] (Capra 2015) is a brief but useful overview of early modern governance, emphasizing the diversity of forms, including case studies of composite Spain, "absolutist" France, the Italian city-states, and Baroque Austria. (Williams 1999 [1970]) is an excellent book-length introduction to the variety of *ancien regime* societies and polities.

[430] I take no position on the historiographic debate over a "general crisis of the seventeenth century." See, for example, (Hobsbawm 1954), (Trevor-Roper 1959), (Parker and Smith 1997), (Elliott 2005). I argue simply that *this* set of crises was a tipping point in the development of new political forms. (Rabb 1975) provides an interesting account of what he aptly calls the struggle for stability in early modern Europe. See also (Benedict and Gutmann 2005).

[431] They had still different results in Spain, where an even more wrenching set of crises – in 1640, Catalonia rebelled, and was not brought back under royal control until 1659; Portugal also rebelled in 1640 and eventually recovered its independence in 1668; and in 1648, the Spanish Netherlands, after eighty years of war, finally achieved independence – combined with both decades of international war and long-standing problems within the Spanish monarchy, led not only to Spain's fall from the ranks of the great powers but also to a decline in the relative power of the crown within Spain. On the decline of seventeenth-century Spain, see (Thompson and Casalilla 1994; 2012). (Grafe 2012), focusing on the economy (and the salt cod trade in particular), presents an account of the late modernization of Spain as rooted in the composite character of the Spanish state.

[432] (Mousnier 1970, 496).

In May 1648, the *Parlement* of Paris,[433] invoking its traditional right to refuse to register royal edicts that violated custom, rejected a (clearly provocative) tax levied on its officers. The dispute soon escalated into demands for broad constitutional reforms, which the crown refused to even consider. In August, the arrest of some locally popular *parlementaires* provoked an armed insurrection in Paris – the "Fronde"[434] – that in January 1649 forced the royal family to flee the city.

The rebels, however, had no unified program or leadership and were unable to field an army of any significance. The crown for its part, though, was unable to break the rebels by force. Out of this stalemate arose the Peace of Rueil, agreed to in March of 1649 – which satisfied neither side. And although order was restored in Paris, disorder was growing in the provinces.[435]

In January 1650, Mazarin struck pre-emptively, arresting Louis II of Bourbon, Prince of Condé, his brother Armand, Prince of Conti, and their brother-in-law Henri of Orleans, Duke of Longueville. This provoked a new revolt – the "Fronde of the Nobles" (or the Princes) – that was both more widespread and much more destructive.

The *frondeurs* received direct military support from Spain, which used the rebellion to bring the Franco-Spanish War into France, and raised substantial armies that were led by three of the great generals of the era, Condé, Frederick Maurice, Duke of Bouillon, and his brother Henry, Viscount of Turenne. Factionalism and regional particularism, though, doomed the rebels. In September 1652 Condé fled to the Spanish army (for whom he fought until 1659).[436] In October, Louis returned triumphantly to Paris.

The story of provincialism and factionalism mixed with a struggle between the King and the high nobility recalls the Wars of Religion. But these rebellions, although a genuine threat to royal predominance in French governance, were put down relatively quickly and decisively. This reflected, in addition to the absence of an appeal to religion, the sustained political work of Richelieu and Louis XIII that had greatly eroded the capacity of local nobles to raise armies and largely eliminated towns as fortified places of resistance. And when Louis XIV assumed personal rule in 1661 (following the death of Mazarin) he acted resolutely to establish his supremacy over the nobility.

11.2 "Absolutism"

The form of state that Louis XIV perfected[437] is usually called absolutist. This is a very misleading description of what was indeed a new style of governance.[438]

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[433] (Shennan 1968) covers the history of the *Parlement*. On its role in the Fronde, see (Moote 1971). (Hamscher 1976) looks at the immediate impact of the Fronde on the *Parlement*. (Hurt 2004) examines Louis XIV's efforts to weaken both the *Parelement de Paris* and its regional counterparts.

[434] (Bonney 1978) is an excellent brief overview. See also (Collins 1995, 65-78) and, at greater length, (Ranum 1993). (Bonney 1981a) focuses on the high nobility. (Kettering 1986a) focuses on patronage. The name comes from the slang for a sling, variously said to be part of a children's game played in defiance of the authorities or used to break the windows of royalists.

[435] (Westrich 1972) and, more briefly, (Beik 1997, ch. 10) look at Bourdeaux.

[436] In a parallel to sixteenth-century practice (see above at n. 358), Condé was rehabilitated, along with Turenne, who returned to the royal party in 1651. And both went on to lead armies of the King against his foreign rivals.

[437] (Collins 1994) is an excellent introduction to the *ancien regime* state in France. For good introductory surveys of the *ancien regime*, with an emphasis on politics and society, see (Williams 1999 [1970]), (Doyle 1986, 2012). (Doyle 1992) is an excellent general history.

[438] (Asch 2015, 369-379), (Campbell 2012), and the beginning pages of (Sommerville 2016 [2012]) provide complementary surveys of the recent historiography of "absolutism." (Henshall 1992) compares France and Britain in

"Absolutist" France (and Austria and Prussia[439]) did decisively reject the medieval[440] and *Standestaat* visions of shared governance. (This was most clearly symbolized by the emergence in the seventeenth century of the doctrine of the divine right of kings.[441]) "Absolutism," however, really meant simply growing central authority and power – Roland Mousnier thus speaks of "absolutism, or, rather, … increasing bureaucratic centralism, which was confused with absolutism"[442] – along with a sustained effort to circumvent, subordinate, or erode traditional privileges and institutions.

For example, Otto Hintze describes "absolutism" as "a concomitant of that process of political organization in which a conglomerate of separate territories becomes fused into a unitary political structure."[443] A (more) unitary political structure, though, need not be – and in early modern Europe certainly was not – absolute. Similarly, Antoni Maczak correctly observes that "the forms of power which could not be tolerated by absolute rulers was the territorial power-base of the great lords."[444] But subordinating the high nobility need not – and in fact did not – mean unilateral, let alone absolute, royal rule. Likewise, Charles Lipp's description of "a system in which authoritarian royal power freed itself from traditional limitations, legitimized itself by divine right, and thus exercised greater domination over society"[445] does not describe anything that could plausibly be called absolute rule.

Quite the contrary, "the power of the monarch depended on the government's ability to manipulate an array of vested interests rather than its capacity to override them."[446] "Absolutism" reflected "an alliance between the monarchies and the high nobility;"[447] "a renewed accommodation between monarchy and nobility, not a radical restructuring of their relationship in favour of the former. … [I]t augmented and stabilized the power of both monarchy and a section of the nobility."[448] "Everywhere in the eighteenth century we find the nobility becoming the support of the new

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some detail. (Miller 1990) contains several short national case studies. See also n. 439. (Teschke 2003, ch. 5) is useful as well.

[439] (Gagliardo 1991ch. 8, 9, 18) provides a brief introduction to the development of "absolutism" in "Germany." At greater length, see (Wilson 2000).

[440] On medieval ideas of kingship, see ???.

[441] (Bossuet 1999 [1707]) is the classic mature French expression. (Beik 2000) provides a useful collection of primary source material for France. (Keohane 1980, ch. 8) is a good brief survey of the development of the idea in the reign of Louis XIV. (Figgis 1896) remains a useful overview.

[442] (Mousnier 1979 [1980], 235).

[443] (Hintze 1975, 173).

[444] (Maczak 1996, 193).

[445] (Lipp 2011, 5).

[446] (Parker 2003, 62).

[447] (Koenigsberger 1987a, 42).

[448] (Zmora 1991, 6). This is a central theme in Perry Anderson's *Lineages of the Absolutist State*. (1974). By "the Absolutist State," though, Anderson means simply "the centralized monarchies of France, England, and Spain" that emerged in the sixteenth century. (1974, 15). And although these states "introduced standing armies, a permanent bureaucracy, national taxation, a codified law, and the beginnings of a unified," (1974, 17. Cf. 29) marking "a decisive rupture with the pyramidal, parcellized sovereignty of the mediaeval social formations, with their estates and liege-systems," (1974, 15) they were not *modern* states. Rather, they represented "*a redeployed and recharged apparatus of feudal domination*, designed to clamp the peasant masses back into their traditional social position;" (1974, 18) "a displacement of politico-legal coercion upwards towards a centralized, militarized summit." (1974, 19). They were "first and foremost modernized instruments for the maintenance of noble domination over the rural masses;" (1974, 20) "exotic, hybrid compositions whose surface 'modernity' again and again betrays a subterranean archaism." (1974, 29). Cf. (1974, 40-42).

monarchies. This alliance of absolute monarchy with the nobility is a characteristic feature of the whole *ancien régime*."[449]

In fact, "the 'success' of Louis XIV's reign after 1661 owed much to a conscious royal determination to be far more sensitive to the interests and aspirations of the social elites"[450] – so long as they did not insist on *autonomous* political power. The "absolutist" state "was forged by respecting pre-existing institutions so long as they could be induced to cooperate with the king, modifying those that proved too recalcitrant … and only occasionally constructing new institutions for circumventing, although rarely outright replacing, those that proved particularly obdurate or inefficient."[451] Thus William Beik titled an article "The Absolutism of Louis XIV as Social Collaboration."[452]

Furthermore, "France remained, despite the ideological trappings of central control and absolutism, a composite state."[453] Royal officials sat heavily, rather than lightly, on provincial institutions and elites, which by the eighteenth century had lost most of their *independent* political power. The balance of power had shifted to the center. Power, however, remained deeply personal and disaggregated. And the French state remained fundamentally patrimonial.[454]

11.3 The Resilience of Assemblies of Estates

Britain's mid-seventeenth-century crisis was much more extreme than France's. The Wars of the Three Kingdoms,[455] including the English Civil War (1642-1651),[456] caused the death of perhaps three or four percent of the population of England and Scotland and a third or more of the population of Ireland (which was double the level of deaths during the potato famine ("the Great Hunger") two hundred years later).[457] And after the execution of the king, the government in London faced nearly another decade of war with Scotland and (the future) Charles II – and England, Scotland, and Ireland alike suffered severely under Cromwell's protectorate (1653-1659).

The restoration of Charles in 1660, however, did not lead to absolutism,[458] both because of the effective resistance of the nobility and the gentry and because of religion (Charles successor, James II, was Catholic with a male Catholic heir). In 1689 Parliament selected a new king, establishing

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[449] (Hintze 1975, 202). Thus H. M. Scott and Christopher Stoors (2007) write of "The Consolidation of Noble Power in Europe, c. 1600-1800." For brief overviews of the French and British nobilities in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see (Mettam 2007), (Swann 2007), (Cannon 2007).

[450] (Rowlands 2002, 2).

[451] (Benedict 1992, 33).

[452] (Beik 2005). Similarly, Alejandra Irigoin and Regina Grafe (2008) write of "bargaining for absolutism" in Spain and Jonathan Dewald (1996, 140-148) devotes a section of his book on the early modern European nobility to "The Absolutist Compromise."

[453] (Nexon 2009, 264).

[454] On the category of patrimonialism, see n. 396.

[455] See n. 179.

[456] (Stone 2005 [1972]) and (Russell 1990) are standard accounts of the causes. (Purkiss 2006) is a lively semi-popular history organized around the people involved in these events.

[457] ???

[458] Ironically, the early Stuart kings – especially James VI/I (see Sommerville 1994) – played an important role in the development of the doctrine of the divine right of kings. (Wootton 2003, ch. 1) provides extensive excerpts from the leading English sources. (Burgess 1996) provides a nuanced account of early Stuart "absolutism."

another type of early modern polity that was more *Standestaat* than either absolutist monarchy or modern state.[459]

The Bill of Rights (1689), which justified James' deposition, was an act of "the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons assembled at Westminster, lawfully, fully and freely representing all the estates of the people of this realm."[460] With well over ninety percent of the adult male population denied the franchise, the House of Commons was an assembly of the gentry and urban propertied interests rather than anything even vaguely resembling a modern legislature – making the rights of the Bill of Rights rights of members of privileged corporations[461] rather than anything even close to the rights of man. And governance remained, both formally and in practice, shared between the crown and the estates.

Furthermore, underscoring the confessional, pre-modern nature of the polity, the Bill of Rights included an oath to swear to "from my heart abhor, detest and abjure as impious and heretical this damnable doctrine and position, that princes excommunicated or deprived by the Pope or any authority of the see of Rome may be deposed or murdered by their subjects or any other whatsoever." (In Britain, only Parliament was entitled to do that!) Similarly, in 1685 Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes. The separation of religion and politics was, at best, a nineteenth-century phenomenon.

The Dutch Republic, which following its independence in 1648 rapidly emerged as a great power, went even further.[462] It was a republic[463] in which the Estates ruled without a monarch. Its principal political institution was the ("national") States General (which was a confederal union of separate territorial corporations, most of which were dominated by their burghers, rather than a national congress of social corporations, as in Britain). And authority remained concentrated in the seven provincial (E)states – although in practice the polity was something like a semi-royal *Ständestaat*, in which the *Stadthouder* (chief executive) of Holland, Zeeland, and Utrecht (who was almost always from the House of Orange) shared power with the Estates and served as in effect the national leader, especially in times of war.[464]

11.4 Fiscal-Military States

Despite such major differences in constitutional form, in the century prior to the French Revolution France, Britain, Austria, the Dutch Republic, and Prussia all were what contemporary historians often call fiscal-military states.[465] War, finance, and state-building were essentially linked throughout late-medieval and early modern European history. A tipping point, though, was reached in the late-

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[459] See, for example, (Claydon 1996) on the transformation of the British monarchy in the aftermath of the "Glorious Revolution." On the Irish dimension of the conflict – the War of the Two Kings – see (Moody, Martin, and Byrne 1991 [1976], ch. 19).

[460] On estates see §7.3.

[461] On the centrality of corporate privilege to early modern governance, see §7.

[462] (Israel 1998) is a massive tome on the history of the Dutch Republic. More briefly, see ???.

[463] For a brief recent survey of early modern republican theory and practice, see (von Friedeburg 2015). At much greater length, see (van Gelderen and Skinner 2002a, b). (Oresko, Gibbs, and Scott 1997) is an interesting, if eclectic, collection looking at royal and republican strategies of legitimation in early modern Europe.

[464] For two extended periods (1650-1672 and 1702-1747), however, the States of Holland, Zeeland, and Utrecht ruled themselves without a *Stadthouder*.

[465] (Parrott 2012b, 327-334) briefly summarizes the type. (Brewer 1990 [1988]) and (Glete 2002) are standard book-length studies. See also (Stone 1994), (Graham and Walsh 2016), (Storrs 2009). (The other eighteenth century great power, Russia, was even more obviously a pre-modern empire state.)

seventeenth century. Increased central authority, power, and efficiency allowed France and its adversaries to deploy armies of unprecedented size – the population of France increased by about a half between 1500 and 1700 but the army was six or seven times larger[466] – and to keep them in the field for years on end. And the "need" for such massive armies drove further concentration of power in the center.

This, however, clearly distinguishes these polities from modern states. Wolfgang Reinhard rightly observes that "in its decisive phase of growth the modern state is a war state, which expands its administration and taxation mainly in order to be able to wage war" and that "the relation between peacetime expenditure and the costs of war was almost ridiculous."[467] In eighteenth-century Britain and France, military spending plus debt, which was almost entirely war debt, typically consumed four-fifths or more of annual income.[468] Such war states are quite unlike the Weberian modern state – but very similar to the polities of Warring States China and ancient empires such as Rome. [469]

Furthermore, these wars remained *dynastic* wars. The two great wars of the first half of the eighteenth century were the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714) – in which Louis XIV struggled to obtain Catalonia and the Spanish Netherlands and was ultimately able to place his grandson on the throne of Spain – and the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748). Eighteenth century France, Austria, Britain, and Prussia were patrimonial monarchies – Britain, for example, got a German (Hanoverian) king in 1714, which provoked (another) rebellion in Scotland – rather than modern states.

11.5 Types of Early Modern Polities

A teleological story of the development of the modern state presents the details of early modern political forms as noise. In fact, however, there were several different types of early modern polities that were of historical significance. In this section I have stressed the differences between "Renaissance" composite polities and "Baroque" fiscal-military states. Considering only forms that sustained an early modern European great power for more than a century, I have also identified the heterarchy of the Holy Roman Empire, Parliamentary government in Britain, and the Dutch Republic – none of which bears any fundamental resemblance to the modern state.

In fact, if we take France as paradigmatic of "the development of the modern state," as is usually the case, then Bourbon absolutism looks more like a dead end than anything else. The French Revolution did not perfect the form developed by the Bourbon kings. It overthrew the *ancien régime* – which had to be destroyed (even if it was not fully swept away) before a modern state could be constructed on its ruins. Only in the "relatively medieval" polities of Britain and the Dutch Republic can we tell anything close to a story of more or less continuous development towards "the modern state."[470]

If we were to look at modern states – which is obviously impossible here – we would find similar temporal and spatial variation. For example, twentieth-century liberal-democratic welfare states and

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[466] For figures on the size of early modern armies, see (Downing 1992, 69), (Greengrass 1991a, 5).

[467] (Reinhard 1996b, 9, 10).

[468] (Brewer 1990 [1988], 40, Fig. 2.1, 116, 133). Cf. (Félix 2012, 78).

[469] See (Hui 2005) for a China-Europe comparison from an IR perspective. (Eisenstadt 1993 [1963]) is a classic macrohistorical work that categorizes early modern European states as a form of empire.

[470] Thus the first chapter after the introduction in Brian Downing's *The Military Revolution and Political Change (1992)* is titled "Medieval Origins of Constitutional Governance." And Downing argues, in effect, that the "absolutist" fiscal-military state is the source of modern autocratic rule.

totalitarian communist party states were significantly different both from each other and from their nineteenth-century predecessors. And, paralleling the role of crises in the emergence and transformation of early modern polities, modern states emerged out of the tumult of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, while the crises of World War I, the Great Depression, and World War II catalyzed not only the emergence of welfare states but also decolonization, which created still another type of modern state.

When we take off our teleological glasses, we see changing circumstances generating a variety of contingent responses that experience different degrees of success, both locally and systemically. And in the second half of the second millennium CE – the modern period – political variety and change are at least as striking as similarities and continuity.

12 Evolution (Not Growth or Development)[471]

The classic story of the emergence of the modern state is an essentialist and substantialist story that closely resembles an account of the growth or development of a biological organism. Early stages may take different forms – e.g., gosling, tadpole, acorn – but they are phases in the growth of a thing that is, from the outset, already embryonically present. History provides only the space for an intrinsic pattern to unfold or a context for purifying the realization of an initially-already-present form.

I have instead told a processual story of the historical change *of* types. Like the evolution of species, structural political changes are discontinuous and without direction; a succession of new things (rather than the growth or development of a thing). A tadpole does indeed develop into an adult frog – because it is a stage in the life cycle of a member of the family Ranidae. But tarsiers, baboons, gibbons, orangutans, gorillas, and even chimpanzees were not leading to humans. These historical (evolutionary) steps happen to have created a path to humans. They were not stages in the development of humans.

Some elements that became essential to modern states did indeed begin to appear in medieval Europe. But "the modern state" is a particular type of assemblage (rather than a particular kind of substance). Until those elements began to be gathered into a new kind of whole, they were not "parts" of – and thus did not mark the emergence of – *that* kind of "thing."

Complex entities are defined principally by the whole that they are, not by the parts that compose them. That *x* and *y* are used in A and then in B does not make A an early form of B.

Evolution, rather than gradually realize a thing essentially or embryonically present from the start, creates new things that are linked by historical succession. A truly evolutionary perspective draws attention to the variety that is obscured when we see history as the gradual (if slow and uneven) realization or purification of a type. Through such a lens, we see many novel forms emerging, with varied innovations of greater and lesser magnitude, that experience different fates in different times and places.

"Early modern Europe" thus appears not as a monolithic space, or even a space with relatively "advanced" and "backward" regions or polities, but as a complex "ecosystem" with a variety of evolutionary niches.

For example, the persistence of city-based polities in a wide-swathe running from northern Italy to the low countries testifies to a particular political ecology. Likewise, it probably is not a coincidence

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[471] The conception of this section is heavily influence by (Padgett and Powell 2012, esp. ch. 1, 2).

that the two relatively "republican" great powers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Britain and the Dutch Republic, as well as the Swiss Federation, were geographically inhospitable to invading and occupying land powers. In Italy, the Alps provided sufficient insulation to protect a regional balance of power that prevented hegemonic domination. And across Europe, enclaves and relict forms persisted because of particular opportunities in the local political ecology.[472]

Viewed as part of a complex and varied ecosystem, the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation – which, it should be underscored, was half again as large as France and had about the same population – appears not as an atavism but as a heterarchic response, rooted in the historical and geographic circumstances of "Germany," to the competing demands and attractions of concentrated and dispersed power. And for two centuries or more, this response was as successful as any other – and even, in the long run, no more unsuccessful than Europe's other Hapsburg polity, "centralized," "absolutist" Spain . Furthermore, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, two very different great powers emerged out of the Empire: Prussia, which evolved from one among many German dynastic composites to a relatively unitary German State, and Austria, which became an increasingly multiethnic empire.

Russia, which emerged as a European great power in the eighteenth century, had still a different type of social and political organization: a more autocratic monarchy, a much more brutal domination of the peasantry, and a minimal role for towns.[473] Poland, which was a significant regional power through much of the early modern period, had a unique political organization.[474]

Even in the nineteenth century, as the legal-rational bureaucratic state began to emerge, the political ecology of Europe was surprisingly complex. If we are not trying to find large national or territorial polities, a simple look at the map in 1815 or 1830 shows three rather different bands: to the west and north of the old Empire, mostly fundamentally territorial states; to the east, mostly large multiethnic land empires; and in the center of the continent, a welter of "German" and "Italian" states of quite varied characters.[475]

[Need a paragraph on an ecosystem perspective on international systems]

We can extend the evolutionary metaphor even further by observing that political types, like biological species, often evolve in a "punctuated equilibrium" pattern.[476] A new type emerges *relatively* rapidly and then, if it succeeds, remains *relatively* stable for a considerable period of time. In

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[472] For example, the Principality of Orange did not become part of France until 1713 and the County of Venaissin remained under papal rule until 1791 – in part because of their distance from Paris (and from the center of the Empire), their proximity to the fragmented Italian regional system, and "good" fortune. Geopolitical location is a large part of the explanation of the fact that the southern Netherlands remained a Hapsburg holding (of Spain until 1714 and then of Austria, until 1794) and that the Duchy of Savoy retained its independence until 1714 – when it became a composite kingdom, receiving Sicily (for which it traded Sardinia in 1720). Ecclesiastical "territorial states" governed large parts of the west of the Empire, with Cologne, Trier, Liege, and Munster covering almost half of the area bordering the low countries. The Tuetonic Order, even after it lost control of Prussia in 1525 and Livonia in 1561, retained fairly substantial holdings within the Empire and scattered holdings in Italy, Bohemia, Greece, and Cyprus. The Order of Malta ruled its eponymous island until 1798.

[473] (Kollmann 2017) is a recent history of early modern Russia, focusing on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. (Williams 1999 [1970], ch. 9-12) and (Anderson 1974, Part II, ch. 1, 2, 6) are useful, if somewhat dated, shorter introductions.

[474] (Ethridge and Gould 1972) is the seminal paper. See also (Gould 2007), which is drawn from (Gould 2002).

[475] (Abramson 2017) is a recent IR account of the persistence of this third band, which he explains as rooted in the fact that this area underwent a commercial revolution in the middle ages.

[476] ???

IR, we implicitly recognize this in the importance we attribute to the quasi-constitutional settlements following general wars (e.g., Westphalia, Vienna, San Francisco). More generally, I have emphasized the role of crisis in catalyzing the creation of new political forms.

We should not push such analogies too far, especially because we are comparing only forms, considered largely independently of the underlying mechanisms that produces them. (For example, "absolutism" in Prussia came about rather differently than in France; there was no "common ancestor" of absolutist states.) Nonetheless, the distinction between the development of instances of an already existing entity and the evolution of new types is essential to comprehending the nature of political change.

[The next three sections, as will become clear in a moment, are, at best, a very incomplete first draft]

13 Novelty through (Re-)Assembly: Continuous Transformation

Both innovation within existing social forms and the invention of new forms[477] tend to involve the reassembly and repurposing of existing elements more than the introduction of radically new ones.[478] New social actors, institutions, and practices usually are more new systems of relations than new "things." More precisely, even new "things" typically arise from new relations among and within existing things.

The principal components of both medieval and early modern polities were kings, nobles, towns, provinces, and localities. Their early modern reassembly, however, created a very different type of royal rule over fundamentally transformed subjects. But the changes in the elements arose largely from changes to existing things. As John Padgett puts it "the Middle Ages ended through the recombination of organizational elements that were, by themselves, deeply medieval."[479]

Roger Mettam's assessment of France is generally applicable. "The same elites, institutions and many of the same families continued to play a dominant role. Yet … there was a slow shift towards the center."[480] Nonetheless, the "same" center and the "same" peripheries – and the "same" elites, institutions, and families – became fundamentally "different" as a result of their enmeshment in new forms of center-periphery relations.

In this section, I consider three examples and introduce the idea of "continuous transformation."

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[477] For this distinction between innovation and invention, see (Padgett and Powell 2012, 1, 5-7).

[478] I draw here heavily on (Padgett and Powell 2012, esp. ch. 1, 5, 6, 15). Padgett and Powell and their collaborators identify several different mechanisms, including "transposition and refunctionality" (2012, 12-15, ch. 6, 14), "anchoring diversity" (2012, 15-16, ch. 14), "incorporation and detachment" (2012, 16, ch. 5), "migration and homology" (2012, 16-19, ch. 7), and "conflict displacement and dual inclusion" (2012, 19-21, ch. 8). And although they employ the frame of networks rather than assemblages, they do emphasize "relational recombination" (2012, 5, 6-7, 11-12, 144, 168, 267, 364-365, 375, 382, 439, 496); a section of one chapter is subtitled "The Assembly of Elements from Multiple Domains" (2012, 400); and another chapter addresses the "dynamics of assembly and recombination" (2012, 496).

[479] (Padgett and Powell 2012, 145). The reference here to the development of merchant banks is generally applicable.

[480] (Mettam 1988, 41).

13.1 The Evolution of Kingship

13.2 Kings and Nobles

13.3 Medieval and Early Modern Armies

The increasing predominance of royal justice, administration, and armies created new links between the crown and its subjects that increasingly circumvented the intermediation of leading noble families through "traditional" mechanisms such as governorships, seigneurial courts, local military musters, and privileged access to political institutions and offices. The nobility, however, reconstituted its privileged position in new ways and in new venues; especially in royal courts and through new (and old) patronage networks operating in new (and old) ways in new (and old) venues.

13.4 Continuous Transformation and the Problem of Periodization

We can take this line of argument one step further by noting that at a very high level of generality we can dicern a fundamental continuity between medieval and early modern societies. Gerd Althoff argues that kinship, friendship, and lordship were the fundamental social and political bonds in medieval Europe – a world in which political organization was based on "groups of people rather than institutions."[481] I am suggesting that the expansion of official "state"/regnal institutions produced an early modern system of kinship, patronage, and kingship; a political world of corporate privilege and unequal relations between subjects of the king (rather than rational-legal rule over formally equally citizens).

Along similar lines, Jacques Le Goff argues that the medieval period can be seen to extend to the French Revolution[482] – making "early modern" history "late medieval" history. Thus read, the modern period represents an especially sharp break. But it also appears as a diversion in the course of history, making globalization a return to the historical norm and trend of the past two millennia. (We will return to this framing in §0.)

More generally, periodization is fundamentally problematized by understanding historical change as an always ongoing process of innovation and invention rooted in the reassembly and repurposing of existing entities and institutions.[483] Continuity is always intermixed with transformation. Historical change is a matter of *continuous transformation*; transformations that are always ongoing and that always involve considerable elements of continuity.

On a time frame of several centuries, static comparisons may suggest a radical break. Looking at processes of change and reproduction, however, we almost always see continuous transformation. For example, rather than a medieval to modern transition, high medieval was succeeded by late medieval, which was succeeded by Renaissance, which was succeeded by Baroque … And on time frames of decades, sharp changes are rarely evident.

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[481] (Althoff 2004 [1990], quote at p. vii).

[482] (Le Goff 2015 [2014], ch. 7).

[483] Le Goff's book (Le Goff), mentioned in the preceding paragraph, is titled *Must We Divide History into Periods?*. For an insightful recent discussion of periodization in IR, see (Buzan and Lawson 2014).

The new is almost always also old. And there is no neutral perspective from which to judge whether novelty or continuity is "more important." Any marking of distinct types and chronological divisions is fundamentally conventional. Anything even close to a sharp demarcations of either time or type are likely to be arbitrary if not significantly misleading.

For example, the Renaissance was fundamentally new to those who experienced it as a renaissance. But it was also a *re*birth; a return to and repurposing of elements that had been lost, sidelined, or subordinated. And there is no uncontentious answer to when it occurred (even if we restrict ourselves to a particular place) – or even what it's "essential features" were. And much as nineteenth-century nationalist historians had their reasons to emphasize deep continuities that to us today seem mostly to obscure more fundamental discontinuities, with the apparent passing of the apotheosis of the modern state, much the same seems true of the standard essentialist (statist) story of its rise.

14 Multiple Networks: (Re-)Assembled Wholes

A focus on re-assembly and re-purposing also draws our attention to the importance of interactions between and the transmission of changes through multiple networks within a system. The changes we have considered are much less a matter of the introduction of new things than the co-evolution of varied elements of a system. In particular, there is no master driver or decisive transforming element. Rather, the mutual adjustment of parts over time changes both the parts and the whole.

Tis is particularly striking in the war-finance-state nexus – and its transformations in both late-medieval and early modern history. [finish]

[Second example]

[Concluding comments]

PART FOUR: GLOBALIZATION

The account I have developed above suggests approaching globalization by looking for continuities embedded in transitions and novelty emerging through reconfigurations of familiar entities, institutions, and practices, producing a postmodern re-assembly of the world of the modern state (and modern markets and modern societies). It also suggests shifting our focus away from the state – not, though, because states are dying (or being transformed – again) but because the modern configuration of single level governance (states-in-a-states-system) is giving way to multi-level muti-actor systems of heterarchic governance.

15 Re-Assembling a Globalizing World

In the modern era, governance was concentrated in set of actors of a single type, the modern state, located on the middle ("national") level of a three-layered system. The modern state aspired to, and in its most developed forms substantially achieved, uniform governance over a territory. Lower-level communities and institutions were hierarchically integrated into a central polity that exercised a more or less effective monopoly on jurisdiction and force – and identity, economic regulation, and social policy. The hallmark of modernity, in this reading, was the comprehensive centering of social life on one type of actor, the modern state.

The modern world was also associated with a relatively sharp functional differentiation of state, market, and civil society (in contrast to the substantial fusion of social, political, and economic entities and activities in the medieval and early modern periods). Modern states struggled mightily, with greater or lesser success, to contain all three domains within the boundaries of the polity; to create national economies and national societies within national polities.

15.1 From States System to Heterarchy

Globalization represents the failure of the efforts to the modern state to dominate and contain political, economic, and social life. The multiple monopolies of the modern state are rapidly, although unevenly, eroding. Authority and capabilities that previously were concentrated in territorially delimited middle-tier polities – modern states – are migrating to other levels and other types of actors. Nonterritorial forms of organization are of increasing salience. And two new "regional" levels seem to be emerging, within states (above the local but below the national) and across states (supranationally but subsystemically).

At the global level, inter-national governance is proving increasingly inadequate to the tasks at hand. Bilateral action by the great powers, which provided nearly all the supranational governance available in the nineteenth century, continues to remain important – but for a steadily declining range of issues. Multilateral action by states, through both formal intergovernmental organizations and more informal international regimes greatly enhanced international governance capabilities in the twentieth century. These mechanisms too, though, while still significant, are increasingly unable to grapple effectively with supranational problems and opportunities. Non-state actors of various sorts, both public and private, are increasingly central to supranational governance, acting in varying combinations with one another and with states.

At the national level as well, we see an increasing "decentering" of the state – or, more accurately, various re-centerings and re-arrangements of relations between states and other kinds of actors. "Subordinate" jurisdictions are in many places acquiring increasing autonomy. "Private" actors are increasingly participating in, and sometimes even taking over, activities previously performed by only states – and new kinds of governance activities as well. In addition, non-national actors located at various levels in the system are playing increasing roles in national politics, economics, and society.

More generally, the relatively sharp distinctions between levels characteristic of modern governance are eroding. In fact, interpenetration of levels, including direct local to local and supranational to local linkages, is becoming the norm. Furthermore, patterns and processes of interpenetration are increasingly varied by place.

This is closely associated with the growing replacement of territorial governance by function governance. [finish paragraph]

A heterarchic system is emerging – and a relatively complex and varied heterarchy at that. [finish paragraph]

15.2 Globalization as Continuous Transformation

But these new entities, institutions, and practices largely involve re-arrangements and re-purposings of "modern" elements. And globalization, rather than a radical break with a line of development that spanned more than half a millennium is another phase in the continuing transformation of polities and international systems fundamentally comparable to the late-medieval, Renaissance, and Baroque changes considered above.

For example, states still remain the single most important type of governance actor, and are likely to continue to remain so for at least several decades. But many functions previously performed by states are now performed by states in conjunction with various other subnational, transnational, and supranational actors. (For example, ???.) A few functions, such as ???, have even been more or less transferred to other actors. And as the functions and relations of states change, their "essential" character changes as well. Postmodern states are a recognizable descendant of modern states, but they are increasingly looking like a new "species" of polity, embedded in a very different "ecosystem."

Or consider the global economy. [finish paragraph]

Even the more radical departure of "cosmopolitan" person to person relations not merely across but largely without the intermediation of states has long and deep historical precedents. [Medieval elite mobility. Merchants and traders. Non-national ministers (e.g. Mazarin) and generals (e.g., Condé)]

[Continuous transformation mix of old and new]

[Return of the old]

15.3 De-centering the State

These changes can be seen as a de-centering of the state – or, better, the re-centering of politics around multiple types of actors on multiple spatial levels. And if the trend continues, as it seems to me clear that it will, talk of the rise of the modern state, given that history did not stop "where it was supposed to" becomes deeply misguided. The modern state, viewed in light of what preceded and followed it, looks more like a digression than a teleological unfolding.

In fact, the evolutionary story of continuous transformation suggests that the focus on the state is fundamentally misguided. The modern state was indeed an important feature of the modern era. But it was not defining. If we are to talk about the arc of modern and post-modern history, we need an alternative, broader framing (which includes but does not fetishize the rise of the modern state).

One possible framing is differentiation. Standard sociological accounts of modernity emphasize the rise of functional differentiation. [finish paragraph]

This line of argument has been extended to globalization by Niklas Luhmann in his modern systems theory. [Two or three paragraphs, including Albert book]

[Concluding paragraphs]

16 Appendix: The Early Modern Language of "States"

The discussion above has focused, appropriately I think, on practice. How contemporaries talked about "states," however, also deserves attention, both because language often provides insight into practice and because theorists sometimes identify emerging changes well before they become prominent in practice. I have removed this discussion Appendix, though, as I suspect that it will not be of central interest to most readers.

16.1 The Pattern of Early Modern Usage

Early modern uses of "state" in English, French, Italian, and Latin largely paralleled late medieval usage. And the principal exception was unconnected to the modern (Weberian) sense.

16.1.1 *Status-Based Senses*

The first two clusters of definitions in the *Oxford English Dictionary*, which is organized chronologically, are "senses relating to a condition of manner of existing" and "senses relating to status or rank."[484] This reflects the root of the term in both Romance and Germanic languages, namely, the Latin *status*.

These senses, which go back to the early fourteenth century, parallel contemporaneous Latin usage. For example, in formulations such as *status reipublicae* (the republic), *status imperii* (the Empire), *status regni* (the kingdom), or *status coronae* (the crown), "the word *status* still meant no more than 'condition,' 'situation'" and *status regis* (the king, kingship) referred to "the royal function, office and dignity" rather than the realm.[485] In addition, "in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries *status*, 'state' and *stato* are frequently synonymous with *potestas*, *regimen*, *gubernatio* (power, rule, governance)."[486] *Status* "was used regularly and fully interchangeably to mean government, constitution, welfare, common good, way of life, status, and estate (in both the sense of hierarchical rank and of social-occupational group)"[487] – but not a polity or unit of rule.

Such uses persisted through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as we will see below. Also common were the senses of "a (specified) order or class of people regarded as part of the body politic, and as such participating in its government," and "a legislative assembly in which the various estates … of the body politic are represented" – the (e)states we considered in §7.3.

Another standard sense in late-medieval and early modern English was "property, possession; a person's private means or income."[488] (There was no clear distinction between "estate" and "state" at this time.[489]) This gave one a status in society and made one a part of the privileged corporation that the French called *le tiers état* and that the British called the Commons.

Still another standard use was "regime," especially in reference to which group in society held the governing power. Such uses usually were closely tied to the Aristotelian distinction between rule by one, by a few, and by the many.[490]

Consider also Louis XIV's (probably apocryphal) *L'état c'est moi*. This understanding of the polity was unquestionably "pre-modern" both in its deeply personal conception of "the state" and in the king has a superior political status and thus need not consult the (other, inferior) *états* of the realm (as indeed French kings did not between 1614 and 1789).[491]

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[484] French usage is similar. *Etat* goes back to the thirteenth century, with initial core senses of "manner of being" and "situation of a person in society." *Dictionnaire de l'Academie Française*.

[485] (Guenée 1985 [1981], 4). Cf. (Stump 1994, 253).

[486] (Guenée 1985 [1981], 5).

[487] (Stump 1994, 253).

[488] *Oxford English Dictionary*.

[489] French similarly did not distinguish *estat* from *état* – although neither referred to property.

[490] (Harding 2002, 2-5) is an excellent brief introduction to this sense.

[491] In §11.2 I in effect read this claim through the lens of absolutism. But it can also be read as a "modern" royalist reading of medieval formulae such as *status regis* and *status regnum* (and their combination in the formula *status regis and regnum*; the state of the king and the kingdom). On such medieval uses, see (Harding 2002, 139-47, 149, 159-160, 252-300, 338). It also has broader connections with central medieval ideas of a regnal community, addressed briefly in §13.1.

16.1.2   "State" as a Unit of Rule

"To attribute to 'state', in a text of before 1500, its present most common meaning of a political body subject to a government and to common laws has every chance of being a gross misinterpretation. The Middle Ages did not use the word 'state' in this sense."[492]

As the medieval heterarchic system gave way to an early modern states system, though, "state" did come to be used to indicate an autonomous (or at least separate) unit of rule, typically defined dynastically, through international recognition, or by reference to a people or place. In the sixteenth century, "state" was first used in the "a community of people living in a defined territory and organized under its own government" sense and as "the body politic as organized for supreme civil rule and government."[493] And such uses became common in the seventeenth century.

For example, the *Oxford English Dictionary* quotes a passage from Francis Bacon's *Essays* (in the revised edition of 1625): "Never any State was … so open to receive Strangers, into their Body, as were the Romans." This is even the principal sense of "(e)state" in the *Essays*.[494] Bacon, however, also made important use of older senses.[495] "State" sometimes means regime type or constitution.[496] Sometimes it means status, especially juridical status.[497] It also refers to a corporate part of society[498] and to property.[499]

Furthermore, the repeated use of formulations such as "prince or State"[500] and "estate or Prince"[501] indicates that "the state" was not understood as fundamentally separate from its ruler. At least through the seventeenth century, early modern polities were in English called realm, kingdom, or commonwealth at least as frequently as state.[502] And "state" never even hinted of a polity that exercised exclusive rule over a territory through a rational-legal bureaucracy – because no such polity was even imagined, let alone coming into existence.

16.2 Machiavelli and Bodin

Niccolò Machiavelli's (1469-1527) *The Prince* and Jean Bodin's (1530-1596) *Six Books of the Commonwealth* were perhaps the most influential sixteenth-century political works with a "modern" (post-medieval) sensibility. Their understandings of "states," however, had no connection to the Weberian idea of a modern state. And Bodin's remained essentially "medieval."

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[492] (Guenée 1985 [1981], 5).

[493] *Oxford English Dictionary*.

[494] This is the sense of 17 of the 22 uses in Essay 29, "Of the True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates," in which the quoted passage appears. Walter Raleigh's *The History of the World*, a word of considerable popularity in its time, similarly uses "state" principally to indicate polity. (e.g.,1614, 42, 55, 77, 80, 84, 87, 89, 78, 82, 91, 110. 124, 133, 145, 225, 234, 246, 263, 277, 314,362, 394, 404, 436, 439, 501, 524, 614, 619).

[495] The *Oxford English Dictionary* cites Bacon for seven other senses.

[496] (Bacon 1868 [1625], 23 [Essay 3], 134, 136, 141 [Essay 11], 312 [Essay 29], 553 [Essay 56]).

[497] (Bacon 1868 [1625], 98 [Essay 9], 121 [Essay 11], 239 [Essay 27], 308 [Essay 29]).

[498] (Bacon 1868 [1625], 203 [Essay 19]), referring to the clergy. See also (Bacon 1868 [1625], 134, 136 [Essay 14]) on the nobility as an estate.

[499] (Bacon 1868 [1625], 91[Essay 9], 236[Essay 22], 298[Essay 28], 369[Essay 34]).

[500] (Bacon 1868 [1625], 142 [Essay 15], 239 [Essay 23], 384 [Essay 36]).

[501] (Bacon 1868 [1625], 307 [Essay 29]). In Essay 29, which includes both Kingdoms and Estates in its title, Bacon also refers to "any prince, or State," "a kingdom or estate," and "the crown, or State." (Bacon 1868 [1625], 307, 312, 309). Cf. also (Bacon 1868 [1625], 94 [Essay 9]: "Kings and estates").

[502] See, for example, the first paragraph of the next to last paragraph of §16.2 and the second paragraph of §16.4.

Chapter 1 of *The Prince*[503] famously begins by asserting that "all states" (*tutti gli Stati*) are either republics or principalities. By "states" Machiavelli means "dominions that have held and hold empire (*imperium*) over men."[504] "State" (*Stato*), in other words, rather than indicate a particular type of (modern) polity, refers to any type of polity or regime across the full sweep of history.[505] And the types of states, Machiavelli argues, are historically invariant. If Machiavelli had a new conception of "states" and statecraft, it was because he looked at old evidence in new ways, not because he addressed a new kind of polity that was beginning to emerge.[506]

Machiavelli is particularly concerned with how a prince can acquire or hold a "state" – or, as he often puts it, "his state" (*suo Stato*).[507] Usually, though, he does not sharply distinguish the prince's rule from the political unit being ruled. "For Machiavelli *stato* is extremely personal" and in an important sense "*the* state [is] … constituted by the current holders of power"[508] – in striking contrast to the impersonality of the modern state.

Machiavelli does sometimes use "state" to mean polity or unit of rule, as when he advises princes to move to newly acquired states.[509] "State" here, though, means polity in general not a particular type of polity. And rule over a state need not be exclusive or territorial.

Quite the contrary, in Chapter 4 Machiavelli distinguishes kingdoms, like that of the Turk, that are ruled by a prince who governs through ministers who serve at his favor, from those, like France, that are ruled by a prince and barons (*Baroni*) whose positions rest on ancient blood (rather than royal favor). These barons "have their own states (*Stati*) and subjects (*sudditi*), who recognize them as lords (*Signori*)."[510] This, according to Machiavelli, was also the situation in Roman Spain, France, and Greece, where he comments on "the numerous principalities (*Principati*) that existed in these states (*Stati*)."[511] And, as we saw above, this was the norm in transalpine early modern Europe.

Although Machiavelli was in many ways precociously modern, especially in his separation of politics and morality, his modernity did not lie in his conception of "the state."

Much the same is true of Bodin, a key figure in the development of "modern" conceptions of sovereignty. In fact, Bodin refers to polities in general not as "states" (*estats*) but as *Republiques* (from

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[503] (Machiavelli 1998 [1985]) and (Machiavelli 1984 [1980]) are relatively literal translations. (Machiavelli 1965) and (Machiavelli 1988) are also excellent and widely used. (Machiavelli 2014) is a convenient, inexpensive, electronic bilingual edition.

[504] (Machiavelli 1998 [1985], 1).

[505] Furthermore, Machiavelli uses city (*città*), the principal form of state in late medieval and Renaissance Italy, synonymously. For example, in one sentence he speaks both of Annibale Bentivogli governing the state (*reggere lo Stato*) of Bologna and, after his death, of one of his distant relatives being given the government of that city (*li detttono il governo di quella città*). (Machiavelli 1998 [1985], 69 [ch. 19]). Similarly, Chapter 5 addresses the proper mode of governing "cities or principalities" (*città o Principati*) that are used to living under their own laws. Cf. (Machiavelli 1998 [1985], 31 [ch. 8]).

[506] Or, in line with the suggestion above at ???, Machiavelli's modernity was his *political*, rather than lega/morall, conception of politics.

[507] E.g, in Chapters 2, 12, 20, 21, and 23.

[508] (Mansfield 1983, 849).

[509] (Machiavelli 1998 [1985], 16 [Ch. 5]).

[510] (Machiavelli 1998 [1985], 13).

[511] (Machiavelli 1998 [1985], 15).

the Latin *respublica*) – which he defines, in Aristotelian terms, as "a rightful government of many households."[512] The standard English translation of "commonwealth" is apt.

For Bodin, in classic Aristotelian fashion, different types of "states" are different types of ruling regimes. "The form and state (*estat*) of a commonwealth depends on who holds the sovereignty."[513] Thus *estat populaire* and *estat aristocratique* indicate democratic or aristocratic constitutions or regimes.[514] As Julian Franklin puts it, *estat* refers to "the system of sovereign power and not to the organized political community over which the sovereign rules."[515]

16.3 Raison d'état

"Reason of state" (*raison d'état*) was a major innovation in the early modern language of "state." The term, which has roots in Machiavelli, was first used prominently by his compatriot Francesco Guicciardini (1483-1540).[516] It "first appeared in French [and English] usage in the late sixteenth century and became increasingly prevalent in the early seventeenth century."[517] Here too, though, the modernity of the doctrine has nothing to do with a new conception of "the state."

Giovanni Botero's (1544-1617) *Reason of State* (1589), an important early popularization of the idea, begins "State [*Stato*] is a stable rule [*dominio*] over a people and Reason of State [*Ragione di Stato*] is the knowledge of the means by which such a dominion [*Dominio*] may be founded, preserved and extended."[518] State indicates rule, not the thing ruled, and reason of state refers to the ruler's knowledge and ability in acquiring, preserving, and extending his rule, not the interests of "the state" as an abstract entity or moral person. And Botero's focus, like Machiavelli's, is on the qualities necessary in a successful ruler,[519] reflecting a personal (rather than an abstract) understanding of the state.

Also like Machiavelli, Botero does sometimes use *Stato* to mean polity or unit of rule. For example, he writes that "Large States [*Stati*] are envied and feared by their neighbors."[520] This comes, though, in a section titled "Whether large, small or middle-sized empires [*Imperij*] are more lasting." In the same section Botero also refers to units of rule as "cities" [*Città*], "republics" [*Republiche*], and "kingdoms" [*Regni*].[521] In other words, Botero sees nothing novel either in "states" in general or in the forms they took in his era.

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[512] (Bodin 1583, 1 [my translation]. Cf. 122 [Bk. I, ch. 8]). Cf. (Raleigh 1662, 1): "A Common-wealth is a certain Soveraign Government of many Families."

[513] (Bodin 1583, 251 [Bk. I, ch. 10] [my translation]).

[514] Chapters 6 and 7 of Book II are titled *De l'estat Aristocratique* and *De l'estat Populaire*. See also (Bodin 1583, 126, 146, 332, 507, 510, 717, 952). His other principal use is the plural *estats*, referring to provincial and national representative institution ("estates"). See especially Bk. III, ch. 7.

[515] (Franklin 1992, xli).

[516] (Viroli 1992, ch 4).

[517] (Church 1972, 45).

[518] (Botero 1956, 1; 1598, 1). The 1598 edition is the last that Botero revised himself, and the basis for the 1956 English translation.

[519] "The foundation upon which every State is built is the obedience of the subjects [*sudditi*] to their prince [*Superiore*], and this in turn is founded upon his outstanding excellence [*eminenza della virtù*]." (Botero 1956, 13-14; 1598, 17).

[520] (Botero 1956, 7; 1598, 7).

[521] (Botero 1956, 7, 8; 1598, 7,8). The following section is titled "Whether compact or dispersed states [*stati*] are more lasting" but speaks also of a dispersed "empire" [*Imperio*]. (Botero 1956, 9; 1598, 11). And Botero also wrote *On the Causes of the Greatness of Cities* [*Città*], in which he understands "city" as "polity," classically conceived as "an assembly of people drawn together to live felicitously." (Botero 1598, 309 [my translation]). Such usage was common at the time.

Raison d'état entered the mainstream of respectable political thought in the 1620s and 1630s through the practice of France's first minister, Cardinal Richelieu (1585-1642) – who Friedrich Meinecke plausibly calls "the greatest practitioner of *raison d'état* in the seventeenth century"[522] – and the stable of publicists he mobilized to polemicize on his behalf.[523]

This literature reflects a strikingly post-medieval view of politics as an autonomous realm of action.[524] It also regularly uses *e(s)tat* in the "modern" sense of polity or unit of rule. But it is used interchangeably with kingdom,[525] empire,[526] monarchy,[527] republic,[528] principality,[529] and government.[530] "State" never refers to a particular type of "modern" polity. And *raison d'état* is a general political logic; an approach to state*craft* that has no special connection to "the modern state."[531]

Furthermore, although there may be a bit more of a separation between the state and its ruler in these works than in Machiavelli's *Prince*,[532] the state is not treated as an abstract entity or distinct moral personality. For example, Richelieu insists that "private families are the true models of

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For example, in just two pages Walter Raleigh (c. 1552-1618) uses prince, state, republic, commonwealth, and nation as terms for a polity or unit of rule. (1662, 171-172).

[522] (Meinecke 1957 [1924], 196).

[523] (Church 1972) remains the standard historical work on Richelieu as a practitioner and theorist of *raison d'etat*.

[524] For example, Henri de Rohan's (1579-1638) *On the Interests of the Princes and States of Christendom* (1638) begins "Princes command the people and interest commands princes" and later on its first page insists that "only interest is never wrong" and that "whether it is well or poorly understood causes states [*estats*] to live or die." (Rohan 1639, 269 [preface to Pt. I] [my translation]). Claude Naudé's (1600-1653) *Political Considerations on Coups d'Etat* (1639), which Nannerl Keohane , (Keohane, 171) justly calls "a manual of *raison d'état*,"[524] draws special attention, as the title indicates, to what he calls *coups d'estat* – "master-strokes of state" in the apt early modern English translation (Naudé 1711 [1639]) – which he defines as "bold and extraordinary actions that princes are constrained to employ in difficult situations and when desperate, contrary to common standards of right, without regard to any order or form of justice, sacrificing particular interests for the public good." (Naudé 1667 [1639], 103 [my translation]). The importance of Rohan and Naudé is illustrated by the fact that (Meinecke 1957 [1924]) devotes an entire chapter (ch. 7) to Naudé and the majority of another chapter (pp. 162-195) to Rohan. Rohan is especially important for our purposes here because he was a Huguenot leader and thus shows that "as a climate of opinion, reason of state surrounded Richelieu's regime" (Keohane 1980, 168), not just a doctrine of the royalist propaganda machine.)

[525] For example, the second chapter of the first part of Richelieu's *Political Testament* is titled "Reform of the various orders of the state [*l'état*]" but the text begins by addressing the "various orders of this kingdom." (Richelieu 1709 [1688], I.67 [ch. 2] [my translation]). For the *Political Testament*, which was assembled from his notes and drafts and published posthumously, I use the sixth edition (Richelieu 1709 [1688]) simply because an electronic copy is readily available. (Richelieu 1961) is a thoughtful selection of the major passages, well translated into English (although sometimes not sufficiently literally for my purposes here).

[526] (Naudé 1667 [1639], 57, 59, 91, 94, 95, 149).

[527] (Naudé 1667 [1639], 140, 147).

[528] (Naudé 1667 [1639], 59).

[529] (Naudé 1667 [1639], 146).

[530] (Naudé 1667 [1639], 85).

[531] For example, although Richelieu was a fierce opponent of composite rule – in his telling, when he entered the king's service, "the Huguenots shared the state with him [the king], the great nobles conducted themselves as if they were not his subjects, and the most powerful governors of the provinces as if they were sovereign in their offices" (Richelieu 1709 [1688], I.6 [ch. 1] [my translation]) and he promised to "ruin the Huguenot party, abase the pride of the great nobles, return all his subjects to their duty, and raise his name among foreign nations to the position it ought to have" (Richelieu 1709 [1688], I.9 [ch. 1] [my translation]; cf. Naudé 1667 [1639], 155) – his goal was not a modern state but a more centralized patrimonial monarchy.

[532] For example, "a capable prince is a great treasure in a state." (Richelieu 1709 [1688], I.234 [ch. 8] [my translation]).

states,"[533] repeatedly refers to "your state"[534] and "his state,"[535] and seems equally concerned with "the interests of the state and the advantage of your [the king's] person."[536] In fact, at one point he even argues that "a great prince ought rather risk his person, and even the interest of his state, than break his word."[537]

Particularly striking for our purposes here is Richelieu's argument that although "there is no question that suppression of the sale and heritability of offices conforms to reason and all rules of right … the inevitable abuses of the distribution of offices simply by the will of king, and thus on the favor and cunning of those most influential with him, makes maintaining the current system more tolerable."[538] The only alternative to the sale of offices that he can imagine is that they be given away by the king to his favorites and their clients. And this view seems to have been widely shared[539] Even a professional bureaucracy, let alone a legal-rational state, seems unthinkable.

We see much the same understanding even a century later in the writings of Frederick the Great (1712-1786), who, after a youth devoted to music and philosophy, became an astute student and practitioner of *raison d'état* during his long and successful reign (1740-1786) as King of Prussia. Frederick extends and develops Rohan's maxim that princes command the people and interests command princes:[540] "*la politique*" – true knowledge of politics – "is the science of always acting through suitable means in conformity with one's interests."[541] He fairly consistently uses "state" – *l'État*, usually with a capital E – to mean the polity over which a prince rules.[542] Frederick even tends to present "the state" as somewhat abstracted from the country (*pays*) or nation over which the sovereign rules.[543] But *raison d'état* applies to all polities, not just those of a particular type or era.

16.4 "State" in Seventeenth-Century Social Contract Theory

Perhaps the most innovative use of "state" in early modern political theory was in the imagination of a pre-political "state of nature," used as a device to understand the rights and duties of rulers and ruled in "the civil state." "State" here, however, has the traditional sense of status or condition.

Both Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and John Locke (1632-1704) use "commonwealth" to refer to what today we would call a state: "*Any Independent Community* which the *Latines* signified by the word

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[533] (Richelieu 1709 [1688], I.223-224 [ch. 7] [my translation]). Similarly, James I (1918, 55. 64) writes "by the Law of Nature the King becomes a naturall Father to all his Lieges" and "the King towards his people is rightly compared to a father of children."

[534] (Richelieu 1709 [1688], 3 [Intro], I.8 [ch. 1], 229 [ch. 7]).

[535] (Richelieu 1709 [1688], I.224, 225 [ch. 7], II.45 [ch. 3])

[536] (Richelieu 1709 [1688], 5 [Intro] [my translation]).

[537] (Richelieu 1709 [1688], II.45 [ch. 3] [my translation]). Although this does clearly separate state and sovereign, the personal honor of the sovereign is placed above the interests of the state!

[538] (Richelieu 1709 [1688], I.167 [ch. 4, sect. i] [my translation]).

[539] Robert Harding (1981, 50) argues that in seventeenth century France, patronage and venality typically were understood to be the two possible means for distributing offices.

[540] See n. 524.

[541] (Frederick II 1920 [1752, 1768], 27 [my translation]). Cf. (Frederick II 1920 [1752, 1768], 50): "There are two kinds of wars: those fought for vanity and those fought for interest."

[542] See, for example, (Frederick II 1920 [1752, 1768], 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12).

[543]

Civitas, to which the word which best answers in our Language, is *Common-wealth*."[544] I cannot find a single passage in Locke's *Second Treatise of Government* (1689) where "state" means polity. And although Hobbes does sometimes use "state" as a generic term for polity or unit of rule,[545] commonwealth is his overwhelmingly preferred term.[546] Furthermore, I am aware of no passage in which either Hobbes or Locke contrasts life in the state of nature with that in "the state" (without an adjective).

Conversely, "state" is regularly used to indicate status or condition. As Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694), the most systematic of the major contractarians, puts it "by 'state' (*status*) in general, we mean a condition in which men are understood to be set for the purpose of performing a certain class of actions. Each state also has its own distinctive laws (*jura*)."[547]

Locke thus speaks of the "state of war,"[548] the "state" of conjugal society,[549] the "state of slavery,"[550] "the state of Free-men,"[551] and "the state of a private Man."[552] Similarly, Hobbes speaks of "the state and posture of gladiators,"[553] "the estate of a desperate debtor,"[554] "the estate of matrimony,"[555] "the estate of eternal life,"[556] and "the state of salvation."[557] And the heart of social contract theory is the contrast between the natural and civil states.

As Locke puts it, "Men living together according to reason, without a common Superior on Earth, with Authority to judge between them, is properly the State of Nature."[558] Hobbes, in the title of Chapter 13 of *Leviathan*, call this "the Natural Condition of Mankind"[559] – to which he contrast the

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[544] (Locke 1988 [1690], 209 [§133]). Hobbes (*Leviathan*, Introduction and ch. 17) also notes that commonwealth has the same meaning as the Latin *civitas*. Pufendorf as well uses *civitas* as his generic term for polity. (1991 [1673], 132 [Bk. II, ch. 5, par. 1]; 1737 [1673], 427 [Bk. II. Ch. 6, par. 10]).

[545] See, for example, *Leviathan*, Introduction, ch. 4, 11, 21, 23, 26, 30.

[546] In Parts One and Two of *Leviathan*, Hobbes uses "commonwealth" approximately 350 times but "state" to mean polity fewer than twenty times. Furthermore, Hobbes, rather than envision "modern" rule of law by rational bureaucrats, sees the commonwealth as a "mortal god" and the sovereign, who rules personally, has the right to regulate any and every thing, as his will dictates. (*Leviathan*, ch. 17).

[547] (Pufendorf 1991 [1673], 115 [Bk. II, ch. 1, par. 1]). For the original Latin text I have used the readily available (Pufendorf 1737 [1673]).

[548] (Locke 1988 [1690], §§16-21, 24, 122, 155, 172, 176, 180-183, 196, 205, 207, 212, 222, 226, 227, 232, 235, 239, 241, 242).

[549] (Locke 1988 [1690], 193 [§83]).

[550] (Locke 1988 [1690], 194 [§85]).

[551] (Locke 1988 [1690], 230 [§192]).

[552] (Locke 1988 [1690], 245 [§237]). He also talks of children, on acquiring the use of reason, coming into "a state of Knowledge." (Locke 1988 [1690], 224 [§170]).

[553] *Leviathan*, ch. 13.

[554] *Leviathan*, ch. 11.

[555] *Leviathan*, ch. 46.

[556] *Leviathan*, ch. 35. Cf. ch. 44 ("the estate of living for ever").

[557] *Leviathan*, ch. 38. Cf. ch. 15 ("man's estate after death").

[558] (Locke 1988 [1690], 173 [§19]).

[559] *Leviathan* does not contain the term "state of nature" – although in ch. 20 Hobbes does refer to "the state of mere nature."

"civil state"[560] or what Locke typically calls "civil society" or "political society."[561] And contractarian theory focuses on the radical differences in political status and conditions in these two "states."

Early modern contractarian theorists explored what they understood to be universal principles that establish the rights and duties of rulers and citizens in the civil state (status, condition), whatever its constitutional or administrative form. They in no way suggested that the polities of their era had any new or even particular character – let alone that they were modern (Weberian) states.

16.5 The Law of Nations

Finally, consider "modern international law," which became a distinct body of thought in the first third of the seventeenth century. As it became increasingly clear that Christendom had been broken into pieces that were unlikely to ever be put back together again, the rightful rules according to which Christian princes and polities dealt with each other became a burning political question.

The *Prolegomena* of Hugo Grotius' *The Law of War and Peace* (1625) begins by noting that although the civil law has been widely addressed, "that Law, which is common to many peoples or communities [*populos aut populorum*] …few have touched upon, and none hitherto treated of universally and methodically; tho' it is the Interest of Mankind that it should be done."[562] International law, for Grotius, governs the relations of peoples, not polities. And he calls it the law of nations (not states).

The formulation *jus gentium* – the law of *gentes* (nations or peoples) – may be unavoidable for an author writing in Latin. But when describing the subjects of this law, Grotius only rarely uses *civitas*, the standard Latin term for "state" in the sense of polity or unit of rule. Most commonly, he uses *populus* (people).[563] And when he does use *civitas* or *respublica* (commonwealth) there is no obvious difference in sense.[564] Grotius addresses politically organized communities, understood generically, rather than "states" understood as a particular type of polity. And he does not clearly distinguish between nations and their rulers, regularly referring to the subjects of the law of nations as "peoples or kings" and "peoples and kings."[565]

What Grotius saw as distinctive about the polities of his era was their separateness. And this separateness, not anything about their internal character, required a new body of law; a law for polities (of any sort) that no longer thought of themselves politically principally as parts of a Christendom.

Much the same is true of Emer de Vattel's (1714-1767) *Law of Nations* (1758),[566] the other towering work of early modern international law, which defines the law of nations as "the science of the law that holds between nations or states."[567] Although "state" is Vattel's most common term for polity,

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[560] *Leviathan*, ch. 13, 14, 16, 39.

[561] For example, these terms are used in the titles of Chapters 7, 8, and 9 of the *Second Treatise* which, according to its title, addresses "the original, extent, and end of civil government." See also ???.

[562] (Grotius 2005 [1625], 35 [Prolog. Par. 1]). This edition, available on-line for free at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1877, uses the English translation of 1738, based on the 1725 edition of Jean Barbeyrac, which (in a later printing, available online from Google Books) I use for the Latin text (Grotius 1735 [1625]).

[563] In the Prolegomena, see par. 1, 2, 3, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 29, 34, 36, 54, 55, 56

[564] See, for example, par. 17 and 25 of the Prolegomena and (Grotius 2005 [1625], vol. 1, 72, 85, 91).

[565] See, for example, Prolegomena, par. 2, 3, 23, 55, 56 and (Grotius 2005 [1625], vol. 1, 113, vol. 2, 165, 195).

[566] (Vattel 1773). (Vattel 2008) is a slightly corrected version of the (very good) 1797 translation of the 1773 edition, available for free online at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/vattel-the-law-of-nations-lf-ed.

[567] (Vattel 1773, Prelim. §3 [my translation]).

he uses it in the broadest possible sense. Both the Preliminaries ("Idea and General Principles of the Law of Nations") and Book I ("Of the Nation Considered in Itself") begin by equating "nation" and "state." Formulations such as "nation(s) or sovereign(s),"[568] "nations or sovereign states,"[569] and "state(s) or nation(s)"[570] are common. Vattel also regularly refers to the subjects of the law of nations as "political societies,"[571] "civil societies,"[572] and "the body politic."[573] And he insists that "every nation that governs itself, *whatever form it has …* is a sovereign state."[574]

We can thus conclude that in word as in deed, "state," right through the middle of the eighteenth century, contains not even a hint of a polity in which a legal-rational bureaucrats rule exercising a territorial monopoly on jurisdiction and the use of force. Such a type of polity not only was not coming into being but its existence was not even imagined.

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[568] (Vattel 1773, Preface, I §105, II §§46, 72, 73, 196, 214, III §§2, 15, 68, 199, IV §4).

[569] (Vattel 1773, Preface, Prelim. §4, I §88, IV §56). Also, the title of the first chapter of the first book is "Of Nations or Sovereign States."

[570] (Vattel 1773, Preface, Prelim. §11, I §15, 16, II §345{Vattel, 1773 #11956).

[571] (Vattel 1773, Preface, I §§16, 21, 26, 27, 28, 39, 40, 51, 69, 177, 195, 200, 203, 206, 214, 244, II §§42, 56, 58, 81, 97, III §§4, 141, 187, 189, 192, 225, 292).

[572] (Vattel 1773, Preface, Prelim §§4, 5, 6, 11, 14, 15, 16, I §§21, 38, 51, 72, 88, 117, 125, 149, 158, 175, 212, 222, 223, 225, 240, II §§6, 18, 90, 122, III §§34, 155, 287, 290).

[573] (Vattel 1773, Prelim. §1, I §§2, 27, 69, II §§63, 152, 219).

[574] (Vattel 1773, I §4 [emphasis added] [my translation]. Cf. I §57, II §38). Vattel also occasionally uses "state" for subordinate jurisdictions: e.g., "the states (*les états*) of the King of Prussia" (I §135); "the states (*les états*) of the house of Austria in Germany" (III §98); "the princes and states (*états*) of the Empire" (IV §59).

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